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Abstract
The thesis aims to contribute to the literature on two fronts. Firstly, it aims to
contribute to the literature by developing a conjectural variations model of price
transmission in vertically related markets where the final product sector exercises
both oligopoly power and oligopsony power. It finds that oligopoly and oligopsony
power do not necessarily weaken the degree of price transmission relative to that
under perfectly competitive markets although they can. The key to these outcomes is
to be found in the functional forms for retail demand and farm supply.
Secondly, it attempts to draw inferences about the conditions under which the prices
of the farm and retail prices cointegrate by themselves based on the predictions of the
existing theoretical models of vertical price transmission. It then evaluates whether
these conditions are borne out empirically. To this end, it tests for the existence of a
co-integrating relation between the raw input and retail prices for a sample of 11 food
and energy markets in the UK using the Johansen Full-information Maximum
Likelihood Procedure. It finds that a co-integrating relation is identified for only 4 out
of 11 price pairs; i.e., for potato, fresh fruits, milk and oil. For all other price pairs, it
is not identified unless the cointegration regression allows for sector shocks. This
result seems to support our theoretical prediction that, given information provided by
a price pair alone, co-integration can be observed only for products for which the cost
share of the farm input is unity; i.e., for products with a constant margin. And
obviously, potatoes, fresh fruits and milk are products which are sold in supermarkets
as they appear in their raw form with minimum processing involved suggesting that
the share of processing cost for these products is minimal.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In recent years the issue of price transmission from the farm to the retail sector in verti-
cally related food markets, where the farm and marketing inputs are combined to produce
the final product, has attracted a great deal of attention both in academic and policy
circles. A plethora of theoretical and empirical studies in the price transmission litera-
ture and waves of government-commissioned inquiries into the behavior of supermarkets
attest to the degree of attention the issue has attracted in these circles.
In the UK, the ascendancy of the issue owes much to public dissatisfaction with the
pricing practices of retail (supermarket) multiples whose level of concentration has shown
a dramatic increase in recent years. It is believed that they exercise market power in
their relation with consumers such that in the event of any price reduction at the farm
level consumers get little in benefit as the gains go to widen the supermarkets' margin. It
is also believed that these retail multiples exercise buyer power over suppliers of the farm
input such that not only do they force farm price down to a level lower than the perfectly
competitive benchmark but they also place vertical restraints on suppliers of the farm
input. In general there seems to be a belief on the public's behalf that retail concentration
is bad for social welfare, as measured by consumers' and producers' surpluses.
The public's belief that retail concentration is bad for social welfare seems to have
received support from economic theory. The works of Dobson et al. (1997, 2001 and 2003)
14
and Clarke et al. (2002), for instance, show that under certain conditions, the increase
in the level of retailer concentration can result in social welfare loss. Consider a market
structure where the retail sector exercises market power in its relation with consumers and
buyer power in its relation with producers who are perfectly competitive. Conventional
wisdom holds that when retailers exercise seller power then relative to when the market
is perfectly competitive, consumers pay a higher price for the product they purchase.
Therefore, relative to the perfectly competitive benchmark, they suffer a welfare loss
in proportion to the size of the price mark-up (the difference between retail price and
marginal cost as a proportion of retail price). Again conventional wisdom holds us that,
when retailers exercise buyer power over suppliers, then relative to when the market is
perfectly competitive, producers receive a lower price for the product they sell. Therefore
relative to a perfectly competitive benchmark, they suffer a welfare loss in proportion to
the size of the price mark-down (the difference between the marginal revenue product
and farm-gate price as a proportion of farm-gate price). On balance therefore, as this
instance shows, the presence of a highly concentrated retail sector which is not only able
to exercise seller power over consumers but also buyer power over producers results in a
net social welfare loss such that a price discount which retailers secure from producers
using their buyer power does not feed through to consumers as this discount only serves
to widen the price mark-up.
As the existing body of economic theory shows, however, the loss to social welfare
inflicted by the joint exercise of seller and buyer power is far worse than a model of pricing
involving a mark-up and a mark-down can capture. This is because such simplistic price
models cannot fully capture the welfare effects of practices commonly known in the
literature as vertical restraints. These are conditions which retailers impose on suppliers
by way of flexing their buyer power. They take different forms the most popular of
which are slotting allowances, lump sum fees which suppliers have to pay retailers in
order for their produce to find a space in supermarket shelves; listing charges whereby
buyers require a fee payment before goods are purchased from the listed supplier; and
15
unjustified high contribution by suppliers to promotional expenses by retailers, to name
just a few. The effects of these practices on price transmission are less known. Potentially,
however, there are enormous negative consequences on social welfare which derive from
them. Firstly, they drive down farm prices to a level below the perfectly competitive
benchmark. Secondly, by driving prices down in this way, they not only force small
producers, who are not efficient, out of business in the long run but also threaten the
viability of even efficient producers whose investments are undermined by their inability
to recover fixed costs as they are forced to price at short run marginal cost. The knock-on
effect of this in the long run is to drive out small retailers who cannot exercise market
power over their suppliers and have as favorable a cost advantage as the retailers with
buyer power, and thereby lead to higher prices and less choice for consumers.
Contrary to the public's perception that retail concentration is detrimental, however,
the same economic theory also shows that under certain other conditions, the increase
in the level of retail concentration can produce benign social welfare effects. Dobson and
Waterson (1999) show that even though retail concentration leads to reduced competition
at all stages of the marketing chain, it can generate productive efficiency benefits that
enhance consumer welfare. Consider the vertical restraints which we made reference
to earlier. They argue that, despite their potential harmful effects, such restraints can
bring about efficient trading arrangements and lower prices for consumers by removing
price distortions resulting from successive mark-ups, by allowing precommitments that
facilitate optimal investment levels and by eliminating avoidable transaction costs such
as search costs. In an earlier paper, Dobson and Waterson (1997), had also shown that,
providing that retail concentration leads to little rise in selling power and that the services
of competing retailers are very close substitutes for each other,.such concentration enables
retailers to extract, from suppliers with seller power, discounts that can be passed on to
consumers as lower prices.
Thus, as the above brief discussion clearly indicates, despite the public's negative
perception of retail concentration, economic theory is ambiguous regarding its social
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welfare effects. Given this ambiguity, it is not surprising that theory cautions against
making hasty policy recommendations regarding the regulation of retail concentration on
consideration of only the negative social welfare effects of such concentration. Indeed, it
advises that any such recommendations involve consideration of a series of welfare trade-
offs. The first is a short-run trade-off between retailer buyer power and increased retailer
seller power. If subsequent to concentration, retail buyer power is relatively greater
than retail seller power, then .discounts extracted from the suppliers can be passed on
to consumers as lower prices for the final good. Obviously, this has a benign effect
on consumer welfare. If, on the other hand, following concentration retail seller power
is greater relative to buyer power, prices may rise to the detriment of consumers and
economic welfare in general. The second is a trade-off between the short run benefits of
lower prices and the long-run damage to supplier competition from weakened brands and
greater own-label penetration and the distortion of retail competition in favor of large
retailers. Indeed these potential trade-offs seem to have influenced the recommendations
of a series of commissioned inquiries into the behavior of retail multiples in the UK.
For instance, both the Monopolies and Mergers Commission report (MMC, 1981) and
the Competition Commission Report (CC, 2000) identified many retail practices which
stand to operate against the public interest. However, neither of these commissions made
recommendations in favor of regulating the behavior of multiples.
Clearly, the ambiguity surrounding the welfare effects of retail concentration points
to the difficulty of making prior judgements regarding the degree of price transmission,
relative to the perfectly competitive benchmark, which obtains when the retail market
is concentrated. A priori, there is no way of telling whether any deviation from this
benchmark results from a concentrated retail sector or from a processing technology that
is characterized by non-constant returns to scale. The popular perception is, however,
that farm price changes do not fully reflect as retail price changes due mainly to retail
concentration which increases firms' seller power.
It is against this background that theoretical work has focused on modelling vertical
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price transmission allowing for seller power (Le., oligopoly power) in the retail market.
(see, for instance, Holloway,1991; McCorriston et al., 1998). Results from this work
suggest that the exercise of market power by supermarkets does not totally explain why
farm price changes are not fully reflected as retail price changes. Indeed, they suggest
that apart from the special case where the retail demand function is assumed to be linear,
market power's impact on the degree of price transmission is ambiguous. This ambiguity
arises largely because results are determined by the functional forms of the retail demand
function. As will become evident in the main body of our thesis, however, there are also
several other determinants of the degree of price transmission which interact with market
power to make its impact ambiguous. A recent work by McCorriston et al. (2001) has
shown that, even assuming a linear retail demand function, allowing for non-constant
returns to scale in industry technology makes market power's impact on the degree of
price transmission ambiguous. While decreasing returns to scale reinforce market power's
impact on the degree of price transmission, increasing returns to scale weaken its impact.
As far as we are aware, market power's impact on the degree of price transmission has
been modelled assuming that supermarkets exercise market power only in their relation
with consumers and not in their relation with producers as buyers of the farm input.
Indeed, there seems to have been no formal treatment of the impact of buyer power (i.e.,
oligopsony power) on the degree of price transmission. However, buyer power could be
as important as seller power. In the UK food industry, for instance, the nature of the
vertical relation between suppliers and grocery multiples has been a cause for concern
both among academics and policy makers. Recent growth in retail concentration has
been construed to mean that not only has the industry's selling power grown but its
buying power might also have increased. This belief seems to have been borne out in the
aforementioned Monopolies and Mergers Commission and the Competition Commission
Reports which conclude that the grocery multiples had used their buying power to obtain
discounts from suppliers. Dobson et al. (1999) also point to the potential for abuse of
buying power in recent trends in the growth in concentration of UK retailing.
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Owing to the absence of a formal model of oligopsony power's impact on the degree
of price transmission, the issue of how supermarkets' exercise of market power in their
dealings with both consumers and producers impacts on the degree of price transmission
has not been addressed fully. Consequently, it remains an issue that is open-ended thus
begging the development of a theoretical model of price transmission which takes account
of the exercise of market power by supermarkets both in the retail and farm sectors.
Many theoretical works that have modelled the impact of market power on the degree
of price transmission have operated within the framework of equilibrium displacement.
So often, modelling within this framework has proceeded on the assumption that the
readership knows the step-by-step technical rigors involved. This assumption might be
valid for a readership which works within the theoretical field. But it might not be
valid for a readership which works within the empirical field. Prior to embarking on any
empirical work, however, the latter category has often to read into economic theory for
inspiration. Even though there is a group within this category which is conversant with
the rigors of the theory, there is likely to be another group which is not as conversant.
And it is this group which will definitely demand exposition of the theory. As far as we are
aware, there seems to be no synthesis of the models of vertical price transmission under
different market structures. With an eye for this category of readership therefore there is
a need to undertake an exposition of the major theoretical models of price transmission
that have sprung up in the literature in the wake of the seminal article of Gardner (1975).
In tandem with the development of theoretical work, recent years have also witnessed
a growing corpus of empirical literature whose focus has been to measure the degree of
price transmission from the farm to the retail sector. In the literature two major strands
of econometric approaches have sprung up. Whereas the first advocates a structural
modelling approach the second advocates a long run equilibrium (i.e., co-integration)
approach.
Estimation of the degree of price transmission conditional on the estimation of such
structural parameters as market power, demand and supply elasticities and industry
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technology sits at the heart of the first modelling approach. While this approach has
found acceptance, its limitation in not being able to dissect the price transmission path
into its short- and long-run components has been well recognized. It is in this context
that the second approach has found ascendancy. This approach is premised on the belief
that if two prices are tied to each other in a long run economic relationship so that they
are co-integrated, a change in one price leads to a proportional change in the other. The
upshot is that even if in the short run the two prices diverge from each other, in the long
run they revert back to equilibrium.
Whilst this suggests that in vertically related food markets, the prices of the farm and
the retail product may cointegrate it does not in any way suggest that they coint.egrate
solely on the basis of information provided by the price pair and without the need for
any other information. To date there has not been an attempt to draw any inferences
about the conditions under which the prices of the farm and retail prices cointegrate
based on the predictions of the theoretical models of vertical price transmission. Indeed,
there seems to be a widespread perception that information provided by the prices of the
farm and retail products alone are adequate for the analysis of the long run economic
relationship between these prices. This partly emanates from the assumption that the
food industry operates with a constant marketing cost, i.e., marketing costs are 1(0).
If marketing costs are not assumed to remain constant, however, there is no a priori
reason to believe that a pair of price series relating to the farm and retail sectors would
cointegrate by themselves. In fact, as we will show in the body of the thesis, existing
theory suggests that price changes at different stages of a vertically related industry are
spurred by industry-level shocks such that any test for cointegration between a price pair
has to proceed taking account of these shocks. An interesting avenue of research would
thus be to see whether the existing models of price transmission can be relied on to make
inferences about cointegration given only information provided by a pair of prices.
Clearly, therefore, as things stand now, there seem to exist several contributions
that can be made to the existing literature. In this thesis, we propose to make three
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contributions.
First, we seek to contribute to the analysis of market power's impact on the degree
of price transmission. In this respect, we seek to examine the degree of price trans-
mission assuming that the retail sector exercises oligopsony power in its relation with
producers. We then analyze the degree of price transmission assuming that, further to
exercising oligopsony power, the retail sector exercises oligopoly power in its relation with
consumers. To this effect we develop a theoretical model of price transmission using a
quantity-setting conjectural variations model of oligopoly and oligopsony.
Second, we seek to contribute to the literature by undertaking an exposition of the
rigors involved in the major theoretical models of vertical price transmission. In this
respect, we undertake a detailed exposition of the models of price transmission which
obtain under the assumptions of different market structures and of industry technologies.
Third, we seek to contribute to the literature by deducing inferences about a coin-
tegrating relation between the farm and retail prices based on the predictions of the
theoretical models of price transmission that we will develop. To this effect, we derive
price transmission elasticities assuming exogenous shocks originating in several sectors
of the food industry and identify the conditions under which a cointegrating relation
between the farm and retail prices can be inferred to exist.
Having stated our proposed contributions, we now offer a brief tour map of the thesis.
In chapter 2, we present a diagrammatic analysis of changes in the price spread and the
resultant degree of price transmission in vertically related markets taking the food market
as our focus of analysis. In this chapter we offer an intuitive explanation of the mechanism
through which the marketing margin is determined assuming that the input and output
markets of the food industry are perfectly competitive and that input and output demand
and supply functions are linear. We offer this explanation for both variable and fixed
input proportions. We then show briefly the link between the marketing margin and the
degree of price transmission as the latter is not independent of changes in the marketing
margin. In fact, it is directly affected by movements in the marketing margin. This
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chapter is designed to prepare the ground work for a more rigorous explanation that is
yet to come in the subsequent chapters.
In chapter 3, we make an exposition of the theoretical model of price transmission
whereby all the markets in the food industry are assumed perfectly competitive, that
industry technology is characterized by constant returns to scale, and that inputs are
combined in variable proportions. Our exposition focuses on the model by Gardner
(1975) whose framework has been looked upon as a benchmark in subsequent models
of price transmission accounting for market power and non-constant returns to scale.
In chapter 4 we undertake an exposition of the models of price transmission that have
extended Gardner by allowing for market power in the retail market and for non-constant
returns to scale in industry technology. Specifically, we undertake an exposition of the
models by Holloway (1991) and McCorriston et al. (1998, 2001).
In chapter 5, we extend the model by Gardner not only allowing for market power
in the retail sector but also for oligopsony power in the farm sector. To this effect,
we first develop the model of oligopsony power and evaluate its impact on the degree of
price transmission and see whether the outcome is any different from when only oligopoly
power is assumed. We then further develop the model allowing for an interaction between
oligopoly and oligopsony power and then evaluate the outcomes for the degree of price
transmission.
In chapter 6, we carry out a set of experiments whereby the impact of market power at
different stages of the industry is evaluated conditional on the values of other determining
factors of the degree of price transmission. Specifically, we allow each of the determining
variables to vary within a certain range, ceteris paribus, given a possible band of values for
certain other key parameters of our interest, particularly market power. We run three sets
of experiments, one assuming the industry is oligopolistic, another assuming the industry
is oligopsonistic, and a final experiment assuming the industry is both oligopolistic and
oligopsonistic.
In chapter 7, we present a review and evaluation of the existing empirical literature
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with a particular focus on cointegration.
In chapter 8, we derive several price transmission elasticities corresponding to exoge-
nous shocks originating in the retail and farm sectors. Based on these elasticities, we
then deduce inferences about the conditions under which a co-integrating relation arises
between the prices of the farm and retail products. We then test the validity of our
inferences from this exercise in chapter 9 using a series of 11 price pairs which belong to
the UK food and energy markets. We finally conclude in chapter 10 where we present
the major results of our thesis, identify its limitations and suggest potential avenues for
future research.
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Chapter 2
A diagrammatic representation of
price transmission
2.1 Background
To date, several theoretical models have been developed to explain the degree of price
transmission from the farm input to the retail product in vertically-related markets.
In the chapters that follow, we will expound these models formally and extend them
further. To set the groundwork for an understanding of these theoretical models, however,
we deem it proper, at this early stage, to offer an intuition for the price transmission
mechanism which these models set out to explain. We provide this intuition using a
diagrammatic approach. This chapter presents such an approach and is intended to offer
an insight into the same issues that will be highlighted in the forthcoming chapters.
Consider a perfectly competitive industry which combines farm and marketing inputs,
a and b respectively, to produce a final product, x. To make matters clear, consider an
industry which processes raw carcase beef using state of the art technology into a variety
of retail products; e.g., packaged ground beef. In this particular case, whereas the carcase
beef constitutes the raw input, the costs of processing, of packaging and of transporting
the final product to supermarket shelves constitute the marketing input. We then want
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to analyze changes in the marketing margin which follow changes in an exogenous shock
originating in each of the markets for a, band x. In the manner of Tomek and Robinson
(1990, Chapter 6), a marketing margin is defined as the difference between the final
product price and the farm-gate price. All throughout the chapter, the marketing margin
will be discussed in absolute terms and not in relative terms.
As will become clear in the course of the analysis, changes in the marketing margin
depend as much on the proportions in which the two inputs are combined as on the source
of the exogenous shock. For a given exogenous shock, marketing margin changes that
obtain when fixed input proportions are assumed are different from changes that obtain
when variable input proportions are assumed. Alternatively, for a given combination of
inputs, marketing margin changes that obtain when a retail demand shock is assumed
are different from those which obtain when a shock originating in the input supply stage
is assumed. This means that for a given exogenous shock, changes in the marketing
margin can be analyzed for different input combinations. Similarly, for a given input
combination, changes in the marketing margin can be analyzed for different sources of
an exogenous shock.
Against this background, we first illustrate the derived demand for the farm input
and show its relation to the marketing margin assuming fixed input proportions. Given
the assumption of fixed input proportions, we next present the incidence of changes
in the marketing margin for different sources of the exogenous shock. We then finally
show changes in the marketing margin assuming that inputs are combined in variable
proportions and that the exogenous shock originates in the farm input supply sector.
2.2 Derived factor demand and the marketing mar-
gin: the case of fixed input proportions
Assume that, in a perfectly competitive industry, a and b are combined in a fixed pro-
portion to produce x (i.e., the ratio, ~ remains constant for all output levels and price
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Figure 2-1: Derived demand for the farm product
ratios). Given this assumption, the demand for either input, which is indirect, can be
derived from the demand for x which is direct. This is done, for anyone input, by
subtracting from the retail price of each separate amount of the final product the supply
price of the corresponding amount of the other input. Consider the demand for the farm
product, a. It is derived as shown in Figure 2.1.
Given the assumption regarding industry technology, it is reasonable to suppose that
in equilibrium both the markets for a and x clear the same quantity of a. In other words,
for every unit of x there corresponds an equivalent unit of a which combines with b. The
horizontal axis in Figure 2.1 therefore measures quantity of a and of x while the vertical
axis measures input and output prices. The maximum price that can be paid for one
unit of x for any level of quantity produced is given by the demand curve for x, DXI while
the minimum price paid for a unit of b for any quantity produced of this input is given
by the supply curve for b, S b.
The difference between the maximum price per unit of x and the minimum price per
unit of b is the maximum price required to pay for a unit of a (Le., P a = Px - Pb).
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Graphically, this is shown as the vertical difference between the demand curve for x and
the supply curve for b.
The derived demand curve for b (Db = Dx - Sa) can be derived in like manner by
subtracting from the maximum price per unit of x, the minimum price per unit of a. But
for the purposes at hand, it suffices to illustrate only the derived demand curve for a.
Now refer back to Figure 2.1. For given supply conditions for b and demand conditions
for x, the equilibrium price of a, P a, is determined at a point where the supply curve for a,
Sa, intersects the derived demand curve for the same, D a. Similarly, for given equilibrium
prices of a and b, the equilibrium price of the retail product, P x, is determined at the
intersection of the supply curve for x, Sx, and the demand curve for the same, D x.
Marshall (op. cit., p. 385-386) identifies four conditions which render the derived
demand curve for a factor inelastic. These are: (1) that the factor in question is essential;
(2) that the demand curve for the final product is inelastic; (3) that the fraction of total
cost that goes to the factor in question is very small; and (4) that the supply curve for
the other factor is more inelastic.
The first condition followsdirectly from the assumption of fixed input proportions. Its
inclusion as a condition therefore serves to make generalizations about situations where
factors are not combined in a fixed proportion.
The second condition follows from the fact that demand for the input in question is
derived from the final good's demand so that the more inelastic demand for the latter is
the more inelastic demand for the input is and vice versa.
The third condition states that in so much as the cost share of the factor in question is
too small to have a significant impact on the price of the final product (and, consequently,
on retail demand), retailers are willing to pay a high price for its acquisition when such
is required.
The fourth condition states that the curvature of the supply curve for one input
influences the derived demand for the other (Ritson, 1990; Tomek and Robinson, op.
cit.). If, for instance, the supply curve for marketing services, Sb is perfectly elastic,
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then, the derived demand curve for the farm product, Da is parallel to the demand
curve for the retail product, Dx as any change in the price of the retail product, P x is
matched by a proportional change in the price of the farm product. If, on the other
hand, the supply curve for marketing services is less perfectly elastic, then, the derived
demand curve for the farm product is inelastic too. Given the assumption of fixed input
proportions, this is because a higher (lower) cost of acquiring these services means a
lower (higher) price paid for the farm product.
2.3 The incidence of changes in the marketing mar-
gin: the case of fixed input proportions
Now that the notion of derived demand under the assumption of fixed input proportions
has been introduced, the next task will be to analyze changes in the marketing margin
subsequent to a shift in (i) the demand curve for the retail product; (ii) the supply curve
for the farm product; and (iii) the supply curve for marketing services.
As a starting point, it is worth emphasizing the point that given the assumption
of fixed input proportions and given the conditions of demand for the farm and retail
products, the nature of the supply curve for marketing services determines the direction
of change in the marketing margin. As will become clear as the analysis progresses, if
the supply curve for marketing services is perfectly elastic, shifts in the supply curve
for the farm product and the demand curve for the final product have no effect on the
marketing margin as absolute changes in the prices of the final and farm products are
equal. In other words, the demand curve for the farm product is parallel to that for the
retail product (Le., both have the same slope) such that the marketing margin remains
unchanged. If, on the other hand, the supply curve for marketing services is less perfectly
elastic, the marketing margin widens (narrows) in absolute terms as retail price increases
(falls) when such shifts occur, because the derived demand curve for the farm product is
more inelastic than the demand curve for the final product.
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In the following, the supply curve for marketing services will be assumed upward
sloping so that the derived demand curve for the farm product is more inelastic than the
demand curve for the final product.
2.3.1 Effects of a retail demand shift and movements in the
marketing margin
Consider, ceteris paribus, that following changes in consumer income or population size,
demand for the final product increases. Obviously, the effect of an increase in demand for
the final product is to increase the derived demand for both inputs, and, consequently,
the prices at which they can be purchased. In Figure 2.2, this is shown as a rightward
shift in the retail demand curve from D'; to D~. Given the new retail demand curve,
demand curves for the farm product and marketing services may then be derived as D~
and D~ respectively.
With reference to Figure 2.2, the explanation as to why the derived demand curves
have to shift in response to a shift in the demand curve for the final product proceeds
as follows. Ceteris paribus, a rightward shift in the retail demand curve is reflected in an
increase in the quantity demanded of the retail product from x 0 to X 1 and in a retail price
increase from P x to P~. For a given supply function of marketing services, this translates
into an increase in demand for the farm product from x 0 to Xl, and, consequently, into
an increase in the supply price charged by producers from P a to P~. This shows as a
rightward shift in the derived demand curve for the farm product from Data D~. As
the production technology requires that inputs be combined in a fixed proportion, the
increase in the quantity demanded of the farm product is matched by a proportionate
increase in the quantity demanded of marketing services. This induces a rightward shift
in the demand curve for these services from Db to D~, and, consequently, an increase in
the price of marketing services from Pb to P~.
As Figure 2.2 makes evident, given that the supply curve for marketing services is
upward sloping so that the derived demand curve for the raw input is more inelastic
29
pp.
s,
Xo Quantity
Figure 2-2: Effect of a rightward retail demand shift on the marketing margin: the case
of fixed input proportions
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than the demand curve for the retail product, the marketing margin would widen from
(Px - Pa) to (P~ - P~) consequent upon a rightward shift in the retail demand curve. This
is because relative to the increase in farm-gate price, the increase in retail price is greater.
It follows therefore that given the assumption of fixed input proportions, the marketing
margin moves in the same direction as output and retail price following a rightward shift
in the retail demand curve
2.3.2 A farm supply shift and movements in the marketing mar-
gin
Next consider the impact of changes in raw input supply on the marketing margin.
Imagine, for instance, that due to an unfavorable weather condition or to a sudden
increase in input prices, the supply of the farm product falls. Given that the demand curve
for the final product and the supply curve for marketing services remain unchanged, this
implies retailers have to pay a higher price for each unit of the farm product. Therefore
the price of the farm product increases. Given that inputs are combined in a fixed
proportion and that the supply function for marketing services remains fixed, a fall in
the quantity supplied of the farm product and consequently, an increase in its price, leads
to a proportionate fall in the demand for marketing services. For a given supply function
for marketing services, the fall in demand for these services results in a fall in their price,
so that at the original price for the final product, retailers get enough in margin to pay
for the increase in farm price. However, an increase in the price of the farm product
makes the retail product more expensive thus reducing its supply.
Therefore, intuitively, a fall in the supply of the farm product results in a fall in
demand for marketing services and, given the assumption of fixed input proportions, in
a fall in the supply of the retail product and an increase in the prices of the farm and
retail products and a fall in the price of marketing services. Since it is assumed that the
derived demand curve for the farm product is more inelastic than the demand curve for
the final product, the increase in farm-gate price is likely to be greater than that in retail
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price. Consequently, the marketing margin falls following a leftward shift in farm supply.
Figure 2.3 shows the adverse change in the supply condition for the farm product as
a leftward shift in the supply curve for the farm product from Sa to S~. The effect of
this is to reduce farm supply from x 0 to X 1. Given a stationary demand for the final
product, this leads to an increase in the farm-gate price from P a to P~. Because the farm
product has become more expensive, retailers reduce their demand for marketing services
from x 0 to X 1 and the price they pay these services from P b to P~. In the diagram, this
shows as a leftward shift in the demand curve for marketing services from Db to D~.
The effect of a fall in the farm product on retail output is reflected as a leftward shift in
the supply of the latter from S x to S~, which, for a given consumer demand function,
leads to an increase in retail price from P x to P~. Given the conditions of retail demand
and marketing supply, the marketing margin falls from (Px - Pa) to (P~-P~) 1. It
therefore follows that consequent upon a leftward shift in raw input supply and given the
assumption of fixed input proportions, the marketing margin moves in the same direction
as quantity and in the opposite direction as retail price.
2.3.3 Effects of a marketing supply shift on the marketing mar-
gin
Finally, suppose the cost of marketing services increases. At the original price, this leads
to a fall in the supply of these services and to an increase in their price. This in turn
leads to a fall in the demand for these services. Given that inputs are combined in a
fixed proportion, the increase in the price of marketing services, and, consequently, the
fall in the quantity demanded of these services leads to a fall in the quantity demanded
of the farm product, and, consequently, to a decrease in its price. Although the price of
marketing services increases and that of the farm product decreases, the net effect is to
IThe sum of the changes in the prices of the farm product and marketing services constitutes the
change in the price of the retail product. And this is definitely less than the change in the price of the
farm product because, in absolute terms, the change in the price of the farm product is greater than
that in the price of marketing services.
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Figure 2-3: Effect of a leftward farm supply shift on the marketing margin: the case of
fixed input proportions
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increase retail price since a reduced demand for both inputs results in a reduced supply
of the retail product. Assuming that the demand function for the final product remains
unchanged, retail price must increase as retail supply falls albeit by less than the increase
in the price of marketing services since the price of the farm product also falls. Under
the given assumptions, therefore the increase in the price of marketing services leads to
a widening of the marketing margin.
In Figure 2.4, the increase in the cost of marketing services shows as a leftward shift
in the supply curve for these services from Sb to S~ followed by an increase in their
price from Pb to P~. To match the fall in the quantity demanded of marketing services,
retailers reduce their original demand for the farm product to a level which is enough to
produce Xl quantity of the retail product. This induces a leftward shift in the demand
curve for the farm product from D'; to D~. Consequently, the price of the farm product
falls from P a to P~. As a result of a fall in the quantity demanded of both inputs, the
supply of retail output falls from x 0 to X 1 and, consequently, its price increases from P x
to P~. This is shown as a leftward shift in the retail supply curve from Sx to S~.
Obviously, the marketing margin widens because the price of the farm product de-
creases when the price of the retail product increases. Therefore, given the assumption of
fixed input proportions, if there occurs a leftward shift in the supply curve for marketing
services, then the marketing margin moves in the same direction as retail price and in
the opposite direction as output.
2.3.4 Fixed input proportions and movements in the marketing
margin: a summary
Given the assumption of fixed input proportions, the preceding analysis has generated
important predictions about the behavior of changes in the marketing margin follow-
ing changes in the conditions of retail demand and inputs supply when all markets are
perfectly competitive. These predictions can be summarized as follows.
First, the margin widens when there is a rightward shift in retail demand. The
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Figure 2-4: Effect of a leftward marketing supply shift on the marketing margin: the case
of fixed input proportions.
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implication is that following a rightward shift in the retail demand curve, the margin
moves in the same direction as retail price and output, i.e., it widens. Second, the
marketing margin narrows when there is a leftward farm supply shift. The implication
is that followinga shift in the supply of the raw (farm) input, the margin moves in the
opposite direction as retail price and in the same direction as retail output. Finally, the
marketing margin widens followinga leftward shift in the supply of marketing services.
The implication is that followinga shift in the supply of marketing services, the margin
moves in the same direction as retail price and in the opposite direction of output.
These predictions strictly hinge on the assumption that inputs are combined in a
fixed proportion and the marketing supply curve is less perfectly elastic. Intuitively,
on relaxing either assumption, one should expect the predictions made about margin
behavior to change. For instance, if the supply curve for marketing services is perfectly
elastic, then in absolute terms the marketing margin remains unchanged in the face of
retail demand and input supply shocks. In the followingsection, we relax the assumption
of fixed input proportions, ceteris paribus, and instead assume variable input proportions
and see whether doing so impacts on margin change behavior.
2.4 The incidence of changes in the marketing mar-
gin: the case of variable input proportions
2.4.1 Background
As can be recalled from the analysis in the earlier section, the conceptual framework
of changes in the marketing margin is highly restrictive in its assumption regarding the
proportion in which inputs are combined to produce a unit of the final product. It
is restrictive in that it assumes that relative input price changes do not lead to input
substitution in the industry. Even though this might be a plausible assumption to make
in the short run when supply of inputs is rigid such that the industry is not in a position
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to vary input proportion in response to relative price changes, in the long run this might
not be the case as suppliers adjust their level of production with time in response to
relative price changes. One should, however, beware of the fact that industry technology
can be characterized by variable proportions even in the short run when individual firms
combine their inputs in fixed proportion. This will become evident later, but first let us
define variable input proportion.
When industry technology is characterized by variable input proportion, i.e., when the
elasticity of substitution is greater than zero, then it follows that in response to relative
input price changes (price ratios), the industry changes its original input combination
with the result that it uses more of the relatively cheaper input and less of the relatively
more expensive input to produce the same unit of output. In other words, it varies the
proportion in which inputs are combined to produce a unit of output following changes
in relative input prices.
In the food industry where the farm product and marketing services combine to
produce the retail product, the degree of input substitution might be limited (see, for
instance, Tomek and Robinson, op. cit., and Gardner, 1975). But wherever the de-
gree of input substitution is substantial, the following hypotheses are offered as possible
explanations.
The most popular hypothesis holds that in response to a relative increase in the
price of the farm product, the industry reacts by using less of this product and more
of marketing services by reducing wastage and spoilage of the relatively more expensive
product (Tomek and Robinson, op. cit.).
The second hypothesis postulates that following a relative increase in the price of
the farm product, the food industry responds by changing the quality of marketing
services and consequently of the retail product. This hypothesis subscribes to the idea
of commodities being a bundle of characteristics and not objects of final consumption
(Lancaster, 1971). Imagine there are two characteristic sets that are embedded in a
typical food product; a first set which is linked to the farm product (nutrition, taste, etc.)
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and a second set which is linked to marketing services (packaging, delivery, convenience,
etc.). Then a relative increase in the price of the farm product can lead to a decrease in the
production of characteristics of the first set and to an increase in those of the second set
via a substitution of marketing services for the farm product. In other words, following
an increase in the price of the farm product the industry invests more on packaging,
advertising, etc. and less on the raw input. As Reed and Clark (2000) suggest this
explanation may be valid in situations whereby packaging is a normal input such that
consumers value the convenience associated with the packaging of food products and
hence are willing to pay more for packaging through higher food prices.
The third hypothesis applies to situations where the industry's retail product is a
composite of many individual commodities suggesting that production processes vary
across firms (Wohlgenant and Haidacher, 1989; Wohlgenant, 1999). Consider, for exam-
ple, an industry in which different beef products sold in supermarkets vary by the amount
of processing involved in their production. Assume now that relative to the price of mar-
keting services the price of the raw input increases. It is likely that firms in the industry
which produce fresh meat products, i.e., firms which use a small proportion of marketing
services and a large proportion of the farm input will reduce demand for fresh meat by
much more than do firms which produce processed beef products, i.e., firms which use
a large proportion of marketing services and a small proportion of the farm input. At
the industry level, this implies that the ratio of farm inputs to marketing services falls
following a relative price increase for the farm input. In other words, the proportion in
which inputs are combined changes.
The fourth hypothesis holds that even though fixed input proportions might be the
norm at the firm level, at the industry level, variable input proportions may hold the
reason being that differences in size of firms lead to the use of different input proportions
to produce the same unit of output (Wohlgenant and Haidacher, op cit).
Coming to the analysis of shifts in the demand curve for the retail product and in the
supply curves for the farm and marketing inputs, the outcomes for the marketing margin
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which obtain when variable input proportions are assumed differ from those that obtain
when fixed input proportions are assumed. To illustrate this point, we will not analyze
all three shifts since the mechanism through which variable input proportions impact
on changes in the marketing margin is the same for all three cases. The mechanism
involves a counter-clockwise rotation of the new demand curve for the input which has
become relatively more expensive, at the pivot of the original demand curve for the same
input (Wohlgenant and Haidacher, op. cit.). To assist illumination of the point therefore
the following will consider only a shift in the supply curve for the farm product. For a
reason that will become clear later on, it will be assumed that the possibility for input
substitution is very limited (Le., the elasticity of substitution is small).
2.4.2 A farm supply shift and movements in the marketing mar-
gin: the case of variable input proportions
Suppose the supply of the farm product falls. Given the assumption of fixed input
proportions, as might be recalled, this would have resulted in an increase in the farm-
gate price. But the fall in farm supply would also have led to a fall in the demand for
marketing services, and, consequently, to a fall in their price. The overall effect of a
fall in the supply of the farm product would thus have been to reduce output of the
retail product and, for a given retail demand function, to increase its price. But as the
increase in retail price is not going to be as large as the increase in farm-gate price since
derived demand for the farm product is more inelastic than retail demand, one would
have expected the margin to narrow following a fall in farm supply.
Now consider how the assumption of variable input proportions impacts on this out-
come. An increase in the farm-gate price relative to that in the price of marketing
services makes the farm product relatively more expensive and marketing services rela-
tively cheaper. This induces retailers to substitute inputs by employing more marketing
services and fewer farm inputs per unit of the final output. But relative to a situation
under fixed input proportions, use of more marketing services and fewer farm inputs per
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Figure 2-5: Effect of a leftward farm supply shift on the marketing margin: the case of
variable input proportions.
unit of the retail output means that retailers have to expend, on average, more money on
the former and less on the latter per unit of the retail output. Assuming that retail price
remains at its fixed input proportions level, one would expect that, subsequent to a fall in
the supply of the farm product, the margin widens relative to its fixed input proportions
level but will still narrow relative to its level in initial equilibrium. So it appears that it
is not that the assumption of variable input proportions reverses the direction of change
in the marketing margin following a fall in the supply of the farm product but that it
affects the magnitude by which the margin changes.
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Figure 2.5 shows the impact on the margin of a leftward shift in the supply curve
for the farm product from Sa to S~ given the assumption of variable input proportions.
Given the assumption of fixed input proportions, this would have led, for a given demand
function for the farm product, to an increase in the farm-gate price from Pa to P~. It
would also have led to a shift in the supply curve for the retail product from Sx to S~,
and, consequently, to an increase in retail price from Px to P~.
Now that input price ratios have changed so that the farm product becomes relatively
more expensive than marketing services, retailers respond by employing a greater pro-
portion of marketing services and a smaller proportion of the farm input per unit of the
retail product. The fact that they demand less of the farm input to produce the same
unit of output means that retailers reduce the maximum price they would have offered
for the farm product under fixed input proportions from P~ to P~'.It is worth noting
though that despite its fall from the fixed input proportions level+, the price offered for
the farm product still lies higher than the original equilibrium price, Pa. This shows as
a counter-clockwise rotation of the new demand curve for the farm product, D~, at the
pivot of the original derived demand curve, Da (contrast this with a leftward parallel shift
in the demand curve for the farm input under fixed proportions). In other words, the
possibility for input substitution makes the derived demand curve for the farm product
more elastic (Wohlgenant and Haidacher, op. cit, p. 7).
Under the given assumption of variable input proportions, therefore, the effect of a
leftward shift in the supply curve for the farm product is to narrow the marketing margin
from its original level but to widen it above the level that obtains under fixed input
proportions. Relative to its position under the assumption of fixed input proportions,
therefore, the marketing margin moves in the direction of retail price and in the opposite
direction as output. The reason is that relative to when fixed input proportions are
2The magnitude by which the price level has to fall is proportional to the magnitude by which quantity
demanded of the farm product falls. If, for instance, on introducing variable input proportions it takes
only half a unit of the farm product to make the same one unit of the retail product, under fixed input
proportions, then it follows that it costs only half the price under the latter to acquire this amount of
the farm product per unit of the fainal product.
41
assumed, retailers use more of the marketing input, which has become relatively cheaper,
and less of the farm input which has become relatively more expensive.
2.4.3 Changes in the marketing margin and the degree of price
transmission: a note
Up till now, there hasn't been any discussion regarding the link between the marketing
margin and the degree to which farm price changes translate into changes in retail price.
Given linear demand and linear input supply functions, however, the degree to which farm
input price changes translate into retail price changes are not independent of changes in
the marketing margin. In fact, they are directly affected by movements in the marketing
margin.
Consider a case where, given the assumptions of fixed input proportions and per-
fectly competitive input and output markets, the supply curve for marketing services is
horizontal. Under the given assumptions, the marketing margin will remain unchanged
regardless of an exogenous shock to the retail or input supply sectors. And, consequently,
ceteris paribus, farm price changes will translate into equal retail price changes. This is
because the demand curves for the farm and retail products are parallel.
Now consider a case where, given the assumptions of fixed input proportions and
perfectly competitive input and output markets, the supply curve for marketing services
is upward-sloping. Under these circumstances, for given changes in the conditions of retail
demand and the supply of the farm and marketing inputs, the marketing margin will be
changing at the same time that the farm input price is changing. Consequently, farm
input price changes will not translate into proportional retail price changes. Therefore,
given a rightward retail demand shift and a leftward marketing supply shift for which
the marketing margin widens, one should expect changes in retail price to be greater
than those in the farm price. On the other hand, given a leftward shift in farm supply
for which the marketing margin narrows, one should expect retail price changes to be
smaller than changes in farm prices.
42
As has been pointed out earlier, the assumption of variable input proportions does
not affect the qualitative impact of changes in the conditions of supply and retail demand
on the marketing margin. Consequently, on introducing the assumption of variable input
proportions, one should expect the above predictions regarding the degree to which farm
price changes translate into changes in retail price to remain valid.
In the subsequent chapters, the link between the marketing margin and the degree
of price transmission will be elaborated in detail. Prior to doing that, however, it is
important to emphasize the point that the degree to which changes in farm price translate
into changes in retail price depends on whether the marketing margin is changing at the
same time that farm-gate price is changing.
2.5 Summary
This chapter has presented a diagrammatic approach to the analysis of the effects of
changes in the conditions of retail demand and inputs supply on the marketing margin.
Based on the assumptions of fixed input proportions and of perfectly competitive input
and output markets, the major results of the diagrammatic approach can be summarized
as follows.
Firstly, the effect on the marketing margin depends on the source of the shock. Thus,
given a retail demand shift, the margin moves in the same direction as retail price and
retail output suggesting that it widens following a rightward retail demand shift and
narrows following a leftward retail demand shift. Given a farm supply shift, the marketing
margin moves in the opposite direction of retail price and in the same direction as retail
output suggesting that it narrows for a leftward shift in supply and widens for a rightward
shift in supply. Finally, given a marketing supply shift, the margin moves in the same
direction as retail price and in the opposite direction of retail output suggesting that it
narrows for a rightward shift in supply and widens for a leftward shift in supply.
Secondly, the effects of changes in the conditions of input supply and retail demand
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on the marketing margin depend on the curvature of the supply curve for marketing
services. If the supply curve for these services is horizontal, the marketing margin remains
unchanged in the face of changes in retail demand and in the supply of inputs. As such,
the above results are valid for a marketing supply curve that is upward-sloping
The introduction of variable input proportions into the analysis, ceteris paribus, seems
to have no qualitative impact on the above results. It only bears on the magnitude
by which the margin changes following changes in the conditions of retail demand and
supply of inputs. For instance, for a leftward farm supply shift, the marketing margin
widens when variable input proportions are assumed relative to its level under fixed input
proportions but it still narrows relative to its level in original equilibrium.
Changes in the marketing margin and the degree of price transmission which follow
an exogenous shock will be discussed in more detail in the forthcoming chapters. But it
is important to emphasize that the diagrammatic approach appears to be a useful aid in
helping to understand the direction of changes in the marketing margin and the likely
impact of these changes on the degree of price transmission.
However, as might have become clear by now, this approach cannot measure accu-
rately marketing margin changes. This accuracy can only be achieved when an algebraic
equilibrium framework of the relationship between retail and input prices is established
as in the manner of Gardner (1975). This equilibrium framework does not only quantify
changes in the margin following disturbances in the different markets but also incorporate
fixed and variable input proportions into one framework treating the former as a special
case where the elasticity of substitution is zero. In the following chapter therefore we
review the theoretical literature to highlight the basic features of this framework. The
specific models which attract a particular focus of our review will be Gardner (1975),
Wohlgenant (1989) and Wohlgenant and Haidacher (1989).
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Chapter 3
The degree of price transmission
under perfectly competitive
markets: an exposition
3.1 Background
In this chapter, we undertake a detailed exposition of the model of price transmission
in perfectly competitive vertically-related markets. We start this exposition with the
Gardner model (Gardner, 1975), a model which assumes perfectly competitive input and
output markets, identical firms, constant returns to scale and variable input proportions
in industry technology. Our exposition of this model is warranted because it is looked
upon as a bench-mark in theoretical models of price transmission assuming different
market structures. We then present an alternative approach to modelling price trans-
mission that has been provided by Wohlgenant (1989), and Wohlgenant and Haidacher
(1989). Whilst it still assumes perfectly competitive output and input markets and vari-
able input proportions, this alternative approach differs from the Gardner model in that
it accounts for diverse firms and non-constant returns to scale. Within the framework of
this approach, the Gardner model is treated as a special case.
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Now consider a vertically-related industry where the upstream market is represented
by the suppliers of raw materials, the intermediate market by processors, distributors,
packaging agents, etc., and the downstream market by retailers who sell the final product
to the consumer. In its simplest form, the production function for this type of industry
can be specified using a one-product-two-input model, x = f (a, b), where x denotes the
output of the retail sector, a denotes the raw (primary) input, and b denotes the input
of intermediaries (i.e., the marketing input).
The underlying notion behind this specification is that of joint demand, where the de-
mand for the final product is considered as a joint demand for all the factors of production
(Marshall, op cit; Friedman, 1962, chapter 7; Tomek and Robinson, op. cit).
In a market structure where all firms involved in the three sectors are perfectly com-
petitive (i.e., there are too many identical firms producing a homogeneous good for any
one of them to have the power to set price, there is free entry and exit, and all firms have
equal access to information), the price of the final product reflects the cost of the raw
input, the cost of marketing inputs and the cost associated with retailing the product
(i.e., the marketing margin).
Given this market structure, recalling from the earlier chapter, the marketing margin
is defined as the difference between the price of the final product and the price of the raw
input. Given this definition of a marketing margin, then, for a given input combination,
the degree of price transmission from the raw input to the retail sector is determined by
whether the marketing margin is changing at the same time that the price of the raw
input is changing. On the other hand, in a market structure where either the retail stage
or the raw input supply stage or both are not competitive (could be characterized by
monopoly, oligopoly, monopsony or oligopsony), then the marketing margin also contains,
apart from the aforementioned, a component which reflects market power (l.e., a mark-up
or a mark-down or both). Under these circumstances, the degree of price transmission
is determined not only by changes in the marketing margin but also by changes in the
mark-up and (or) in the mark-down.
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However, regardless of the market structure, the assumptions regarding the produc-
tion function, i.e., whether the two inputs are combined in fixed or variable proportions
and whether the technology exhibits constant, increasing or decreasing returns to scale
have a significant effect on the magnitude of changes in the marketing margin and the
resultant degree of price transmission.
All these will become clear in the course of our exposition of the various market
structures. The most natural way to start this exposition is to consider a perfectly
competitive multi-stage model of an industry where the separability of demand for the
final product from the derived demand for the raw input makes it possible to analyze the
price spread and the elasticity of price transmission. In this respect, the model developed
by Gardner (1975), which, for our purposes, will be referred to as the basic model, is the
appropriate point of departure.
3.2 The model (Gardner, 1975)
This model describes a perfectly competitive industry which produces a final product (x),
using purchased raw input (a) and a marketing input (b). For our purposes, we denote
a to be a farm input and b to be marketing services. Industry equilibrium is described
by the following six equations.
The first equation describes the marketing industry's production (supply) function
as:
x=/(a,b) (3.1a)
The major assumption regarding the production function is that the technology ex-
hibits constant returns to scale such that a scaling of both inputs by an amount ,\ ~ 0
results in output changing ,\ times. The assumption of constant returns to scale derives
from the property of homogeneous functions that is well established in microeconomics
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theory (see for instance, Varian, 1992, chapter 1).
Given a production function with two variable inputs, f (a, b) , and a scalar k, we
say the function is homogeneous of degree k, if V a,b and A > 0, f (Aa, Ab) = Akf (a, b).
The function exhibits constant returns to scale when k= 1, increasing returns to scale
when k> 1, and decreasing returns to scale when k«; 1. The production function which
is being considered thus belongs to a class of homogeneous functions with k= 1. Given
that all firms in the industry are identical and that input prices are kept constant, the
assumption of constant returns to scale implies that the industry total cost function is
linear in output. This in turn implies that the industry's marginal cost, which is the same
for all firms in the industry, is also linear. Given a linear marginal cost, economic theory
states that the price of output which the industry faces equals minimum average cost
which also equals marginal cost. From this it therefore follows that, given the assumption
of constant returns to scale, the industry's supply curve for the final product is horizontal
with equilibrium output being determined at the point of intersection between the supply
curve and the final output demand curve.
The second assumption concerning the production function is that inputs are com-
bined in variable proportions. This means that the proportion in which the two factors
are combined to produce output varies as relative input prices change. Consequently,
firms are in a position to substitute the relatively expensive input for the relatively cheap
one whenever relative prices change.
The second equation describes the demand function for the retail product as:
(3.1b)
where P x is the retail price of the final product and N is an exogenous demand shifter.
It can take many forms, such as population increase, change in income, for example.
Having specified demand and supply equations in the retail market, the model then
specifies demand and supply equations in the input market. The demand equations for
the two inputs are derived from the profit maximization problem of the firm which can
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be stated as:
7r = MaxPxf (a, b) - Paa - Pib
x
(3.1 c)
Then the first-order conditions for a maximum are expressed as partial derivatives of the
functionv j, with respect to a and b respectively as:
(3.1d)
and
(3.1e)
where the subscripts fa and f b denote the partial derivatives of x with respect to a and
bl.
Equations (3.1d) and (3.1e) state that profits are maximized when each factor is paid
a price equal to the value of its marginal product. Another way of putting this is to say
that the price paid each factor is a proportion of the retail price, the proportion being
the marginal product of the factor.
The last two equations capture, in inverse form, the input supply functions for a and
b respectively as:
Pa = 9 (a, W) (3.1j)
1We assume the second order conditions for profit maximization are satisified
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and
Pb = h (b, T) (3.1g)
where Wand T are exogenous shifters of the supply functions for a and b respectively.
For convenience, W takes the form of weather and T a specific tax respectively.
The system thus contains six equations in six endogenous variables (i.e., x, a, b,
P x s P a, Pb)' For given equilibrium values of these variables, the price spread (i.e., the
marketing margin) is measured, in absolute terms, as the difference between P x and P a
(i.e., Px - Pa).
Having described equilibrium in both input and retail markets, the model then in-
troduces shocks originating in these markets. These shocks arise following changes in
either of the exogenous variables, N, Wor T. Their effect is to disturb (displace) initial
equilibrium levels of output, inputs and prices in all markets. These equilibrium distur-
bances can be expressed as percentage changes (i.e., as dP xl P x, or da] a, for instance).
Accordingly, the relative change in the price spread can be expressed as the difference
between the percentage changes in P x (i.e., dP xl P x) and in P a (l.e., dP al Pa). The
effects of each exogenous shifter on equilibrium levels of output, inputs and prices are
analyzed as follows.
3.2.1 Effects of a retail demand shift
First let the demand shifter, N, displace initial equilibrium (i.e., allow for a shift in the
retail demand curve). The change in equation (3.1a) can then be expressed, in total
differential form, as:
(3.2a)
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For convenience and without loss of generality, multiply the first term on the right-
hand side of (3.2a) by (; x ~), and the second term by (~ x ~). Noting from equations
(3.1d) and (3.1e) that fa = ~; and fb = ~, equation (3.2a) can then be re-written as:
(3.2d)
which, on rearranging, reduces to:
(3.2d')
where dx* = dx]»; da* = da]«; db" = db/b. The expressions Sa = ~pPa and Sb = ~pRb
xX xX
represent cost shares of the farm input and marketing services respectively.
In a similar fashion, changes in equation (3.1b) can be expressed, in total differential
form, as:
ax ax dN
dx = ap
x
dPx + aN dN (3.2b)
Multiplying the first term on the right-hand side by (It x ;,"') , and the second term
by (~ x ;;) , equation (3.2b) can be re-written as:
(3.2b')
which, on re-arranging, and on assuming a doubling of the exogenous demand shifter
(i.e., d: = 1) can be written as2:
21t is assumed that d; = dN* = 1implying that the percentage changes in the endogenous
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dx" = TJdP; + TJN (3.2b")
where TJ= ;:" x It is the own price elasticity of demand for x and is negative in all
normal cases; TJN = %:r x ~ is the elasticity of x to a change in N, which assuming x is
a normal good, is positive in all normal cases; and dP; = dPx/ Px.
Expressed in total differential form, the change in equation (3.1d) can be written as:
(3.2c)
where /a = * and Px =]:.
As one of the most fundamental postulates of economic theory, Euler's theorem states
that given an homogenous production function of degree one, x = / (a, b):
kx = a/a + bib (3.3a)
where k=l. Given the condition for profit maximization, that firms pay each factor its
marginal revenue product (as stated in equations 3.1d and 3.1e), it follows from (3.3a)
that a firm with a constant returns to scale production function makes zero profit in the
long-run as its revenue is totally exhausted in making payments to all factors".
Applying this theorem to a// Ba, therefore one obtains:
a a (a/ Of)aa (x) = aa a aa + bab (3.3b)
variables are evaluted for a doubling of the demand shifter.
31t is worth noting that given that under perfectly competitive markets fa = ~ and fb = ~ then
(3.3a) can be written as P",x = Paa+ Psb, which on dividing through out by P",x reduces to 1 = Sa + Sb
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which, on considering that the first partial of a constant returns to scale technology is
homogeneous of degree zero (i.e., k-l=O for k=l) so that the left-hand side reduces to
zero, can be written as:
0= aJaa + bJab (3.3c)
or, alternatively, as:
b
Jaa = --Jab
a
(3.3d)
Equation (3.3d) might be interpreted as stating that the change in the marginal
product of a with respect to a is equal to a proportion of the negative of this change
with respect to b. Clearly, as more and more of b is employed, then for a given Jab, the
change in the marginal product of a with respect to a gets smaller and smaller. On the
other hand, for given quantities of a and b, then the change in the marginal product of
a with respect to a gets smaller as the change in the marginal product of a with respect
to b increases.
On totally differentiating (3.3b), one obtains:
(3.3e)
Multiplying the first term of the right-hand side of equation (3.3e) by (;: x 1:) , and
the second term by (la X it), one then obtains:
(3.3/)
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which, on rearranging, is written as:
(3.3g)
where dl; = 1:.
Hicks (1932) shows that the elasticity of substitution, a, is inversely proportional to
the cross second-order partial derivative of the production function exhibiting constant
returns to scale and is written as:
(3.4)
The expression for a in (3.4) can be interpreted as stating that as the quantity pro-
duced of the final product gets smaller, it gets easier to substitute one input for the other
(or vice versa) such that the substitution elasticity gets larger.
Making use of equation (3.3d), (3.3g) can be re-written as:
dl; = - lab (~) (~) da" + (b~:b) db· (3.3h)
Multiplying both terms of the right-hand side of 3.3h by (~ X fb) , and using (3.4) one
can then obtain:
(3.3i)
where Bb = ~ is the share of b in total output multiplied by I b since Ib = ~ j and
~ is the inverse of equation (3.4). Now that dla has been defined in terms of a relative
change, equation (3.2c) can be re-written, in a relative change form, as:
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dP* = dP* - Bb da* + Bb db*
a x a a (3.2c')
where dP: = dPa/ Pa.
Similarly, one can write equation (3.1e), in total differential form, as:
(3.2d)
Using equation (3.3a), Euler's theorem can also be applied to ax/ab to obtain:
(3.5a)
which, on considering that the first differential of a constant returns to scale technology is
homogeneous of degree zero, so that the left-hand side reduces to zero, can be re-written
as:
(3.5b)
Totally differentiating equation (3.5a), one can then obtain,
(3.5c)
Multiplying the first term of the right-hand side of equation (3.5c) by (_h x ~) , and
the second term by (~ x It ) , one obtains:
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(3.5d)
which, on re-arranging, reduces to:
(3.5e)
Making use of (3.5b), equation (3.5e) can then be written as:
(3.5/)
And multiplying both terms of the right-hand side of (3.5/) by (1; x fa), and using
(3.4) one obtains:
dr = Sada* _ Sadb*
b a a (3.5g)
Finally, adding to equation (3.5g) the relative change in Px, the relative change in
equation (3.2d) can be written as:
dR* = dP* + Sa do" _ Sa db*
b x a a (3.2t!)
where Sa = aja/x,which is the share of a in total output multiplied by j a since fa = *";
and dP; = dn/ nand da: and db",
The change in equation (3.l/), can be written, in total differential form, as:
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(BPa) (BPa)dPa = Ba da+ BW dW (3.2e)
Multiplying the first term of (3.2e) by (~ x :a) and noting that dW = 0 (since dW =
dT = 0 when dN > 0), the relative change in (3.l!) can be written as:
dP* = ..!..da*
a ea
(3.2e')
where ea = (::a x ~ ) is the supply elasticity for the raw input (i.e., for a).
In a similar vein, one can write the change in equation (3.lg), in total differential
form, as:
dR = (BPb) db (aPb) dT
b ab + aT (3.2!)
Multiplying the first term of the right-hand side of (3.2!) by (!? x ;b) , and noting that
dT = 0, the relative change in H can be written as:
(3.2j)
where eb = (~~bX It ) is the supply elasticity for the marketing input.
Up to now only the relative changes in the six endogenous variables assuming a
change in the demand shifter, N have been derived. Yet, however, the simultaneous
changes in the endogenous variables have not been expressed in terms of the elasticity
of x to a change in N, 1JN' In the following section therefore the relative changes in the
endogenous variables are solved for in terms of 1JN'
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Solving for relative changes in the endogenous variables in terms of 7JN
It is quite evident from the above that, the system contains six equations in six en-
dogenous variables (dx*, da", db", dP;, dP;, dPb*)' As it stands now therefore the system
is intractable. With the view to making it tractable, the number of equations in each
market is reduced to only one and then solved for the endogenous variables in the three
markets simultaneously in terms of 7JN' To do this, equations (3.2a") and (2.9b") are
equated to eliminate x in the product market, (3.2c') and (3.2e') to eliminate P a from
the raw input market, and (3.2d') and (3.21') to eliminate H from the services market.
Doing this generates the following three-equation system:
(3.6a)
dP* - (Bb + _!_) da* + Bbdb* = 0
x (j ea a
(3.6b)
dP* + Sa da" _ (Sa +.!.) db* = 0
x (j (j eb
(3.6c)
where equation (3.6a) describes equilibrium adjustment in the market for x, (3.6b) in the
market for a and (3.6c) in the market for b.
Solving the system of equations (3.6a)-(3.6c) for da", db* and dP; using Cramer's
rule, the following reduced-form equations for the relative changes in the six endogenous
variables are obtained and expressed in terms of 7JN4• For the purposes at hand, however,
4Muth (1964) has also solved this system of equations assuming simultaneous changes in the exogenous
variables. See also Alston and Scobie (1983), who solve this system of equations when the shock comes
from the marketing sector.
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only relative changes for retail output and farm input prices are presented. They are
given by:
(3.7d)
(3.7b')
where the denominator, D = -"l (Sbea + Saeb + a)+eaeb+a (Saea + Sbeb) is in all normal
cases positive since "l < 0 while all other parameters are non-negative. Equations (3.7a')
and (3.7b') are identical to Gardner's equations A.I and A.2 respectively.
A retail demand shift and movements in the price spread
In the preceding section, the system has been solved for dP; and dP~. The percentage
change in the price spread can now be expressed as:
(3.8)
which is identical to Gardner's equation A.5.
As has been pointed out, the denominator D is positive in all normal cases. The sign
of equation (3.8) is therefore determined by the numerator. In fact, as ''IN and Sb are
positive, the sign is solely determined by the relative sizes of the price elasticities ea and
Based on equation (3.8), the predictions of the model regarding movements in the price
spread in the face of a retail demand shift are thus that the spread remains unchanged
when ea = eb; falls when ea < eb; and rises when ea > eb·
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The fact that the spread remains unchanged when ea = eb follows from the fact that
the retail demand shift results in proportionate changes in P a and Pb which in turn
translate into an equally proportionate change in Pe-
Considering a rightward shift in retail demand, the intuition for the price spread
falling given that ea < eb, can be explained with reference to an industry which produces
food using a farm product, a and marketing services, b. Because the farm product, a,
is land-intensive and a specific factor to the food industry while the components of the
marketing input, b, are not, it follows that, in the short-run, the supply of a cannot be
increased readily in response to a demand shift while that of b can. As a result, for a
small a, the increase in Pais much more than that in Pi; i.e., ~ > 1. And since the
cost share of b in total retail value is relatively smaller, the increase in Px is smaller than
that in Pa' Hence, the narrowing of the price spread in percentage terms.
Again, considering the case of the food industry, the intuitive explanation for the price
spread rising in the face of a rightward shift in retail demand given that ea > eb is as
follows. If ea > eb, a given increase in retail demand pulls up Pb more than P a, increasing
the relative cost of b in the retail good. As the compounding effect is to increase P x, by
much more than the increase in P a, the price spread increases.
It is worthy of note here that these outcomes clearly depend on the magnitude of the
elasticity of substitution, a, To illustrate this point, let ea < ei: If the two inputs, a and
b are assumed highly substitutable to each other, a relative increase in P a owing to a
rightward shift in demand will induce substitution of a for b thus moderating the initial
price increase in P a' Hence, the greater a is, the less the price spread changes. In the
extreme case where a --+ 00, which implies perfect substitutability of the two inputs,
equation (3.8) approaches zero, such that the price spread remains unchanged as demand
shifts. On the contrary, as a --+ 0, which represents the case of fixed input proportions,
the maximum change in price spread is achieved.
Having analyzed the effects of a retail demand shift on changes in the levels of final
output, inputs, prices and the price spread, the model then analyses the effects of a raw
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(farm) input supply shift on changes in these variables in a similar way.
3.2.2 Effects of a farm supply shift
Analysis of the effects of a farm supply shift brought about by a change in W proceeds
in the same way as that of the effects of a retail demand shift. The only modification
needed here is to set equation (3.6b) to ew and equations (3.6a) and (3.6c) to zero. This
is done because Nand T are assumed to remain constant when W changes. The term
ew = (~~ x ;.:) denotes the percentage change in Pain response to a percentage change
in W, which, when evaluated for a shock is always positive. It is derived by multiplying
the second term of the right-hand side of equation (3.2e) by (W x ;.:).
With this modification, equations (3.6a)-{3.6c) are re-written as:
(3.9a)
dP* (Sb 1) d * Sbdb*- -+- a+- =ew
x a ea a
(3.9b)
dP* + Sada* - (Sa + 2.) db* = 0
x (j (j eb (3.9c)
where equation (3.9a) describes equilibrium adjustment in the market for x,{3.9b) in the
market for a and (3.9c) in the market for b.
Solving for relative changes in the endogenous variables in terms of ew
Solving the system of equations (3.9a)-{3.9c) using Cramer's rule yields the reduced-form
equations for relative changes in the six endogenous variables, expressed, in terms of ew .
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Again, for the purposes at hand, only reduced-form equations for prices of the retail
product and the farm input are presented. These are given respectively by:
(3.1Ga)
and
(3.1Gb)
They are identical to Gardner's identities A.6 and A.7 respectively.
A farm supply shift and movements in the price spread
For given values of dP; and dP:, the percentage change in the price spread following a
shift in the inverse supply function for a are then expressed as:
(3.11)
which is identical to Gardner's A.9.
As previously pointed out, the denominator, D, is positive in all normal cases. There-
fore, equation (3.11) is negative in all normal cases because ew is positive and 1] is
negative, and ea and eb are non-negative. This means that the spread will narrow as Pa
increases subsequent to a leftward shift in the supply of the raw input. The converse of
this is that the price spread will widen when there is an exogenous shock that reduces
P a by increasing a.
The economic reasoning for this is that despite both P x and P a falling as a increases,
for a large (7, the increase in x requires that additional marketing inputs be employed.
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Assuming a less perfectly elastic eb (i. e, 0 ~ eb ~ 00) this leads, in the short-run, to an
increase in Pi; and, consequently, for a given b, to an increase in Sb. Thus, the initial
fall in P x is made up for by the increase in Ps; This therefore leads to the widening of
the price spread. Here too, the outcome for equation (3.11) hinges on the value of a with
a larger magnitude dampening the effect of the shift on the price spread and vice versa.
3.2.3 Effects of a marketing supply shift
Finally, the model analyses the effects of a shift in the inverse supply function for b by
setting equations (3.9a) and (3.9b) to zero while setting equation (3.9c) to er where
eT = (~ x t) denotes the percentage change in H in response to a percentage change
in the exogenous variable, T. This follows from the assumption that dN = dW = 0 when
T changes. It is derived by multiplying the second term of the right-hand side of equation
(3.2j) by ('1 x ~).
Modifying equations (3.9a)-(3.9c) thus, the following three-equation system is ob-
tained.
(3.12a)
ar: - (Sb +.!.) do" + Sb db· = 0
x a ea a
(3.12b)
• Sad. (Sa 1) db.dP+-a--+- =er
x a a eb
(3.12c)
where equations (3.12a)-{3.12c) describe equilibrium adjustment in the markets for X,
for a and for b respectively.
63
Solving for relative changes in the endogenous variables in terms of eT
Solving the system using Cramer's rule, the reduced-form equations for the six endoge-
nous variables are derived and expressed in terms of eT. But only reduced-form equations
for the prices of the retail product and for the marketing input are presented here. These
are given by:
(3.13a)
and
(3.13b)
A marketing supply shift and movements in the price spread
With values of dP; and dP; determined, the percentage change in the price spread
following a percentage change in the exogenous variable, T, is expressed as:
(3.14)
Given that D is positive, and so are all terms in the numerator except for "I which is
negative, the price spread in equation (3.14) is positive in all normal cases. This implies
that a marketing shock, T, which leads to an increase in H, results in a widening of
the price spread. This result follows because the increase in H is reflected partly by an
increase in Px , and, partly by a decrease in Pa. For a small a, the intuition is that as
Pb increases the demand for marketing services falls, and, so does the demand for the
primary input. The latter results in a decrease in Pa'
Due to the aggregation problem, however, it is likely that the change in the exogenous
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shock, T will affect some marketing components more strongly than others. This means
that the relative prices of these particular types will increase more substantially than
those of others. This points to the need for disaggregating the marketing components
into those whose relative prices change more substantially and into those whose relative
prices change little following changes in T. As this complicates the analysis, however,
the model is kept to its simplest form with all marketing inputs aggregated.
3.2.4 The elasticity of price transmission
The elasticity of price transmission, T, is defined, in this particular context, as the per-
centage change in Px which results from a percentage change in the price of the farm
input, Pa5. Algebraically, it is defined as:
PC .u;T =--
dP*a
(3.15)
where the superscript, PC, denotes perfect competition.
Just as dP; and dP; take on different values for each of the exogenous shifts so far
considered, so does T assume different values for each of such shifts. The elasticities of
price transmission from the farm input to the retail sector in the face of exogenous shifts
originating in the retail, farm and marketing sectors respectively are therefore expressed
as:
(3.16a)
5Please note this definition does not necessarily hold in the face of a retail demand shift whereby one
talks in terms of a pass back elasticity (McCorriston, et al., 1999). However, this notion is not present
in Gardner.
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(3.16b)
and
(3.16c)
where 3.16a and 3.16b are identical to Gardner's A.IQ and A.11.
As equation (3.16a) clearly shows, when the exogenous shock originates in the retail
sector, the elasticity of price transmission is determined by the relative cost shares, by the
elasticities of farm and marketing inputs and by the elasticity of substitution. Assuming
all other parameters are kept constant, the elasticity of price transmission takes on the
value of unity for ea =eb. This is because the increase in retail demand increases the
demand for the two inputs. And, since they are equally elastic to shifts in demand, their
prices increase proportionately. This being the case, a percentage increase in Pais fully
reflected as a percentage increase in P x. Another special case of the elasticity becoming
unity arises when Sa = 1.When this holds, the marketing margin remains unchanged as
t; increases.
For ea < eb, a percentage increase in Pa is less than fully reflected in the change in
P x because n doesn't increase by as much as P a does because the supply of b can be
more readily increased with a modest increase in its price. As a result, Px increases by
an amount which is less than the increase in Pa. This implies that the marketing margin
narrows as Pa changes.
For ea > eb, a price transmission elasticity of more than unity obtains. This is
because Pb increases by much more than P a does because supply of b is relatively less
flexible. Therefore, the initial increase in Pais reinforced by that in Pi: In other
words, the marketing margin widens at the same time that Pa increases. Hence, a case
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of dP; / dP; > 1. But this scenario is very unlikely to occur in an industry where the
farm input is assumed to be specific to the industry, and, consequently, more rigid in its
response to a retail demand shift, and, hence less price elastic than the marketing input.
When the exogenous shock originates in the supply of the farm input, T is less than
unity in all normal cases, as equation (3.16b) clearly indicates. For a given fall in the
supply of the farm input, this means that the increase in Pa is less than fully reflected in
the change in Px• This also means that the marketing margin narrows as Pa increases.
The intuition is that relative to the farm input, the marketing input becomes cheaper so
that Px cannot rise by as much as Pa does. The only special case for which T in (3.16b)
takes on the value of unity is when the cost share of the farm input, Sa = 1 in which case
the marketing margin remains unchanged. This in itself is a special case of P x increasing
in proportion to the share of the farm input, Sa, i.e., T =Sa. This is called a long-run,
non-specific factor case, and obtains when eb is perfectly elastic ..
When the exogenous shock originates in the marketing sector, the elasticity of price
transmission is not well defined as it takes different values according to whether a < 'fJ
or a > 'fJ or a = n, As is clearly indicated in equation (3.16c), for a < n, the elasticity of
price transmission is less than zero. This outcome can be generalized to a case of fixed
input proportions for which a = o. This can be interpreted as stating that a change
in a marketing shock results in Px and Pa moving in opposite directions. The economic
reasoning goes as follows. The increase in H induces a fall in demand for marketing
services and assuming a relatively less elastic ea and a very small a, a fall in demand
for the farm input, that reflects a fall in demand for marketing services, induces a fall in
Pa. Yet P x rises to make up for the rise in Pi: The upshot of this is that the marketing
margin widens at the same time that Pa decreases.
For a > 'fJ, the price transmission elasticity is not only positive in the face of a
marketing shock but also greater than unity. Intuitively, this means that as Pb increases
following the marketing shock, any shift towards the use of more farm input leads to an
increase in P a assuming a large a. Consequently, both P a and Pb compound each other
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to lead to an increase in P x' Consequently, the marketing margin widens.
As can be noted for a = 'fJ, the elasticity of price transmission is not defined because
the denominator in equation (3.16c) is zero. In this case, the marketing margin is not
defined. But in no case can the transmission elasticity in (3.16c) take on the value of
unity.
Thus far, a cursory look into equations (3.16a)-(3.16c) seems to hint at the importance
of a, 'fJ,ea, Sa, and eb in determining the sign and magnitude of the elasticity of price
transmission for a given source of an exogenous shock. Let's now examine the role of
each parameter in detail through comparative statics which we undertake in the following
sub-section.
3.2.5 Comparative statics
To test for the sensitivity of the elasticity of price transmission to changes in anyone
of the determining parameters, comparative statics can be run by differentiating T with
respect to each determining parameter. In anticipation of a model of price transmission
assuming market power in the retail sector, which we will expound in the next chapter,
consider (3.16b) which describes the elasticity of price transmission assuming a supply
shock originating in the raw input sector.
First consider the sensitivity of T to Sa and one obtains:
8r = (a + eb) (eb - Sb'fJ] > 0
8Sa (e, + Saa - Sb'fJ) (3.17 a)
Clearly, (3.17a) is in all circumstances positive since 'fJ < 0 which is to be expected. As
Sa increases, so does the degree of price transmission. In fact, as has been shown with
reference to equation (3.I6b), for a perfectly elastic ei, r =Sa such that for Sa = 1, r
takes on the value of unity.
Next consider the sensitivity of T to eb; and one obtains:
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(3.17b)
It can be seen that the comparative static result for (3.17b) is not well defined as the value
it takes depends on the relative magnitudes of (J and 1] such that for (J = 1], 87/8eb = 0;
for (J < 1], 87/ 8eb > 0; and for (J > 1], 87/ 8eb < o.
The following explanation is provided for the ambiguity of this result. Firstly, if,
relative to ea, eb increases, then an increase in demand for marketing services, following
an increase in Pa, can be accommodated with a fall in Pi, if (J > 1]. This leads to
a decrease in the degree of price transmission. Normally, this applies when economies
of scale operate in the supply of marketing services. Secondly, if, relative to ea, eb
increases, then an increase in demand for marketing services resulting from an increase
in P a can only be accommodated with an increase in Pi, if (J < 1]. This compounds the
initial increase in Pa and thereby leads to an increase in the degree of price transmission.
Finally, if, eb increases relative to ea, then no price transmission occurs as Pa increases
if (J = 1].
Now consider the sensitivity of 7 with respect to (J; one obtains,
(3.17c)
As (3.17c) shows, the comparative static result is always positive since TJ < O.
The intuition goes as follows. Assume P a increases, then, for a large (J, processors
use more marketing services which have become relatively cheaper. But in the long term,
this will raise the price of marketing services and thereby compound the initial increase
in P a. Consequently, the degree of price transmission from the farm input market to the
retail market will be greater than when a small (J is considered.
Finally, consider the sensitivity of 7 to 1]; one obtains,
69
(3.17d)
The intuition is that as retail demand becomes more elastic, retailers are limited in the
extent to which they can increase P x to match the increase in Pa and vice versa.
3.2.6 Perfect price transmission: a note
The concept of perfect price transmission has been in wide use since its coinage by
Colman (1985) in relation to the transmission of policy prices. Perfect price transmission
in this context is defined as a degree of price transmission "where a change in a policy
regulated price, such as intervention or minimum import price, causes an equal change
in the farm-gate price" (p.172).
In an empirical context of vertically related markets in seven countries in the European
Union, Palaskas (1995) defines perfect price transmission as occurring when the long-run
co-integrating coefficient is unity. In this context, a coefficient with a value of unity
implies that a 1% increase in the price of the farm input leads to a 1% increase in retail
price given that prices are expressed in logarithms. Asche et al. (2001) take a similar
view of perfect price transmission and defines it as occurring when the cost share of the
farm input, Sa in total industry output value is unity. As shown above, when Sa = 1,
T = 1.
In a theoretical context of vertically-related markets and assuming a farm input supply
shock, McCorriston et al.. (1998) define perfect price transmission as occurring when the
transmission elasticity, T, equals the share of the farm input (Sa). Thus, their definition
generalizes to different values of Sa of which a unit value is a special case. In their
context, perfect price transmission implies that a 1% increase in the price of the farm
input increases retail price Sa times.
It is now worth asking whether the theoretical model of price transmission under
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perfectly competitive markets, as expounded in the foregoing, always predicts perfect
price transmission as defined in a vertical market context.
It appears that the definition given by Palaskas is admitted by the model in very few
special cases which arise under highly restrictive assumptions. The first case arises when
the supply elasticities for marketing and farm inputs are equal given a retail demand
shock. The second case supporting a unit transmission elasticity arises when, for a retail
demand or farm input supply shock, the cost share of the farm input is unity.
It also appears that the definition given by McCorriston et al.. is supported by the
model in a very special case. For a given farm supply shock, or a retail demand shock,
this arises when an industry faces a perfectly elastic marketing supply. This obtains
when an industry operates in the very long-run whereby a long-run non-specific factor
case arises.
For a given exogenous shock arising in the marketing sector, however, under no cir-
cumstances does perfect price transmission of any sort arise. Referring back to equation
(3.16c), this is because, in all normal cases, 1] is negative whereas a and ea are non-
negative.
To re-cap, in price transmission discourses in vertically related markets, there seem
to exist two major contexts in which perfect price transmission is believed to occur.
Both consider the cost share of the farm input central to this occurrence. While Asche
defines perfect price transmission as occurring when Sa = 1, which is another way of
saying T = 1, McCorriston et al.. define perfect transmission as occurring when the
transmission elasticity is equal to Sa, i.e., T =Sa' As such, the former definition can be
considered as a special case of the latter. Evaluating the definition given by Palaskas on
counts of the definition given by McCorriston et al.., there seems to be no ground for
believing that a long-run co-integrating coefficient of unity always signifies perfect price
transmission. To take an example, for a given raw input supply shock, let Sa = 0.1. In
this case, T = 1 doesn't mean anything special while T = 0.1 does.
The theoretical model as presented in the foregoing admits perfect price transmission
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as a special case arising under highly restrictive assumptions rather than as a general
case. In fact, for a given exogenous shock that originates in the marketing sector, perfect
price transmission does not occur under any conditions.
Given the different definitions that are in use in the literature, a meaningful approach
will be to define perfect price transmission as the degree of price transmission which
occurs under perfectly competitive markets against which degrees of price transmission
that obtain in all other markets are then compared.
3.3 An alternative approach
As has been made clear at the beginning of the chapter, the predictions of the Gardner
model rest on the assumption that the industry operates with constant returns to scale
implying that the industry supply curve is horizontal. This derives from the assumption
that each firm in the industry is identical in size to every other and is too small to have
any impact on industry price. In other words, all firms in the industry are assumed to
be marginal.
Wohlgenant and Haidacher (WH, 1989) and Wohlgenant (W, 1989) show that, given a
perfectly competitive market where inputs are combined in variable proportions, relaxing
the assumption of identical (marginal) firms makes the assumptions of constant returns
to scale and horizontal industry supply curve redundant. They show this by assuming
that firms in the industry have diverse production functions such that some are infra-
marginal and others are marginal. Obviously, the assumption of firm diversity results in
a less than perfectly elastic final product industry supply curve.
Implicit in the perfectly competitive model with identical firms is the assumption that
the relationship between the price of an input and quantity demanded of it is negative
implying that the input in question is normal, Le. an increase in its price reduces its
demand. If, however, the industry's firms are diverse, then an input is treated as normal
by some firms and as inferior by others with the implication that whether an input is
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considered normal or inferior to industry production is determined by the weighted sums
of demand elasticities for individual firms. Theory states that an increase in the price
of an inferior input raises a firm's average costs, but reduces its marginal costs. Given
the assumption of identical firms in industry, then it followsthat higher long run average
costs drive firms from the industry, reduce industry output and consequently put an
upward pressure on market price of output. But given the assumption of diverse firms,
an increase in long-run average cost does not necessarily lead to reduced output and to
higher consumer price.
To see this clearly, take an example provided by Reed and Clarke (2000). Assume
there are two groups of firms in a competitive industry. The first contains infra-marginal
firms which enjoy a cost advantage so that they can remain in the industry even if the
long run average cost of other firms lies above market price. The second group contains
marginal firms which do not possess this cost advantage so that when the long run
average cost lies above market price they exit the industry. Given this composition of
firms, say the price of an input which is inferior to the infra-marginal firms increases.
Because of their cost advantage, these firms increase the supply of their output in the
long run despite the increase in the price of the inferior input. This puts a downward
pressure on the price of the industry output. Nowconsider the price of an input which is
inferior to marginal firms increases; then their long run average cost increases to a level
above output price in which case they exit the industry thus reducing industry supply
and putting an upward pressure on market price of output ..
To illustrate their point, WH and W first set up a structural model which is expressed
in terms of a two-equation system as:
(3.18a)
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(3.18b)
where S~ is the supply of the ith firm in the industry; PT) PI, and Ware prices of the
retail, farm and marketing inputs respectively; Dr is the industry retail demand Z is
the retail demand shifter whereas QI and D} represent the quantity supplied of the
farm input and the quantity demanded of the farm input by the ith firm respectively.
This two-equation system derives from a far bigger system which contains endogenous
retail demand, retail supply and farm-level demand equations, a predetermined farm-
level supply equation, an exogenous (a perfectly elastic) marketing supply equation, and
retail and farm level market clearing equations.
The assumptions underlying equations (3.18a) and (3.18b) are that consumer demand
is homogeneous of degree zero in retail price and income and that output supply and input
demand are homogeneous of degree zero in farm and non-farm inputs.
Assuming a consumer demand shift, they next totally differentiate (3.18a) and (3.18b)
to obtain the following eight structural elasticities,
(3.19a)
(3.19b)
where ~rr is the elasticity of retail supply with respect to retail price, e is the elasticity
of retail demand with respect to retail price, ~rl is the elasticity of retail supply with
respect to farm price, ez is the elasticity of retail demand with respect to Z, ~rw is the
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elasticity of retail supply with respect to W, ~fr is the elasticity of farm-level demand
with respect to retail price, ~ff is the elasticity of farm-level demand with respect to farm
price, and e/w is the elasticity of farm-level demand with respect to W. It is important to
note here that the elasticities of aggregate retail supply and aggregate farm-level demand
are defined as quantity-share-weighted sums of the respective elasticities of supply and
demand for individual firms.
The key to their model is the assumption that the symmetry restrictions at the firm
level hold at the industry level as well. These restrictions are: (1) that the change in
output supply resulting from a change in price of an input equals the negative of the
effect of a change in output price on demand for the input in question; and (2) that the
change in demand for one input resulting from a change in price of another input equals
the change in demand for the other input resulting from a change in price of the first
input.
At the firm level, the first symmetry restriction implies that
(3.20)
which, when summed over all firms, and with further manipulation, can be expressed, in
elasticity form, as:
(3.20a)
The next step in the model involves specifying the following reduced form equations
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(3.21a)
(3.21b)
Equations (3.1ga) and (3.19b) are then used to describe the comparative statics of
(3.21a) and (3.21b), in elasticity form, as:
(3.22a)
(3.22b)
where Arz is the long run own price elasticity of industry supply; Arw is the long run
elasticity of industry supply to the marketing input price; Ar! is the long run elasticity
of industry supply to the farm input price; Afz is the elasticity of industry demand for
the farm input to shifts in consumer demand; A!w is the elasticity of industry demand
for farm input to the price of the marketing input; and, finally, All is the own price
elasticity of industry demand for the farm input. Theory suggests that in all normal
cases, Ar! and Afl are negatively signed whereas Arz and Afz are positively signed. On
the other hand, Arw and A fw cannot be signed a priori for the aforementioned reasons.
They show that given the symmetry restriction in (3.20a)
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(3.23)
This condition requires that firms take farm and consumer prices as given (i.e., they are
competitive) and that when they do so the response of consumer and farm-level prices is
symmetric.
Given the above specifications they then state the conditions under which the in-
dustry's production function exhibits constant returns to scale. They show that the
production function of the industry exhibits constant returns to scale when the following
conditions hold.
Arz = -Art (3.24a)
(3.24b)
The most important prediction of their model is that, given diverse firms, constant
returns to scale arises as a special case rather than in general. But when it obtains, the
implication is that the industry gets zero profit in the long run. This is because, given
constant returns to scale, changes in retail demand and quantity of the farm output are
proportionate thus leaving both retail and farm input prices unchanged. The corollary
is that constant returns to scale implies a horizontal retail supply curve.
It is thus clear that the Gardner model assuming identical firms is a special case of the
model of a perfectly competitive industry with diverse firms which operates with constant
returns to scale. The implication is that if the assumption of diverse firms results in non-
constant returns to scale, then it follows that the predictions of the Gardner model do
not hold. In the next chapter, we will review the relevant models which analyze the
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effects of non-constant returns to scale in production technology on the predictions of
the Gardner model.
But before concluding our review of the model of perfectly competitive markets with
diverse firms, it is important to discuss its predictions regarding the elasticity of price
transmission. In the context of diverse firms, it is defined as:
(3.25)
If the assumptions of a perfectly competitive industry and constant returns to scale are
held, then by virtue of (3.23) and (3.24b) and taking note of the assumption of perfectly
elastic marketing supply, estimates of this elasticity reduce to the cost share of the farm
input, Sa. In the absence of a constant returns to scale assumption, however, a different
estimate of the elasticity is obtained. It is interesting to note that, for a given retail
demand shock, the Gardner model yields a price transmission elasticity equal to Sa only
when the long run supply of the marketing input is perfectly elastic. This is not surprising
because while in the perfectly competitive model with diverse firms, a perfectly elastic
marketing supply is assumed, in the Gardner model this is not assumed.
3.4 Summary and evaluation
This chapter has made an exposition and discussed the major predictions of the model of
price transmission assuming all stages in a vertically related industry are perfectly com-
petitive, that the industry operates with constant returns to scale, and that production
inputs are combined in variable proportions. Three major predictions appear to come
out from this analysis and are summarized as follows.
Firstly, the degree of price transmission from the farm to the retail sector, as measured
by the elasticity of price transmission, is determined as much by where the exogenous
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shock originates as it is by such structural parameters as demand and input supply
elasticities, input cost shares and the elasticity of substitution.
Given an exogenous shock originating in the retail sector, the elasticity of price trans-
mission is equal to unity either when the supply elasticities for both inputs are equal or
the share of the farm input is equal to unity implying that the marketing margin remains
unchanged in the face of such an exogenous shock. Given such a shock, the elasticity of
price transmission is less than unity when the farm input supply elasticity is less than the
marketing supply elasticity implying the marketing margin narrows as the farm input
price increases. When the farm input supply elasticity is greater than the marketing
supply elasticity, the price transmission elasticity is greater than unity implying that the
marketing margin widens at the same time that the farm input price increases.
Given an exogenous shock originating in the farm sector, the price transmission elas-
ticity is less than unity in all normal circumstances implying that the marketing margin
narrows at the same time that the farm input price increases. When the share of the
farm input is unity, however, the price transmission elasticity is equal to unity given this
shock.
Given an exogenous shock originating in the marketing sector, the price transmission
elasticity is greater than unity when the substitution elasticity is greater than the retail
demand elasticity. It is negative when the substitution elasticity is smaller than the
retail demand elasticity. On the other hand, it is undefined for a substitution elasticity
equal to the retail demand elasticity. This occurs despite the fact that the marketing
margin always widens at the same time that the farm input price falls implying retail
price increases following an increase in the price of the marketing input.
Secondly, the relative significance of each of the parameters which determine the
degree of price transmission varies. For a given exogenous shock originating in the farm
sector, the substitution elasticity and the farm input cost share impact on the degree of
price transmission positively while the elasticity of market demand impacts negatively.
However, for such a shock, the marketing elasticity's impact is ambiguous, dependent as
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it is on the relative magnitudes of a and "'.
Finally, perfect price transmission, defined as a percentage change in farm input price
translating into a percentage change in retail price or into a percentage change in retail
price which is equal to the share of the farm input, is an exception rather than a rule,
arising as it is under highly restrictive assumptions.
The overriding implication of these conclusions is that, given a perfectly competitive
industry, and for a given exogenous shock, one is unlikely to be able to make robust
predictions regarding the marketing margin and the degree of price transmission unless
there is information on many parameters (l.e., the supply elasticities for both inputs,
the substitution elasticity, the retail demand elasticity, and the input cost shares). This
implication follows because the outcomes for the marketing margin and the degree of
price transmission are dependent on the interactions between these parameters.
In this review we have shown that the model of vertical price transmission assuming
perfectly competitive markets, constant returns to scale and variable input proportions
is a potent model in that it provides considerable insight into the movements of margin
behavior and the degree of price transmission in these markets. Despite its potency to
predict margin behavior and the degree of price transmission resulting from an exogenous
shock, nevertheless, the model's predictions are limited in their generality. This is because
the assumptions of perfectly competitive markets, constant returns to scale technology
and identical firms on which the model rests are highly restrictive. On relaxing each
of these assumptions, however, totally different predictions hold about movements in
the price spread and the degree of price transmission. For instance, as has been shown
towards the end of the chapter, assuming diverse firms in a perfectly competitive industry
operating with variable input proportions can make the assumption of constant returns
to scale redundant and thereby affect the predictions of the model of price transmission in
a perfectly competitive market with identical firms. In the next chapter, we explore the
effects, on the model's predictions regarding the degree of price transmission, of relaxing
the assumptions of perfect competition in the retail sector and of constant returns to scale
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in technology while keeping the assumptions that all firms in the industry are identical
and that the input markets are perfectly competitive.
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Chapter 4
The degree of price transmission
under the assumption of market
power and non-constant returns to
scale: an exposition
4.1 Background
In the preceding chapter, we have reviewed and evaluated the literature which analyses
the degree of price transmission in vertically-related markets assuming that all the stages
in the industry are perfectly competitive, that the industry in question is made up of
infinite number of identical firms, and that the industry operates with constant returns to
scale. Given these assumptions, the model has been shown to predict that the degree of
price transmission from the farm to the retail sector is determined by where, in the vertical
chain, the exogenous shock originates and by the relative magnitudes of parameters
that determine the elasticity of price transmission. And finally, it has been shown to
predict that perfect price transmission is a special case that arises under highly restrictive
assumptions rather in general.
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This chapter sets out to illustrate the implications of relaxing the assumption of per-
fect competition in all stages of the vertical market and of constant returns to scale in
industry technology while still keeping the assumption of identical firms in the industry.
To this end, it first reviews the relevant literature which analyses price transmission as-
suming market power in the retail sector with all the input markets kept still perfectly
competitive. It then reviews the literature which analyses price transmission assuming
not only market power in the retail sector but also non-constant returns to scale in indus-
try technology. It finally evaluates whether the predictions of the perfectly competitive
market with identical firms are borne out when the assumptions of market power in the
retail stage and of non-constant returns to scale in industry technology are introduced.
4.2 Market power: a definition
Before embarking on the review of the literature relating to price transmission in the
presence of market power in the retail sector, it is important to first define market power
and show its derivation. Market power means that a firm can change market price in
order to influence the quantity of output which it sells in a particular market (Tirole,
1992, p. 219). This stands in contrast with the assumption of perfect competition where
a firm has no influence over market price. Traditionally, market power has been modelled
in the context of a quantity-setting conjectural variations model of oligopoly.
The quantity-setting conjectural variations model of oligopoly has been criticized as
applying such dynamic concepts as reactions and conjectures to an apparently static,
simultaneous-move game (Friedman, 1983). Despite this criticism, however, Dixit (1986)
and Quirmbach (1988) emphasize the practical appeals of the conjectural variations ap-
proach. Firstly, it offers a framework within which different models of oligopoly (e.g.,
Cournot, monopoly) can be treated. Secondly, it allows measurement of the degree of
market power by parametrizing conjectural variations; with the parameterized conjec-
tural variation treating perfect competition, perfect collusion and the Cournot outcomes
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as special cases. These practical appeals are in fact what explain its popularity in the
applied industrial organization literature.
4.3 Conjectural Variations
Conjectural variations in a non-competitive industry, where there are many identical
firms with the same marginal cost, is defined as the change in output of all other firms
in response to a change in output of a representative firm (see, Iwata, 1974; Appelbaum,
1982; Dixit, 1986; and Quirmbach, 1988, inter alia).
Algebraically, and using the notation of the Gardner model which has just been
reviewed in the preceding chapter, this is denoted by:
(4.1)
where x is industry output; Xi is output of the representative firm; ::, is the firm's
conjecture about the change in industry output following a change in its own output and
A= ~ is the firm's conjectural variation.
Multiplying both sides of equation (4.1) by 7,one can obtain the elasticity of industry
output conjectured by the ith firm which is denoted by:
(4.2)
As (4.2) clearly shows, the firm's conjectural elasticity, ()i, is composed of both the
firm's output share (xi/x) and its conjectures about the change in industry output
(8x/8xi)' When the market is perfectly competitive, ()i = 0 applies because ::i = 0 =}
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A = -1. When the market is monopolistic or collusive, ()i = 1 because ::i = 1 ==? A = 0
and ~ = 1. In the special case of Cournot behavior, where ::i = 1 ==? A = 0, ()i becomes
the share of output of the ith firm in total industry output, ~l.
4.4 Profit maximization in the presence of oligopoly
power in the output market
Having defined a firm's conjectural variation, the next step is to show how to solve the
profit maximization problem of the firm when the output market is assumed oligopolistic.
A market is said to be oligopolistic when, unlike in the perfectly competitive market,
there are a small number of large firms competing among themselves for a market share.
Competition among firms might be on the basis of quantity, as in the case of the Cournot
model, or on the basis of price, as in the case of the Bertrand model.
4.4.1 The Cournot model of oligopoly
In the Cournot model, it is assumed that, on setting the profit maximizing level of output,
each firm makes a conjecture about changes in industry level output following changes in
its own output by first making a conjecture about changes in output by all other firms.
In the Bertrand model, on the other hand, a profit maximizing firm is assumed to set its
own price by making a conjecture about the change in industry price, following a change
in its own price, by first making a conjecture about the change in price by all other firms
in the industry.
1If we are assuming industry output as being an aggregation of output produced by n identical firms;
i.e., Q == nq (the symmetric case), then
8Q n8q
-=-=n8q 8q
This means that the level of industry output changes in proportion to the number of firms changing
their level of output. In the case being considered, only one firm changes output. Hence, 8Q/8q = 1
(Tirole, 1992, p. 220).
85
The classic model of oligopoly first developed by Cournot (1838) and as presented in
Varian (1992) considers two firms producing an homogeneous product with output levels
Xl and X2. Industry output is represented by X=XI +X2. The industry's inverse demand
function is denoted by P(X)=P(XI+X2). Finally, each firm's cost function is denoted by
Ci(Xi). Given these assumptions, each firm's profit maximization problem is then specified
as:
max7Ti(Xi, X2) = P(XI + X2)Xi - C;{Xi); i = 1,2.
Xi
(4.3)
Equation (4.3) states that one firm's profit depends on the other firm's choice of
output. Hence, in order to maximize its profit, firm 1 should make a conjecture about
firm 2's level of output and vice versa. When each firm's conjecture about the other
firm's choice of output is actually correct, then both firms' choices of output are said to
constitute a Nash equilibrium.
The following first-order conditions are necessary conditions for a Nash-Cournot equi-
librium to hold.
(4.4a)
and
(4.4b)
The second-order condition for each firm is given by:
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(4.5)
From the first-order conditions, Xl and X2 are solved for to obtain the reaction func-
tions for firms 1 and 2 respectively as:
OC(Xl) _ P(X)
OXI
oP (1+ fu:l.)oX OX2 (4.6a)
and
OC2(X2) _ P(X)
X2 = J,(X2) = ax>( )
oP 1+ ox2
oX OXI
(4.6b)
The slopes of the reaction functions are (~) for firm 1 and (~) for firm 2. In the
original Cournot model both are assumed zero because each firm believes that the other
firm's choice of output does not change in response to a change in its level of output
because the strategic output choices are made simultaneously. This is what gives the
model its static nature.
In the manner of Appelbaum (1982), the Cournot model can be generalized to n
identical firms producing an homogeneous product, x, using multiple inputs. Assume
marginal costs are constant and the same across all firms which implies that firms' costs
are linear. Furthermore, let firms face the same industry linear demand curve. Let
Ci=Ci (Xi,W) be the cost function of the ith firm where Xi is output of that firm and w
is the input price vector. For a given industry demand function for the final product,
X =D(Px, N), where Pa: is industry price and N is a demand shifter, the inverse demand
function is specified as Pa:= P{x).
Assuming that the demand function is continuously differentiable and decreasing in
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market price (i.e., pi (x) < 0 ) and that the cost function is continuously differentiable
and non-decreasing in output (i.e., C'(x) > 0), firm i chooses output to maximize profit,
s, as:
max-r, = Px (X) Xi - C, (Xi, w) i = 1, ...,n
Xi
(4.7)
The first-order condition for a maximum is then given by:
(4.8)
where Cf (Xi) is marginal cost, MCi of the ith firm. Assume that the second-order
diti (J21r. 0 \...I' 1 2 . ti fi dcon ition 8x1 < v Z=, , ... , n IS sa IS e .
,
Equation (4.8) can be interpreted as stating that once the level of output which
maximizes profit is attained, the amount of profit an extra unit of output brings to the
firm (price minus marginal cost) and the magnitude by which price has to fall in order
for the extra unit of output to be sold must equal zero.
Algebraically, this can be written as:
(4.8a)
Factoring out P x, multiplying the second term of the right-hand side by ~, and then
division by dx yields,
Px (x) [1+ ~1 = AIc, (4.8b)
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where 'fJ is the price elasticity of industry demand (~: x ~) which is in all circumstances
negative.
Equation (4.8b) is used to derive industry 'Lerner Index' (LI) which measures the
degree of oligopoly power (see Appelbaum op. cit; and Bhuyan and Lopez, 1997)2. This
is written as:
(4.8c)
In the manner of Bhuyan and Lopez, op. cit., equation (4.8c) is weighted by the
market share (Si = xi/x) to obtain:
(4.9a)
Equation (4.9a) can then be summed over i firms to obtain the aggregate 'Lerner Index'
for the industry as:
(4.9b)
2Cowling and Waterson (1976) define the 'Lerner Index' slightly differently as:
1+A
NT}
et»,
Ai = b'i:i and N is the number of firms in the industry. As the number of firms declines the
price cost margin increases.
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where MC and () are the weighted marginal cost and weighted elasticity of conjectural
variation. The fact that M C ~ 0 implies that L1 < 1; and the fact that I TJ I> 0, and
that Px - MC ~ 0 implies that L1 ~ o. Thus, the degree of oligopoly power lies between
zero and one.
As (4.9b) makes evident, the 'Lerner Index' is proportional to the conjectural elastic-
ity, (), and inversely proportional to the industry price elasticity of demand. Obviously,
for a given demand elasticity, the higher (), the larger the mark-up which is defined as
the difference between price and marginal cost expressed as a proportion of price. And
conversely, the lower (), the smaller the mark-up taking the extreme value of zero for a
perfectly competitive market where P = MC. On the other hand, the less elastic con-
sumer demand, the larger the mark-up and the greater the price distortiorr' and vice
versa.
4.4.2 The Bertrand model of oligopoly
In the preceding, it was shown that in the Cournot model, oligopoly power shows as the
mark-up of retail price over marginal cost because firms compete over output quantities
taking market price as given. In the Bertrand model of oligopoly, however, the price
mark-up disappears when firms have to compete over market price.
In the manner of Varian (1992)4, consider a two-firm industry where each firm faces
a constant marginal cost and produces an homogeneous product. The market demand
curve is defined in such a way that each firm believes that it can supply the whole market
if it sets its own price below the other firm's price. Given these assumptions therefore
each firm's profit maximization problem can be set as:
3Price distortion is defined as the deviation of market price from the socially optimal price, i.e., the
marginal cost (Tirole, 1992, p. 66).
4See also Tirole (1992) for an exposition of the Bertrand Paradox.
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(4.10)
where the price set by the ith firm is given by Pi.
The first-order conditions for firms 1 and 2 are then written, respectively, as:
(4.11a)
and
(4.11b)
where Cl and C2 are marginal costs for firms 1 and 2 respectively. Assume that the
second-order condition, ~~i ::; 0 is satisfied for i=l, 2.
From the first-order conditions, it can be observed that, on maximizing profit, each
firm makes a conjecture about the change in market price following a change in its price
level, g;. The fact that P=PI if PI < P2; P = P2 if PI > P2; and P = PI = P2 if PI = P2
implies that when making a conjecture about the change in market price, following a
change in its own price level, each firm is implicitly holding a belief about the change in
the price of the rival firm in response to a change in its output price.
Rearranging equations (4.11a) and (4.11b), the reaction functions for firms 1 and 2
can then be obtained as:
(4.12a)
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and
(4.12b)
In the Bertrand model, the Nash equilibrium holds when each firm maximizes profit
given that the conjecture it makes about (9i:;) is actually correct. This means that
once equilibrium is achieved, then no change in one firm's output price will induce a
change in market price. In other words, in equilibrium, ~:: = O. The key conclusion
that follows from the Bertrand model is therefore that in equilibrium each firm must
set output price equal to its marginal cost, which is what actually holds in the perfectly
competitive model. As a result, the price-cost margin vanishes in the Bertrand model.
Under the given assumptions of product homogeneity and identical firms, any dis-
cussion of the effects of oligopoly power on the degree of price transmission is therefore
possible only when a model of oligopoly assumes a pricing system whereby each firm in
the industry allows for a price-cost margin. And of course this is possible only when
firms are considered as competing on the basis of quantity as in the Cournot model and
not on the basis of price as in the Bertrand model.
Assume that firms are competing on the basis of quantity. We then want to review
the theoretical literature to see if assuming market power in the output market produces
outcomes for the price spread and the degree of price transmission that are any different
from those obtained assnming perfect competition in this market. Two models that will
form the focus of our review are Holloway (1991) and McCorriston et al. (1998).
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4.5 The price spread in an oligopolistic market (Hol-
loway, 1991)
As has been pointed out earlier, the assumption of firms producing an homogeneous
product dictates one to model market power in the context of quantity-setting oligopoly.
As might be recalled, implicit in this model of oligopoly is that price of industry output
is set equal to marginal cost plus the price-cost margin (i.e., the price mark-up). This is
clearly seen when (4.9b) is rearranged to appear as:
(4.13)
It can be readily observed from (4.13) that the introduction of market power at the
retail stage of the industry makes for a radical departure in approach when modelling
price transmission. This is because retail price no longer equals marginal cost as when
the retail stage is assumed perfectly competitive. Instead, it contains two components;
a marginal cost component and a mark-up component. Assume now that retail price
changes in response to a change in the price of the farm input. Then the change in
retail price will reflect part as a change in the marginal cost and part as a change in the
mark-up.
In the literature, there have developed several theoretical models which extend the
work of Gardner op. cit. to allow for oligopoly power at the retail stage of the food
industry. An early such model is that by Holloway (1991). This model extends the
Gardner model by employing the notion of conjectural variations in the context of the
food industry while explicitly allowingfor the entry of new firms into this industry. The
model operates within a 10-equation system.
The first equation denotes the industry's retail demand function as in the Gardner
model inclusive of a retail demand shifter while the second denotes aggregate output
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of the industry, X= 2:i Xi, ViE {I, 2, ...n} where n is the number of firms. The third
equation denotes the first-order condition for an oligopolistic firm which is as stated in
(4.13) above. The fourth equation specifies a nonzero fixed cost, K, which is defined
as the difference between the value of the nth firm's output and its marginal cost, i.e.,
as Pxxn - MCnxn - K = O. This equation is included in order to make the number
of firms endogenous, and together with the first-order condition, to make the conduct
parameter, ()be determined not only by the elasticity of demand but also by a fixed cost,
K,. The fifth and sixth equations describe demand for the farm and marketing inputs
as derived from Shephard's lemma'' while the seventh and eighth equations describe
aggregation conditions for the inputs market in symmetric equilibrium. The last two
equations describe inverse supply relations for the farm and marketing inputs as specified
in the Gardner model.
This system of ten equations is then allowed to be displaced, in the manner of the
Gardner model, by simultaneous movements in the exogenous variables in the retail, farm
and marketing sectors and then the equilibrating adjustments in each of the endogenous
variables solved for. This is done by assuming that farm commodity supplies are exoge-
nous in the manner of Wohlgenant, op. cit. and that the supply of nonfarm inputs to
the food industry is perfectly elastic.
The model then analyses, using comparative statics and simulation, the elasticities
of Gardner's farm-retail price spread with respect to the three exogenous variables. The
major conclusions that derive from this model are that, relative to the perfectly compet-
itive case with an infinite number of firms, Cournot competition among a small number
of firms distorts the adjustment of the price spread to movements in the exogenous vari-
5Dcnoting the farm input of the nth firm by an and its marketing input by bn and their respective
prices by Pa and Pb, then, given the cost function C(Pa,Pb,x) where x is industry output, then by
Shephard's lemma, the nth firm's conditional factor demand functions are derived as:
an = 8C{.)xn/8Pa
bn = 8C(.)xn/8Pb
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ables. Given an increase in retail demand, the model finds that the price spread falls
by much more when the number of firms is small than when it is large. On the other
hand, given an increase in the supply of the farm input, the price spread widens by much
more when the number of firms in the industry is small than when this number is large.
Finally, given an increase in the price of marketing services, the price spread increases
by much less when the number of firms is small than when it is large.
Holloway's model assumes linearity in both the retail demand and input supply func-
tions. Consequently, its predictions are model dependent. However, it is a potent model
in that it predicts the distortionary effects of oligopoly power on movements in the price
spread following changes in the conditions of input supply and retail demand. As such,
it suggests that prior to estimating the degree of price transmission in the food industry
the behavior of this industry be examined through a rigorous test for perfect competition
in its retail sector. Following this suggestion, a number of studies have been conducted
so far. For empirical literature in this regard, see, inter alia, Holloway, op. cit.; Bhuyan
and Lopez, op. cit.; and Gohin and Guyomard ( 2000).
Even though the Holloway model analyses the distortionary effects of oligopoly power
in the retail market on movements in the price spread relative to those in a perfectly
competitive market, it does not analyze the degree of price transmission which results
from the presence of market power. As a model of vertical price transmission therefore
it is not complete.
Recently, McCorriston et al. (1998) extend the Gardner model to allow for market
power in the retail sector of the industry and then evaluate the effects of market power
on the degree of price transmission taking the Gardner model as a benchmark. Their
approach to measuring market power is very much in the tradition of the Holloway
model as they operate within the framework of a quantity-setting conjectural variations
model of oligopoly. But there are several differences with the Holloway model. First,
they do not assume number of firms to be endogenous, i.e., they do not assume entry
into the industry to be determined by a non-negative fixed cost. Second, they conduct
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comparative statics assuming only a shift in the supply of the farm input Third, they
assume a generalized form of retail demand function rather than a linear retail demand
function as the Holloway model does. Fourth, their major interest in modelling is more
to evaluate the magnitude of the price transmission elasticity in the presence of market
power relative to that in the Gardner model than to evaluate movements in the price
spread under different market structures as the Holloway model does.
The model by McCorriston et al. operates within a system containing seven equations.
Using the notation of the Gardner model, this system of equations is described and
discussed at length.
4.6 The degree of price transmission in the presence
of oligopoly power in the output market (Me-
Corriston et al .. , 1998)
The first equation describes the production function of the industry as:
x = f (a,b) (4.14a)
The second equation describes the demand function for the retail product as:
(4.14b)
The third and fourth equations describe the inverse demand functions for the farm and
marketing inputs as:
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P« = CIa (4.14c)
and
(4.14d)
respectively where C denotes industry marginal cost. They are derived from the firm's
cost minimization problem. Finally, the fifth and sixth equations describe the inverse
supply functions for these two inputs as:
Pa = g(a, W) (4.14e)
and
Pb = h(b,T) (4.14/)
The first-order condition for a profit maximum assuming market power in the retail sector
is expressed in terms of the firm's mark-up over industry marginal cost, C as:
(4.14g)
which is then used to describe the price equation
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(4.14h)
where the reciprocal of the bracketed term in (4.14g) is denoted by A = ~.
It is worth noting that except for the inverse demand functions for the farm and
marketing inputs in (4.14c) and (4.14d) and for the retail price equation in (4.14h),
the system's specification is similar to that of Gardner's. The system contains seven
equations in seven endogenous variables (i.e., a, b, x, P x, P a, Pb).
4.6.1 The effects of a farm input supply shift
Having defined the system's equilibrium, the effects of disturbances in initial equilibrium
originating in the farm input supply sector are analyzed in the same manner as in the
Gardner model. As before, the procedure involves expressing changes in each of the seven
equations as total differential changes. And not surprisingly, these changes are identical
to those for the Gardner model except for changes in the inverse demand functions for
the farm and marketing services which are now specified as:
dPa = de* - {3 (da· - db*) (4.15a)
a
and
dH = de· + ~ (da· - db·) (4.15b)
a
where
dP; (1 - /l) = de· (4.15c)
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where
wO
/-L = - (0 _ 17)and
w = 817/8Px
(4.15d)
The terms a and (3 represent the factor cost shares, ((1!0/11) and ((1!~/11)respectively
in the presence of oligopoly power", The term /-L represents the negative of the change in
the price-cost margin and represents a fall (rise) in the price-cost margin as retail price
rises conditional on whether w is positive (negative). For instance, if an increase in Px
results in the demand elasticity becoming more elastic, i.e., 17,which is negative gets
larger in absolute terms as well, then the price-cost margin will narrow, implying that
price falls in response to demand becoming more elastic.
4.6.2 The functional forms of retail demand and the price-cost
margin: a digression
As has been hint.ed at from (4.15d), the direction of change in the price-cost margin
following changes in Px, critically depends on the demand elasticity's response to Px'
The funct.ional form of demand is thus the key determinant of the change in the price-cost
margin following changes in the conditions of supply in the farm input. To appreciate
the import.ance of this crucial point, it is important that we make a digression in order to
explain the sensitivity of the demand elasticity to a change in retail price given different
functional forms.
Consider a generalized demand function of the form:
6Recall from (3.3a) the Euler equation, x = faa+ fbb. By virtue of (4.14c) and (4.14d), fa = Pale and
fb= PblC a. Also by virtue of (4.1g), C = Pz(l +(}Iry). Then the Euler equation can be written as:
x =Px(i+~/,,) + P,(it~/,,)which on dividing through out by x can be re-written as :
1 - P"a + P"b D oting o - p..a and (3 - P"b the Euler eq at' b
- P",x(l+O/'1l P"x(l+o/'1)' en ~ - P",x(l+o/'1) - P"x(l+o/'1)' u Ion can e
written as:
1= a + {3 which is as shown in this model.
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x = f(p) (4.16)
from which the elasticity of demand is calculated as:
'TJ = (8X x !!.)
8p x (4.17)
To analyze the direction of change in the elasticity of demand, when P x changes,
differentiate 'TJ with respect to P x to obtain:
[ (
8 (~) !!.) + (8X) !_(8X 8x .!!...)]
8p x 8p x 8p 8p x2 (4.18)
which, on simplification, reduces to:
87] [82 Xp 8x 1 8x 8x p 1
-- --+------8p - 8p2X 8p x 8p 8p x2 (4.18a)
To evaluate the sign and magnitude of ~ for different functional forms of demand
consider the linear and constant elasticity demand functions. First consider the linear
demand function.
x=a-bp (4.19)
where a and b are positive constants. The first and second-order derivatives of the linear
demand function are given as follows:
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OX 02X
- = -b < O· and - = 0
op 'Op2 (4.20)
Using (4.20), (4.18a) can then be re-written as:
0", ox 1 ox ox p
op = op; - op op x2 (4.18b)
which, when divided throughout by (~; x ~) , reduces to
(4.18c)
Since in all normal cases", is negative, (4.18c) is always positive, implying that, when
a linear demand function is assumed, the elasticity of demand moves in the same direction
as retail price with the result that when the latter increases so does demand elasticity
and vice versa. The implication of this outcome for the price-cost margin is quite clear.
As might be recalled from (4.9b ), the price-cost margin is inversely proportional to the
elasticity of demand so that when the latter increases the margin narrows and vice versa.
Given a linear demand curve, therefore the demand elasticity moves in the same direction
as retail price the implication being that the margin moves in the opposite direction as
demand elasticity and hence retail price.
Intuitively, this can be interpreted as saying that when consumers and retailers are
related in a linear demand function, then retailers are more likely to lose customers if
they increase price substantially in response to an increase in farm input price as this
drives consumers away who have now become more sensitive to price changes.
This being the case, in the event of a sudden increase in farm input price following
an exogenous shock, retailers increase price by just a little so that their customers are
not driven away. But a small retail price increase comes only at the expense of a squeeze
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in their margin. If, on the other hand, there occurs a sudden fall in farm input price
following such an exogenous shock, then retailers do not have to reduce retail price
substantially as consumers have now become insensitive to a retail price change (in other
words, they have become 'captive customers'). Instead, retailers reduce their price by
just a little and instead widen their margin.
Consider now a constant elasticity demand function of the form:
a
x=-pe (4.21)
where a and e are constants. Its first and second-order derivatives are given as:
(4.22)
which, when substituted into equation (4.18a) yield a value for ~ given by,
8", =0
8p . (4.18d)
For a given constant elasticity demand function therefore, the elasticity of demand is
insensitive to changes in retail price with the result that the former remains unchanged
as retail price changes. Intuitively, this means that in response to a change in farm input
price, retailers change their price in the same proportion as the change in marginal cost
with the result that their margin remains unchanged.
The effects of different functional forms on the price-cost margin can be summarized
by invoking equation (4.13) which partitions the industry output price into marginal
cost and the price-cost margin. Now consider an increase in the price of industry output.
Then when I/l; = 1+ 'T/ > 0, as in a linear demand case, the change in retail price is
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less than that in marginal cost because the change in the price cost-margin is negative.
When :A = 0, as in a constant elasticity demand case, the change in retail price equals
that in marginal cost so that the price-cost margin remains unchanged.
So much for the digression. Now going back to the model which is being considered,
having analyzed the effects of shifts in the inverse supply function for the farm input on
all endogenous variables, the percentage changes in these variables are then solved for in
terms of the percentage change in the farm input price, ew.
4.6.3 Solving for relative changes in the endogenous variables
in terms of ew.
Doing this results in the following three-equation system 7•
-'T]dP; + ada" + j3db* = 0 (4.23a)
(4.23b)
(4.23c)
This system of equations is solved using Cramer's rule. For the purposes of our
review, only percentage changes in the prices of the retail product and the farm input
are presented respectively as:
7Note when Jl=O, this three-equation system reduces to that in the basic model assuming the exoge-
nous shock originates in the farm input supply sector.
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(4.24a)
dP* = eWea (I - /-l) (eb + aa) - (3TJ)
a D' (4.24b)
where D' = -TJ ({3ea + (3eb+ a) + (1 - /-l) eaeb + (I - /-l) a {aea + (3eb) . It is positive
in normal cases.
4.6.4 The elasticity of price transmission in an oligopolistic
market
Having obtained the percentage changes in P x and P a, the model finally derives the
elasticity of price transmission, rIC (where the superscript, IC, stands for an imperfectly
competitive market), as follows.
(4.25)
Judging from (4.25), the major finding of the model by McCorriston et. al.. is that
under the assumption of market power, the relative magnitude of the price transmission
elasticity cannot be determined a priori. As the above digression has made clear, this is
because /-l is signed differently for different functional forms.
For a linear demand function, the transmission elasticity in an imperfectly competitive
market is less than that in a perfectly competitive market since /-l < O. On the other hand,
for a non-linear demand function (specifically, for a constant elasticity demand form),
the transmission elasticity in an imperfectly competitive market is identical to that in a
perfectly competitive model since /-l = o. An important implication deriving from their
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finding is that in the absence of prior knowledge regarding the demand function with
which a particular industry is operating, then one just is not in a position to evaluate
the degree of price transmission in an oligopolistic market relative to that in a perfectly
competitive market.
Their finding is consistent with those established in the international trade literature,
where the pass-through of foreign exchange costs to import price has been assessed (see,
for instance, Bernhofen and Xu, 1999; Feenstra, 1988), and in the tax incidence literature
where the impact of tax shifts on retail price changes has been assessed (Seade, 1985).
It is worth noting that while Holloway's model shows that, taking the Gardner model
as a benchmark, the assumption of oligopoly power leads to distortions in the movements
of the price spread following changes in the exogenous variables originating in the retail,
farm and marketing sectors, the model by McCorriston et al.. is inconclusive on this
count. This is not surprising given that the former assumes a linear retail demand
function while the latter assumes a generalized demand function.
4.6.5 Summary and evaluation
In the preceding, we have reviewed two important theoretical models which analyze the
effects of oligopoly power in the retail market on movements in the price spread and on the
degree of price transmission. These are the models by Holloway and that by McCorriston
et al.. Methodologically, it has been shown that they operate within the framework of the
quantity-setting conjectural variations model of oligopoly. Whereas both models use the
Gardner model as a benchmark, the Holloway model aims to evaluate movements in the
price spread in the presence of market power in the retail market assuming simultaneous
shocks in the output and input markets while the model by McCorriston et. al.. aims to
evaluate the magnitude of the elasticity of price transmission in such a market assuming
only a raw input supply shock.
The major conclusion of the Holloway model is that, relative to the perfectly compet-
itive case with an infinite number of firms, Cournot competition among a small number
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of oligopolistic firms distorts the adjustment of the price spread to movements in the
exogenous variables. Thus, relative to the change in the price spread that obtains in
the presence of competition among a large number of firms, the change in the price
spread which obtains in the presence of Cournot competition among a small number of
oligopolistic firms is much more for a retail demand and farm input supply increases and
much less for a marketing price increase. This result derives directly from the assumption
of linear retail demand and input supply functions. As such, this conclusion is model
sensitive.
The major conclusion of the model by McCorriston et al., on the other hand, is that
the effects of oligopoly power at the retail stage of the industry on the elasticity of price
transmission cannot be determined a priori. This derives directly from the assumption
of a generalized retail demand function for the industry. Given a linear industry retail
demand function, the price-cost margin changes in the opposite direction to retail price
with the result that when the latter increases the price-cost margin falls so that the net
increase in retail price is less than that in the marginal cost and vice versa. Consequently,
the elasticity of price transmission assuming an oligopolistic industry is smaller than a
price transmission elasticity in a perfectly competitive industry. On the other hand,
given a constant elasticity retail demand function, the elasticity of price transmission is
the same in both perfectly competitive and oligopolistic markets. This is because changes
in retail price only reflect those in the marginal cost as the price-cost margin remains
unchanged following changes in farm input price.
The major implication that derives from the model by McCorriston et al. is that in
the absence of a prior knowledge regarding the demand function with which a particular
industry is operating one just is not in a position to evaluate the degree of price trans-
mission in an oligopolistic market taking the degree of price transmission in a perfectly
competitive market as a benchmark.
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4.7 The degree of price transmission in the presence
of oligopoly power in the output market and of
non-constant returns to scale in industry tech-
nology (McCorriston et. al.. 2001)
4.7.1 Background
The literature that we have reviewed in relation to price transmission in both the Gardner
model and the models with market power (i.e., those by Holloway and McCorriston et
al.) assumes industry technology is characterized by constant returns to scale.
The major critique of this assumption is that by focusing on market structure to
explain firms' performance (i.e., the price-cost margin), it neglects the role of firms' cost
structure in determining this very performance (Morrison Paul, 1999; and McCorriston et
al.. ,2001). For instance, a drop in unit cost which follows any technological improvement
results in increased cost efficiency (i.e., unit cost falls for any output level) thus leading
to lower costs and ultimately to a lower price for consumers ( Morrison Paul, op. cit.).
In the empirical literature, only rarely has constant returns to scale been observed
in production. Testing for oligopoly power and constant returns to scale in 40 food and
tobacco industries in the US, for instance, Bhuyan and Lopez, op. cit. find that the null
hypothesis of constant returns to scale is rejected in thirty-three industries of the sample
with 20 industries exhibiting increasing returns to scale and 13 exhibiting decreasing
returns to scale. Of the total sample, only 7 industries exhibit constant returns to scale.
The aforementioned theoretical critique and the rarity of empirical evidence support-
ing constant returns to scale in production points to the necessity of having to extend
the model of imperfect competition reviewed previously to take account of non-constant
returns to scale in technology. In the following, we review a recent model by McCorris-
ton et al. (2001) which does just this. It does not only allow for oligopoly power in the
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retail market but also account for non-constant returns to scale in industry technology.
This model works on the premise that there is a link between returns to scale and the
price-cost margin. To see clearly the workings of the model therefore it is necessary to
first establish a linkage between returns to scale and the price-cost margin which we do
next.
4.7.2 The linkage between returns to scale and the price-cost
margin: a digression
The linkage between returns to scale and the firm's price-cost margin is better appreciated
if a relationship between the cost function and production technology is first established.
In the manner of Simon and Blume (1994), and sticking to the notation of the Gardner
model consider
(4.26)
where a = Sa and f3 = Sb are shares of input, a and b in total output, x, and k is a
technology parameter.
For a given cost function,
(4.27)
where P a and Pb are the respective prices of a and b, the first-order condition for a
maximum of profit is given by8:
BThis is done by first defining the profit function as:
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(4.28a)
and
(4.28b)
Division of P« by Pb and using equation (4.28a) yields values of a and b as:
(
n ){3/n+f3
_ Qrb l/Ot+f3
a - (3P
a
ki/{3 x (4.29a)
and
(
R kI/n) -n/n+{3
b - Q b I/n+{3
- (3P
a
X (4.29b)
Substituting a and b into (4.27), one obtains the cost function expressed as a function
of input prices, input cost shares and output:
(4.30a)
Re-writing, for convenience, (4.30a) as:
and then differentiating 7r with respect to a and b to get the first-order conditions normalising the price
of output to 1.
109
(4.30b)
where ¢ denotes the bracketed term in (4.30a), the average cost function (AC) can be
written as:
(4.31 )
Denoting, for simplicity, a + (3 = p, where p is a scale measure, then Q!,:3 - 1= l;e.
We say there are constant returns to scale in technology when AC is constant at ¢, for all
levels of output; i.e., when (l;e) = 0; increasing returns to scale when AC is declining
in output; i.e., when ~1;P1< 0; and decreasing returns to scale when AC is increasing
. t t' h l::.e 09III oU,PU ,I.e., w en p > .
9The returns to scale measure for the Cobb-Douglas production function can, alternatively, be derived
as in Varian (1992, p. 17). Considering a production function
then, by the homogeneity rule, scaling of the inputs by a scalar, t, yields
from which,
To see how output reacts to a scaling of the inputs, differentiate y" with respect to t to obtain,
Denoting, for simplicity, a+f3 = p, then we have 1-I/a+f3 = 1-1/ p =7'We say constant returns
110
From the behavior of the cost curves, it is a very well known fact that when the
average cost curve is falling, the marginal cost curve is falling over a certain range of
output and when the former is rising the latter is rising too. From this behavior of the
cost curves therefore it can be predicted that, for a given price of the retail product, Px,
the price-cost margin widens as the average cost falls (because marginal cost also falls
for a given price), when increasing returns to scale obtain in production, and falls as the
latter rises (because marginal cost rises for a given price), when decreasing returns to
scale operate in production. On the other hand, the price-cost margin remains unchanged
when the average cost remains fixed which implies that marginal cost is also fixed.
It is with an eye for this linkage between the mark-up and marginal cost, which is
normally lost to a model which assumes constant returns to scale in industry technol-
ogy, that McCorriston et al. (2001) extend the model of price transmission under the
assumption of market power allowing for non-constant returns to scale.
4.7.3 The model (McCorriston et. al .. , 2001).
In many ways, this model is similar to that which allows for market power with constant
returns to scale as in McCorriston et al. (1998) and is described by a system of equations
as presented in (4.14a)-(4.14h). The innovation introduced into the model being reviewed
concerns relative changes in the prices of the farm and marketing inputs which now have
to account for the effects of returns to scale as follows.
dp. = de· _ ./!._da· + ./!._db· + a(p - 1) dx"
a pa pa ap (4.32a)
and
to scale obtain when £=l = OJ(implying p = 1) increasing returns to scale when cl > 0; (implyingp p
p> 1) and decreasing returns to scale when ~ < 0 (implying p < 1).
111
dR* = de* + !!:_da* - !!:_db* + u(p - 1) dai"
b pa pa up (4.32b)
Division of the input cost shares, a and /3, by the scale measure, p, is done in order
to take account of an increase in cost shares when technology exhibits decreasing returns
to scale (because division of the cost shares by P Ip<lyields larger such shares) and a
decrease in these shares when the latter exhibits increasing returns to scale (because
division of the cost shares by P Ip>l yields smaller such shares).
The fact that changes in the prices of the farm and marketing inputs are proportional
to a change in the retail product when there are increasing returns to scale in production
and inversely proportional to a change in the latter when technology exhibits decreasing
returns to scale can be explained as follows.
As pointed out earlier, when there are increasing returns to scale, average cost falls as
output increases. This means, for a given demand for the retail product, it pays for firms
to expand output as average cost falls. But this in turn means they have to demand more
of these inputs which they can only do by paying higher prices. Conversely, average cost
rises with output when there are decreasing returns to scale. This creates an incentive
for firms to cut back on their scale of production so that (by so doing) they can reduce
average cost. This is reflected in less of the inputs being demanded, and, consequently,
in lower prices being paid for these inputs.
4.7.4 Effects of a shift in farm input supply
Analysis of the disturbances in initial equilibrium that come about subsequent to a
farm input supply shock proceeds in the same fashion as in the perfectly competitive
and market power models. This involves the task of expressing changes in each of the
endogenous variables as total differential changes and then solving for the reduced-form
equations for the percentage changes in the endogenous variables following an exogenous
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shock to the farm input sector. In the model being reviewed, these are derived, using
Cramer's rule, from a three-equation system which is described as:
-T]dP; + ado" + /3db* = 0 (4.33a)
(1- J-l)dP* _ (ea/3 - pa + eaaa (p - 1)) da* + (/3 + /3a (p - 1)) db'" = ew (4.33b)
x ~ ~
(1_ J-l)dP'" + (a + aa (p - 1)) da" _ (eba + ap - /3a (p - 1)) db'" = 0
x ap ap (4.33c)
Again for the purposes of our review we consider only changes in the prices of the
farm input and the retail product respectively as:
dP* = ewea[(1 - J-l)p(peb + a(7) - /3T]+ T](p - 1)+ T](p - 1) (peb + oa)]
a D" (4.34a)
and
(4.34b)
where D" = -T] (oea + oeb + ap - /3eba (p - 1) - aeaa (p - 1) - (eaeb) p (p - 1))+
(1 - J-l)p(eaebP + oeaa + /3eba).
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4.7.5 The elasticity of price transmission assuming oligopoly
power and non-constant returns to scale
Given dP; and dP:, the model finally derives the elasticity of price transmission assuming
market power in the retail sector and non-constant returns to scale in industry technology,
TNCR, as:
NCR dP; np (eb+ 0")
T =--=
dP; [(nO" + ebP) ((1 - J-L) P + TJ (p - 1)) - ,aryl (4.35)
To see how the introduction of non-constant returns to scale impacts on the degrees
of price transmission in the Gardner model and the model by McCorriston et al.., 1998,
the elasticity of price transmission in the Gardner model, TPC, is divided by TNCR and
evaluated for a perfectly elastic marketing supply to obtainl''
(4.36)
where TJ and J-L are normally negative.
Given (4.36), the model makes predictions about the magnitude of the elasticity of
price transmission in a market structure with oligopoly power in the retail market and
non-constant returns to scale in industry technology taking as a benchmark the elasticity
of price transmission in perfectly competitive markets with constant returns. These
predictions can be summarized as follows.
First, given constant returns to scale (i.e., for P = 1), a linear demand function, and
market power in the retail sector, the elasticity of price transmission falls short of that
obtained assuming a perfectly competitive industry by J-L (i.e., for P = 1, J-L < 0). When
lOFor ease of comparison, recall that, for a given shock originating in the farm input sector, the
elasticity of price transmission in the Gardner model is given by:
rPc _ S,,(tr+~,,)
- eb+S ..tr-S,,'1 •
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such is the case, the transmission elasticity for an industry with market power is said to
be 'under-shifting' relative to that for a competitive industry.
Second, given decreasing returns to scale, a linear demand function and market power
in the retail sector (i. e., for J-l < ° and p < 1), 'under-shifting' gets even more pronounced
because, algebraically speaking, the impact of market power is reinforced by an amount,
TJ (p - 1) / p, which is positive since TJ is negative and p < 1.
Third, given increasing returns to scale, a linear demand function and market power
in the retail sector (Le. for J-l < ° and p > 1), then, for a small TJ, 'under-shifting' becomes
less pronounced; with the impact of market power on the elasticity of price transmission
being undermined by the amount, TJ (p - 1) / p, which is negative since TJ is negative and
p > 1. In fact, in the extreme case of J-l = 0, 'over-shifting' might obtain as rPc /rNCR
is less than unity (i.e., for p Ip>land J-l = 0) the implication being that the transmission
elasticity for a perfectly competitive industry with increasing returns to scale is greater
than that for a competitive industry with constant returns to scale.
Intuitively, the fact that, for a relatively low substitution elasticity, decreasing returns
to scale work to the same effect as market power can be explained with reference to the
inverse relationship between average costs and returns to scale already established earlier.
As might be recalled, it was said earlier that as firms expand (or contract) output,
their average cost rises (or falls) if the technology exhibits decreasing returns to scale.
This means that a downward adjustment in output resulting from a negative shock to
the supply of the farm input leads to a fall in the industry's average unit cost. This in
turn means that an increase in P a which follows an exogenous supply shock does not
translate into a proportional increase in P x because at the same time that the former
increases, average cost falls with the result that the increase in the latter is smaller than
that in Pa. Consequently, the degree of price transmission from the farm to the retail
sector is smaller.
In the converse case of a technology exhibiting increasing returns to scale, average cost
falls (or rises) as output expands (or contracts). This means that a downward adjustment
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in output resulting from a shock originating in the farm supply sector leads to an increase
in industry average cost, and, subsequently, to that in retail price.
The implication is that an increase in P a which follows an exogenous shock in the
farm input sector is exacerbated by an increase in industry average cost, and, subse-
quently, by an increase in P x that comes as a result of a contraction in retail output. It
thus follows that relative to when constant returns to scale are assumed, the degree of
price transmission is greater when increasing returns to scale obtain. This seems to be
congruent with findings in the international trade literature. For instance, Feenstra op
cit. find that an increase in the expected exchange rate can be more than fully passed
through when marginal costs are declining in output.
4.7.6 Summary and evaluation
This section has introduced and reviewed a recent model by McCorriston et al.. (2001)
which analyses the interaction between market power in the retail market and non-
constant returns to scale in industry technology. As the review has made evident, a price
transmission elasticity which is derived allowing for non-constant returns to scale and
market power is sensitive not only to changes in the structure of the market as measured
by the demand elasticity and the market power parameters but also to cost changes as
reflected by the nature of returns to scale.
For given values of these market structure parameters, and taking the elasticity of
price transmission assuming market power and constant returns to scale as a bench
mark, and keeping all other determining parameters constant, the model just reviewed
shows that the degree of price transmission from the farm to the retail sector reflects
the nature of returns to scale with which industry technology operates. This being
the case, under the given assumptions, the degree of price transmission is greater when
production technology is characterized by increasing returns to scale and smaller when
this technology is characterized by decreasing returns to scale.
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4.8 A brief summary of the theoretical literature re-
view and possible directions for further research
4.8.1 A brief summary
To this stage we have presented a detailed review of the major theoretical models of price
transmission in vertically-related markets whereby an industry is assumed to produce a
finished product using two inputs. The key conclusion that comes out of this review
is that the outcomes for the degree of price transmission are highly sensitive to the
assumptions made regarding market structure and processing technology.
Given the assumptions of perfectly competitive markets in the input and output mar-
kets, of variable input proportions and constant returns to scale in industry technology,
three major predictions emerge out of the review regarding the degree of price transmis-
sion. Firstly, the degree of price transmission from the farm to the retail sector hinges on
the relative magnitudes of the retail demand and supply elasticities and cost shares of the
two inputs. Secondly, ceteris paribus, the outcome for the degree of price transmission is
determined by whether the exogenous shock originates in the inputs supply sector or in
the retail sector. Finally, in all normal cases, price transmission is not perfect with per-
fect price transmission arising only as an exception under highly restrictive assumptions
rather than as a generality.
Given the assumptions of constant returns to scale, of variable input proportions
and of perfect competition in the markets for the two inputs, the review shows that the
outcome for the degree of price transmission in the presence of oligopoly power in the
final product market, hinges, ceteris paribus, on the assumption regarding the industry's
retail demand function. Firstly, given a constant elasticity demand function, the review
shows that the degree of price transmission in the presence of oligopoly power is identical
to the degree of price transmission in a perfectly competitive market. Secondly, given
a linear demand function, the review shows that the degree of price transmission in the
presence of oligopoly power is smaller than that in the perfectly competitive model.
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The review also shows that for a given degree of competition in the markets for
inputs and for the final product, and assuming all other parameters remain constant, the
degree of price transmission is sensitive to the nature of returns to scale characterizing
industry technology. Ceteris paribus, relative to the degree of price transmission obtained
assuming constant returns to scale in industry technology, the degree of price transmission
is greater when industry technology exhibits increasing returns to scale and smaller when
industry technology exhibits decreasing returns to scale.
4.8.2 Possible directions for further research
As our review has made evident, the theoretical models of price transmission are premised
on restrictive assumptions. First, they assume that the degree of price transmission is
insensitive to the direction of change in the conditions of input supply or in those of
retail demand. In other words, they assume that the magnitude and speed of change in
retail price is symmetric with respect to an increase as well as a decrease in the price
of the farm input. Second, not only do they assume that in the process of exchange
on the spot trading occurs between retailers and input suppliers with the result that
there is no need for any explicit contractual agreement to be put in place but they also
assume that the boundary between retailers and input suppliers is distinct. Finally, as
our review has shown, in accounting for market power, the models of price transmission
assume the existence of only selling power (l.e., oligopoly power) and not buying power
[i.e., oligopsony power) despite the latter's significance in vertically-related markets.
As a review of the literature will show, however, not only is it possible for the mag-
nitude and speed of change in retail price to be asymmetric with respect to an increase
as well as a decrease in the price of the farm input but it is also possible for retail price
adjustment to cost changes to be rigid (sticky). Furthermore, it is possible for the process
of exchange between producers and retailers to be characterized by a contractual agree-
ment and for the boundary between retailers and input suppliers to dissipate as much as
it is possible for market power to reveal itself in farm supply. In the following, we present
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a brief review of the existing literature regarding each of these theoretical possibilities.
Let's first examine the literature regarding price asymmetry.
Contracting
The models of price transmission that we have reviewed so far have implicitly assumed
that, in the process of exchange, on the spot trading (arms-length pricing) occurs between
retailers and producers with the need for any explicit contractual agreement being ruled
out as the two sides of each transaction are involved in a take-it-or-leave-it exchange.
But in the real world, a contract (be it explicit or implicit) plays a very important
role in mediating trade of a "quid pro quo" type. Such a role becomes more important
when the trading partners are involved in a long-term relationship whereby the quo is
effected long after the quid (Hart and Holmstrom, 1989). Of major interest in this regard
is the kind of long-term relationship that involves asset-specificity (Williamson, 1985).
The notion of asset-specificity holds that a small number of parties make a huge
investment in specific assets which are made with an eye for a particular transaction
(physical asset specificity); or in locations that are linked in a 'cheek-by-jowl' manner so
as to economize on inventory and transportation costs (site-specificity); in human capital,
arising in a learning-by-doing manner (human asset specificity); and in a generalized
production capacity that is built with a specific buyer in mind (dedicated assets).
In all these four cases, the opportunity cost of investment that has already been
made is much lower in the best alternative uses. These asset-specific investments thus
produce a 'lock-in effect' such that, potentially, either party to the transaction will have a
monopoly power ex post (after the investment is made) despite the fact that there might
have been free competition ex ante (prior to making the investment). To forestall the
possibility of such ex post monopoly power, parties to the transaction enter into a long
term contractual relationship and make arrangements for governing the relationship.
In the extant literature, it is rare to come by theoretical models which analyze the
degree of price transmission taking account of the fact that the different stages of the
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vertical market are locked-in in a contractual agreement. However, some contributors
to the literature have made the point that the existence of a contractual relationship
between agents in different stages of a vertical market (i.e., agents at the farm and
retail stages) opens up the way for vertical market practices that cannot be captured
by models of price transmission that we have reviewed so far. Known in the literature
as vertical market restraints, these practices emanate when the balance of negotiating
power between the retail and supply stages in the vertical market is lopsided such that
the stage which negotiates from a position of strength extracts rent from that stage which
negotiates from a position of weakness. Potentially, this power can abide in either stage.
McCorriston and Sheldon (1997) identify several such practices both in the UK and
US food markets ranging from discounts, full-line forcing, exclusive distribution, exclu-
sive territories, and slotting allowances. Discounts are defined as concessions which the
retailer gets for carrying the supplier's brands. Full-line forcing is defined as a practice
which forces the retailer to carry the complete range of a supplier's goods whereas ex-
clusive distribution and exclusive territories are defined as contractual provisions that
restrict not only a retailer's carrying only the supplier's brand but also restrict the geo-
graphical area of sales of that brand. On the other hand, slotting allowances are defined
as fees which suppliers pay to the retailer for shelf space. While the first four practices
arise when the supplier has more negotiating power than the retailer, the last practice
arises when the retailer has more negotiating power than the supplier. The emergence
of own-label products in big supermarkets in recent years has been interpreted as an
increase in retailer's exercise of leverage over suppliers.
Theoretically, the social impact of these practices has been shown to be ambiguous.
Operating within the framework of manufacturer-retailer bargaining model whereby the
supply stage exercises monopoly power while the retail stage exercises oligopoly power,
Dobson and Waterson (1997), for instance, show that the impact of this bilateral bar-
gaining on the level of price consumers get depends on whether retailers sell identical or
differentiated goods. They find that consumer price is lower if the services of competing
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retailers are very close substitutes for one another. If the services of competing retailers
are differentiated, on the other hand, the price level consumers get is higher because the
bargaining leads not only to the increase in the price-cost margin of retailers but also to
an increase in rent which the supplier extracts from the retailers.
Whatever the case, the existence of contractual relationships between the retail and
supply stages in a vertical market will definitely have a substantial implication for models
of price transmission which account for the impact of market power. Recalling from our
review of the literature, the standard approach measures market power as an index of
the gap between retail price and marginal cost. As such, it measures market power
in terms of variables that are easy to measure but variables that are not adequate .
However, McCorriston (2002) argues, that such variables lack adequacy to capture the
full complexity of market power. He further argues that if existing models are to inform
on the full impact of market power on the degree of price transmission, market power
needs to be re-defined to take account of trading practices which come about when the
relationship between the supply and retail stages in the vertical market is contractual
rather than an 'arm's length pricing'.
Vertical integration
The models of 'arm's lengt.h pricing' that have been considered so far assume that the
contracting parties (firms) in a vertically related industry have distinct boundaries; i.e.,
they are independent entities. They do not treat the special case where both might be
vertically integrated such that any contractual relations or market exchanges are ruled
out. But in the real world vertical integration assumes an important place as one of
many forms of economic exchanges.
Perry (1989) describes a firm as vertically integrated
if it encompasses two single-output production processes in which either
(1) the entire out.put of the "upstream" process is employed as part or all of
the quantity of one intermediate input into the "downstream" process or (2)
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the entire quantity of one intermediate input into the "downstream" process
is obtained from part or all of the output of the "upstream" process (p. 185).
As the above description evidently shows, the defining feature of vertical integration
is that it eliminates contractual or market exchanges and replaces them with internal
exchanges within the boundaries of the firm. Apart from guaranteeing internal exchanges
within the boundaries of the firm, vertical integration offers the firm complete ownership
and control over neighboring stages of production or distribution and thereby gives it
complete flexibility to decide over matters of investment, employment, production, and
distribution relevant to all stages within the firm.(p. 186).
The latter description of vertical integration, however seems to suggest that the nature
of the firm's relationship with labor and capital cannot be predetermined. Grossman
and Hart (1986), for instance, focus on ownership and complete control over assets in
defining vertical integration For them, whether the workers are employees or independent
contractors does not in anyway alter the extent of vertical integration. On the other hand,
for Williamson (1975) all that matters for distinguishing vertical integration is that the
firm switch from purchasing inputs to producing them by hiring labor. For him, capital
can be either owned or leased without altering the extent of vertical integration.
Vertical integration is a generic concept that might incorporate vertical "formation"
which describes integration at the time of the firm's creation; vertical "expansion" which
describes a firm's internal growth that translates into formation of new subsidiaries in
neighboring stages; or vertical "merger" which describes vertical integration occurring
through the acquisition by one firm of an existing firm in a neighboring stage. (Perry,
op cit P. 187).
Perry, op cit summarizes three broad determinants of vertical integration: techno-
logical economics, transactional economies and imperfect competition in the market.
Technological economies may give rise to vertical integration since a firm which has in-
tegrated the upstream processes requires less of the other intermediate inputs in order
to obtain the same output in the downstream process. Vertical integration arising from
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technological economies is deemed more important in flow process operations (chemicals,
metals, and so on), the most-oft cited example being the integration of iron and steel
making where there is a substantial saving of energy from not having to reheat iron.
The way transactional economies might give rise to vertical integration is well ex-
plained by Williamson (1975, 1985). According to him, contractual exchanges between a
buyer and a seller involve costs which arise, in the main, from investments in assets which
are specific to the contract. These investments are considered specific; and, outside of
the contract, their opportunity cost is low. Hence, the notion of asset specificity.
The presence of asset specificity in the contract gives rise to "bilateral monopoly"
and the corresponding "quasi-rents" expressed as the difference between the asset's value
under the contract and that outside of it. The existence of such rents in turn encourages
"opportunistic" behavior on the side of either party with each trying to extract these
rents using, as a stick, the threat of withdrawing from the contract absent any price
concessions (so called "hold up" problem). When asset-specificity is substantial, and
the environment complex and uncertain, the cost of governing "opportunistic" behavior
under the contract becomes huge so much so that internal exchange through vertical
integration might be the preferred mode of industrial governance.
Finally, imperfect competition in a market may give rise to vertical integration when
such a market is characterized either by monopoly or monopsony. A typical example
is when, in a vertically-related market, an upstream monopolist forward-integrates into
the competitive downstream stage which employs, with other intermediate inputs, a
monopolist's product upstream in variable proportions.
In such circumstances, owing to a very high product price set by the monopolist,
the downstream firm may be compelled to substitute the monopolist's product for other
inputs that are supplied competitively at a cheaper price. Consequently, the monopolist
is forced to give up its profit from the sale of its product to the downstream firm. To
recoup lost profit, therefore the monopolist might have an incentive to forward-integrate
into the downstream stage. It should be noted that such an incentive to integrate would
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not have existed had the downstream firm applied fixed proportions technology because,
in this case, the derived demand for the monopolist's output would move in proportion
to consumer demand.
Yet another incentive for vertical integration arises when a monopsonist backward-
integrates into an upstream stage that is competitive. Suppose a firm is the sole buyer
of a raw material (monopsony case) supplied by competitive firms that are subject to a
rising supply price. Because of the rising supply price, manufacturers in the upstream
stage produce too little of the raw material. Consequently, they bid up its price and
create monopsony inefficiency. To correct this inefficiency therefore the monopsonist
backward- integrates into the upstream stage.
The list of determinants is too long to be summarized here. And, of course, the major
interest of this survey is not to analyze the determinants of vertical integration (see Perry
1989, op cit for a comprehensive survey). It is rather to see whether the predictions of
the price transmission models in a non-integrated market, reviewed in the preceding, are
borne out to the same degree in a vertically-integrated market.
As far as we are aware, there seems to exist no theoretical model of price transmission
which operates within the framework of a vertically-integrated market. Therefore a
comparison of the predictions of the price transmission models for integrated and non-
integrated market st.ructures is not possible.
McCorriston and Sheldon (1996), however, come close to approaching this issue when
they analyze the role of intermediate stages, in the production and distribution system
of the EU banana regime, on the pass-through of tariff changes to final goods' prices.
Using the predictions of a two-stage theoretical model of a market whereby both the
wholesaling (which processes and distributes an imported intermediate good, in this case
banana) and retailing stages exercise oligopoly power, they run policy simulations for the
UK banana market both when the market is vertically integrated (i.e., when the market
is thought of as a single stage) and when it is vertically relatedl".
11In their case too, the issue of vertical integration is approached only indirectly. In fact, there is no
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Table 41Th ff t f ne e ec s 0 po ICY c anges on e egree 0 pnce transm
Market structure Degree of pass-through
One/Two stage-perfect competition 1.00 (1.00)
Single-stage monopoly 0.50 (0.50)
Two-stage monopoly 0.25 (0.25)
Single-stage Cournot oligopoly 0.71 (0.76)
Two-stage Cournot oligopoly 0.38 (0.43)
h th d f ission
Using the UK banana market data for 1989, and assuming a 14 % fall in import
tariff, they simulate the effects of policy changes on the degree of pass-through (price
transmission from the wholesaling stage to the retailing stage) and on consumer welfare.
As our interest, however, is to see how price transmission operates in vertically-related
and vertically-integrated markets, we only present their simulation results for the effects
of policy changes on the degree of tariff pass-through under different market structures
and for two differentiated products.
The above simulation results clearly indicate that relative to the competitive case, a
higher degree of tariff (cost) pass-through obtains when the industry is vertically inte-
grated (as proxied by a single-stage production) rather than when it involves a multi-stage
production process. This is true both for monopoly and oligopoly markets.
A disaggregated downstream sector
All the theoretical models of price transmission that we have reviewed thus far do not
distinguish between processing and retailing stages. They rather treat them as a single
stage. Obviously, doing this simplifies evaluation of the degree of price transmission from
the farm to the final product sectors but it might not reflect reality on the ground. It is a
well known fact that many vertically-related industries have the processing and retailing
stages as separate entities. In theoretical modelling therefore it is necessary to treat them
reference to the single-stage banana market as being synonymous with a vertically-integrated industry.
But from their analysis, it can easily be deduced that, when talking about a one-stage market, all they
have in mind is a vertically-integrated banana market with the retailer processing and distributing the
imported item by itself (partial integration, in this case, back-ward integration).
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as such. And this implies that there be three stages in the market, i.o., farm, processing
and retailing stages, rather than two, as is usually assumed in practice.
As McCorriston and Sheldon, op cit. have shown, modelling price transmission within
the framework of a three-stage industry does not alter the qualitative predictions regard-
ing the degree of price transmission which derive from a two-stage framework. But the
quantitative implication of modelling along this line for the degree of price transmission
(Le., the magnitude of the price transmission elasticity) can be considerable when these
stages are characterized by market power. Hence, a theoretical development of a price
transmission model which accounts for more than two stages in the industry can make
for an interesting research pursuit.
Oligopsony power
As can be recalled from the price transmission models that we have reviewed (see, for
instance, McCorriston et al., 1998), the impact of market power on the degree of price
transmission is analyzed assuming that the retail stage exercises only selling power and
not buying power over suppliers. However, buying power could be at least as important,
if not, more so than seller power. From their investigation into the UK food chain, for
instance, the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC, 1981) and the Competition
Commission (CC, 2000) report that the grocery multiples had used their buying power
to obtain discounts from suppliers. Indeed, of the 52 practices that were identified by the
CC as characterizing the vertical relation between retailers' and suppliers, 27 stood to
operate against the public interest (i.e., against the suppliers and in some cases against
the consumers). Dobson et al. (1999) also point to the potential for abuse of buying
power in recent trends in the growth in concentration of UK retailing.
To date, there seems to have been no formal treatment of oligopsony power's im-
pact on the degree of price transmission. All the relevant contributions made so far in
connection with oligopsony power have focused either on measuring its degree as in, for
instance, Schroeter (1988); Azzam and Pagoulatos (1990); Rogers and Sexton (1994);
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or on comparative statics analysis of the effects of a farm product supply shift on retail
price, output and profit as in Chen and Lent (1992); or on returns to research as in
Alston et al. (1997).
Given that the food industry is potentially both oligopolistic and oligopsonistic, the
absence of any formal treatment of oligopsony power's impact on the degree of price
transmission has meant that the combined effects of oligopoly and oligopsony power on
the degree of price transmission cannot be assessed. Thus, a theoretical development of
a model of price transmission accounting for the effects of both oligopoly and oligopsony
power is a possible avenue for further research.
Aggregation
As our review has shown, the issue of aggregation features a key element in studies which
model price transmission allowing for oligopoly power in the retail sector of an industry
composed of multiple firms that produce a homogeneous product. The aggregation issue
arises because most often empirical work is conducted with the industry rather than
the firm as a unit of analysis, as most variables of interest are available at the industry
level. Different price transmission models deal with the issue of aggregation differently.
One category of models ( See, for instance, Bhuyan and Lopez, op cit) aggregates over
firms to obtain industry level variables by applying the consistent aggregation conditions
suggested by Iwata, op cit and Appelbaum, op cit. This category of studies achieves
aggregation at the industry level with respect to the variables of interest, i.e., industry
marginal cost and conjectural variations by normalizing firm-level variables by market
shares and by assuming that firms face the same marginal cost, the same retail price
and the same demand elasticity and that, in equilibrium, they have the same conjectural
variations.
This mode of aggregation is criticized on several grounds. Firstly, the assumption
of identical marginal costs that derives from the application of the Gorman polar cost
function, which assumes that firms have different fixed costs but identical slopes because
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different firms' cost functions are parallel to each other, is unrealistic. In fact, as Bresna-
han, op cit shows, in the presence of market power, the marginal costs of firms are likely
to vary in equilibrium.
Secondly, the practice of normalizing firm-level variables by market share is open to
criticism. This criticism is particularly directed at the implicit assumption that firms
of similar market share have similar conjectural elasticities. This assumption is steeped
in the belief that firms operate at the same level of physical capacity and have the
same financial status in relation to the capital market. Haskel and Scaramozzino (1997)
show that this might not be necessarily the case. Assume a quantity-setting conjectural
variations model where two firms have the same market share but operate at different
levels of physical capacity. Given this assumption, they argue, a rival without spare
capacity cannot respond to changes in output levels by the other firm in the same way
that a firm with a spare capacity can. Consequently, the two firms would not have similar
conjectural elasticities. Now assume two firms have similar market shares but one has a
better access to the capital market than the other. As a result, they would not have the
same conjectural elasticities because a rival's response to quantity changes by the other
firm would depend on the ease with which it can raise funds. Furthermore, as Deaton
and Muellbauer (1980) and Allen (1998) point out, providing that firms' products are
strict substitutes, the industry's demand system is not insensitive to the market shares
of firms. This is because as the firm's market share rises, the elasticity of demand for its
product becomes more inelastic. The implicat.ion is that two firms with different market
shares cannot face the same demand elasticity for their products as often assumed in this
kind of modcis.
Thirdly, this mode of aggregation is insensitive to whether the firm is a leader or a
follower. However, a firm's reaction to changes in output by other firms certainly depends
on whether that firm is a leader or a follower. In a quantity-setting conjectural variations
model of oligopoly therefore it is reasonable to expect two firms to react differently in
response to a quantity change by a particular firm depending on whether they are a
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leader or a follower.
Several studies have avoided the first two criticisms by normalizing firm-level variables
by the number of firms rather than by market shares. See, for instance, McCorriston, et
al. (2001). This is in keeping with the procedure suggested by Cowling and Waterson, op
cit. who do not only allow for differences in firms' marginal costs but during aggregation
normalize industry level variables using the number of firms thereby totally avoiding mar-
ket shares. Despite this improvement, however, many a study in the price transmission
literature seem to suffer from the third criticism. One fruitful avenue of research that
can be pursued in the future is therefore to model price transmission allowing for market
power in the context of a Stackelberg model whereby firms are categorized according to
whether they are leaders or followers.
'Prices rise faster than they fall': price asymmetry
Recent years have seen the emergence of a vast literature on price asymmetry. This has
been motivated by the widespread belief that in response to cost changes not only do
prices rise faster than they fall (short-run price asymmetry) but they also rise by a greater
magnitude than when they fall (long run price asymmetry). In this small section, we do
not pretend to undertake an exhaustive review of studies that have been carried out with
price asymmetry as their major theme. And of course, our major aim is to see whether
there is any evidence of price asymmetry in the literature. To make our point therefore
we will present the findings of only selected studies. As far as we are aware, there has not
been any theoretical work which models price asymmetry in vertically-related markets.
All the findings that we present will therefore be extracted from empirical studies.
Peltzman (2000) carries out a comprehensive study to test for the symmetric response
of output price to changes in costs. He utilizes monthly economy-wide data on 77 con-
sumer and 165 producer goods in the United States and finds that in over two-thirds
of the sample, the null hypothesis of symmetry in price transmission is rejected. This
applies both in the short- and long-run cases. Thus, his findings support the widespread
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belief that prices rise faster than they fall [i.e., price transmission is asymmetric) in re-
sponse to cost changes. When he analyzes data for a specific supermarket chain, however,
he doesn't find any systematic asymmetry. His findings thus appear to suggest that price
asymmetry is a phenomenon that is unique to economy-wide data and not to firm level
data. Given that he considers only a single cost component relating to a major input in
each of the product categories, it is difficult to evaluate whether output prices respond
asymmetrically to cost shocks in general and not just to changes in the price of a single
input.
Analyzing fortnightly data for US retail and crude oil prices from March 1986 to
December 1992, Borenstein et al. (1997) had previously shown that the change in retail
gasoline price is greater for an increase than for a decrease in crude oil price. In a similar
exercise, Kinnucan and Forker (1987) had shown, using monthly data for four major
dairy products in the US spanning January 1971-December 1981, that the farm-retail
price transmission in the dairy sector is asymmetric.
Using a monthly series for crude oil and retail petrol prices for the UK over the
period January 1982 to June 1995, Reilly and Witt (1997) also reject the hypothesis of
a symmetric response by petrol retailers to rises and falls in crude oil prices. Earlier,
Bacon (1991), using fortnightly data from 1982 to 1989, and Manning (1991), analyzing
monthly data from March 1981 to December 1989 for the UK had found evidence that
pump prices in the UK show a faster and more concentrated response to cost increases
than to cost decreases.
Analyzing producer and wholesale prices for pork in northern Germany from January
1990 to October 1993, von Cramon-Taubadel (1997) also finds that price transmission
between the producer and wholesale levels of the pork market in northern Germany is
asymmetric.
Meyer and von Cramon- Taubadel (2002, mimeo.) present an extensive survey of the
literature on price asymmetry. Spanning the period, 1980-2002, their survey identifies 38
scientific studies that have tested the null hypothesis of symmetry in the degree of price
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transmission using different econometric applications. Of the 197 such tests run for a
broad category of products, nearly one-half reject the null hypothesis of symmetry.
As this brief review of the literature shows, there seems to exist a huge body of
empirical evidence to suggest that price transmission in vertically-related markets is
asymmetric. Several contributors have invoked different explanations for the asymmetric
response of retail price to input price changes.
Using a model in which firms take account of menu costs and inflation in their decisions
to adjust their desired level of price, Ball and Mankiw (1994) show that shocks which
increase a firm's desired price will trigger a greater response than shocks which reduce it.
This is because firms will take advantage of positive shocks to correct for accumulated and
anticipated inflation, while inflation will already have effected some of the adjustments
made necessary by negative shocks by reducing real prices.
Market power at the retail stage of an industry has been cited as a possible explanation
for price asymmetry (see, for instance, von Cramon- Taubadel, 1998; Borenstein et al.,
1997). This explanation proceeds by saying that in an attempt to hide market power,
oligopolistic retailers will collude more quickly in response to shocks that squeeze their
margin ( i.e., shocks that raise raw input price) than to shocks which stretch this margin
(i.e., shocks which lower raw input price). This, they propose, generates an asymmetry in
the speed with which retail price responds to cost changes. Without having to allow for
collusion among oligopolist firms, another view ascribes asymmetry to firms' conjecture
in an industry that in response to cost increases rivals increase their retail prices by
much more than they reduce them in response to a proportional fall in costs (Bailey and
Brorsen, 1989).
The plethora of studies pointing to the existence of price asymmetry in the degree
of price transmission seem to suggest that an empirical test for the sensitivity of the
elasticity of price transmission both to market structure parameters and to processing
technology should be supplemented with tests for its sensitivity to price asymmetry. At a
theoretical level, however, this plethora is a pointer to a possible extension of the existing
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models of price transmission to account for the asymmetric response of retail price to
changes in the price of the raw input.
4.9 Extensions
In the previous section, we have presented a summary and an evaluation of the existing
models of price transmission. First, it has shown that these models assume the same
degree of price transmission when the shock is positive as when it is negative. Second,
it has shown that these models operate within the framework of a two-stage industry.
Third, it has shown that any transactions among the different stages of the vertical
market take place on the spot and not on a contractual basis. Finally, it has shown that
market power applies to the retailer-consumer relation and not to the retailer-supplier
relation.
By way of a critique, it has pointed out that; (1) price adjustment can be asymmetric
depending on whether the shock is positive or negative; (2) there can be more than two-
stages involved in the production process of vertically-related markets; (3) transactions
among the different stages can take form in a contractual relation rather than in on-
the-spot trading; (4) aggregation (5) the retailer-supplier relation can be characterized
by market power (i.e., oligopsony power) as much as the retailer-consumer relation is
characterized by oligopoly power.
The above crit.iques are pointers to the possible theoretical extensions that can be
made in the future regarding research on price transmission. The first possible extension
is to allow for asymmetry in retail price adjustment to changes in farm input price. The
second possible extension is to allow for more than two stages in the vertical market.
Another potential extension is to allow for contracting rather than on-the-spot trading
among different stages of the vertical market. The last but not least theoretical exten-
sion is to allow for market power in the retailer-supplier relation and then evaluate its
interaction with oligopoly power..
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Obviously, incorporating all these extensions in a single framework is not going to
be an easy task. However, an extension of the existing models of price transmission
to account for either of these possibilities is quite feasible. In this thesis we set out to
extend the existing theoretical models of price transmission allowing for market power
in the retailer-supplier relation. Particularly, we allow for oligopsony power in the farm
sector. We then allow for its interaction with oligopoly power in the retail sector and
assess the impact of this interaction taking the degree of price transmission in a perfectly
competitive market as a benchmark.
4.10 Plan for the rest of the thesis
Throughout the preceding chapters, we have attempted to offer the reader a reasonable
inventory of the extant theoretical literatures on price transmission in vertical markets.
To recap what we have done thus far, in chapter 2 we have provided an intuitive approach
to understanding the mechanisms through which changes in the price of the farm input is
transmitted to the price of the final product. Apart from being intuitive, this chapter has
set the stage for a more rigorous analysis of the degree of price transmission in chapter 3
in which we have reviewed the degree of price transmission in vertically-related markets
assuming that both the input and output markets are perfectly competitive, that inputs
are combined in variable proportions and that industry technology is characterized by
constant returns to scale. In chapter 4, we have introduced the reader to the major
extensions that have been made to the model expounded in chapter three, namely the
models of price transmission accounting for oligopoly power in the output market, and
for non-constant returns to scale in industry technology.
As might be recalled, we have identified, wherever appropriate, the existing gaps in the
theoretical literature and suggested several possible research avenues that can be pursued
in the future. Such include: modelling price transmission allowing for oligopsony power
in the retailer-snpplier relation; modelling price transmission allowing for a contractual
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relation between retailers and input suppliers; modelling price transmission allowing for
an asymmetric response of retail price to a rise as well as a fall in farm input price;
and modelling price transmission allowing for a disaggregated downstream sector of the
vertical market. Of all these contributions, the one we have picked out as being of major
policy significance is modelling price transmission when, ceteris paribus, the retailer in
the vertical market exercises oligopsony (buyer) power.
On this particular front, we categorize our specific contributions into two. Our first
contribution involves extending the Gardner model (1975) of price transmission in vertical
markets assuming that the retailer in the vertical chain exercises oligopsony power over
the sellers of the farm input. We then further extend the model assuming that the retailer
not only exercises oligopoly power in its relation with farm input suppliers but that it
also exercises oligopoly power in its relation with consumers. This is presented in chapter
5. Our second contribution involves simulating the degree of price transmission when the
retailer exercises market power both in its relation with consumers and suppliers of the
farm input given our assumption regarding retail demand and farm supply functions,
input proportions and the cost share of the farm input in total industry cost. We then
evaluate the interaction between and the significance of each of these market structure
parameters. This is presented in chapter 6.
134
Chapter 5
The degree of price transmission
under the assumption of oligopoly
and oligopsony power
5.1 Background
We have shown earlier, through a survey of the existing theoretical literature, that the
effect, on the degree of price transmission, of allowing for oligopoly power at the retail
end of a vertically-related industry is ambiguous. This is because the outcome for the
degree of price transmission depends on the type of retail demand function faced by the
industry.
To date, the impact of market power on the degree of price transmission has been
analyzed exclusively in the context of oligopoly power. There seems to have been no
formal treatment of the impact of market power when retailers exercise buying power
(i.e., oligopsony power) over farm input suppliers. All the relevant contributions made
so far in connection with oligopsony power have focused either on measuring its degree
as in, for instance, Schroeter (1988); Azzam and Pagoulatos (1990); Rogers and Sexton
(1994); or on comparative statics analysis of the effects of a farm product supply shift
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on price, output and profit as in Chen and Lent (1992); or on returns to research as in
Alston et al. (1997).
This chapter therefore sets out to examine the impact of oligopsony power in the
farm sector on the degree of price transmission assuming all other sectors are perfectly
competitive. It then allows for the interaction between oligopoly power at the retail
sector and oligopsony power in the farm sector. With these aims in mind, the chapter
develops a model where both oligopoly and oligopsony co-exist. Using this model, it then
analyses the effects of functional forms on the degree of price transmission.
It might be wondered as to why oligopsony power should be assumed to apply only
in the supply of the farm input. Rogers and Sexton (1994) identify several reasons why
oligopsony power is more likely to apply in this market than in the market for other inputs.
Firstly, the bulky and perishable nature of this input makes the cost of shipping so high
that producers are limited in their geographic mobility and thus are forced to supply
their produce to buyers who are close to their outlets. Secondly, the specialized nature of
processors' needs for the farm input renders it very difficult for them not only to substitute
other farm inputs for the input they process but also to substitute the latter for other
farm inputs in alternative processes of production. Thirdly, the extensive investments
that farm input producers put in sunk assets in order to specialize in the production of
particular farm commodities renders the supply of these commodities inelastic. In other
words, such investments are potentially fraught with Williamson's 'hold-up problem'.
Buyer power can be defined, following Dobson et al. (2001), as the ability of leading
retail firms to obtain from suppliers more favorable terms than those available to other
buyers or to be expected under normal competitive conditions. In this context, buyer
power can mean not only the ability of retail firms to extract discounts from suppliers, but
also their ability to place contractual obligations, commonly known as vertical restraints,
on suppliers. While the ability to extract discounts might manifest itself in the price
mark-down which we will define later, the ability to place vertical restraints can take
several forms. It can, for instance, take form in listing charges whereby buyers require a
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fee payment before goods are purchased from the listed supplier; in slotting allowances
whereby the buyers require a fee for the allocation of shelf-space; and in unjustified high
contribution by suppliers to promotional expenses by retailers, to name just a few.
In the presence of buyer power in a vertically-related market, it is difficult, a priori,
to derive the implications for the degree of price transmission which would obtain under
a perfectly competitive industry. As we will show later on in the chapter, this is because,
in and of itself, buyer power has very little to do with price transmission. As far as the
outcome for the degree of price transmission is concerned, buyer power in an industry
matters only to the extent that retailers use this power either to extract discounts from or
to impose vertical restraints on suppliers. Dobson et al. (2001) identify three conditions
which have to be satisfied for retailers to be able to exercise their buying power over
suppliers. These are that (i) they contribute to a substantial portion of purchases in the
market; (ii) there are barriers to entry into the buyers' market; and (iii) the farm supply
curve retailers face is less perfectly elastic; Le., it is upward sloping.
Assume now the above three conditions for the exercise of buyer power are satisfied.
When is the exercise of buyer power by retailers believed to be bad for price transmission
taking, as a benchmark, the degree of price transmission which obtains in a perfectly
competitive market? What are the welfare costs which result from the exercise of market
power that warrant government intervention? Assuming such welfare costs exist, is it
producers or consumers who lose out most? To answer these questions we need to consider
some intuitively appealing theoretical insights from the literature regarding the effects of
buyer power both when it exists in isolation, and when it interacts with seller power.
First, consider the case of an industry where retailers exercise buying power in their
relation with farm input suppliers but not selling power in their relation with consumers.
Further assume that the supply sector is characterized by perfect competition. This kind
of market structure matches our description of buyer power that exists in isolation. As
we will show later in the chapter, when buyer power prevails in the market, the price paid
producers is less than that in a perfectly competitive input market. On price transmission
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considerations, Dobson et al.. (1997, 2001, 2003) argue that, in isolation, buyer power
is not necessarily bad. In fact, if the competition among retailers is so intense, it is
possible that lower price paid to farmers might feed through to lower retail prices and
thereby enhance the degree of price transmission from the farm to the retail sector. The
degree of price transmission thus achieved can be further enhanced if there are cost
savings associated with the joint purchasing implied by buyer power. Thus, on price
transmission considerations, the exercise of buyer power by retailers in such a market
structure cannot be judged to be bad. On welfare considerations, however, there seems
to be reason to believe that the exercise of such power is bad to the extent that it lowers
the price producers get to levels below the perfectly competitive market. Yet, whether
the prevalence of buyer power and its exercise by retailers is bad on considerations of
overall social welfare is unclear. This is because the net social welfare effect depends on
the relative importance of the welfare gain consumers enjoy by getting lower price for
the final good they purchase and the welfare loss that producers suffer by receiving lower
price for the good they sell to retailers.
Now consider the case of an industry where retailers exercise buyer power over sup-
pliers at the same time that they exercise seller power over consumers. In this case,
any lower price paid to farm input suppliers might not feed through to consumers as
the discount extracted from the suppliers might increase retailers margin instead. In
fact, depending on the elasticity of market demand, consumers might end up paying a
higher price as a result of mark-up pricing. In this particular instance, the exercise of
buyer power is bad both on price transmission and social welfare counts. It is bad on
the first count because relative to that in the perfectly competitive case, the degree of
price transmission which obtains in this type of market structure is smaller. It is bad
on the second count because of a social welfare loss resulting from consumers paying a
higher price than they would have paid if there were no seller power and from producers
receiving a lower price than they would have if there were no buyer power. Much of the
discourse, among policy and academic circles, on the effects of market power both on
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the degree price transmission and on social welfare seems to have been inspired by this
theoretical insight.
Next consider the case of an industry where retailers exercise buyer power over pro-
ducers at the same time that the latter exercise seller power over retailers. This is the
case of what is commonly known in the literature as bilateral bargaining (see Dobson
et al., 1997). A priori, one cannot evaluate the effect of bilateral bargaining on price
transmission and on social welfare. This is because the observed outcomes for price
transmission and social welfare reflect the relative bargaining power of sellers of the farm
input and of its buyers. If, relative to buyer power, the seller power of suppliers is more
significant, then the price paid to farmers might be higher than in a perfectly competitive
market the implication to consumers being that they have to pay a higher price for the
final product, and,.consequently, suffer a welfare loss. If, on the other hand, relative
to the seller power of producers, buyer power is more significant, then it is more likely
that producers get a price lower than that in the perfectly competitive case. It has to
be noted, however, that owing to their bargaining position, producers are less likely to
get a price as much lower as in the first case we considered, i.e., a case where seller's
bargaining power is assumed away. Whether lower prices thus forced on producers will
feed through to final good prices as in the first case we considered depends on whether
retailers exercise seller power over consumers. Given this market structure therefore it is
difficult to say which of the two market powers prevails on balance.
To this point, we have conceived of buyer power in the context of only discounts that
retailers get from suppliers. As such, we have disregarded the impact that buyer power,
in the form of vertical restraints, can have on the degree of price transmission and welfare
be it in isolation or on interaction with seller power. However, as we have pointed out
above, the retailer-supplier relation might be characterized by vertical restraints which
not only drive farm prices down but also restrict producers' freedom to supply elsewhere.
As Dobson et al. (2003) argue, on social welfare considerations, these practices are
harmful to the farm input producers. Firstly, they drive down farm prices to a level
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below the perfectly competitive case. Secondly, by driving prices down in this way, they
not only force small producers, who are not efficient, out of business but also threaten the
viability of even efficient producers whose investments are undermined by their inability
to recover fixed costs now that they are forced to price at short run marginal cost. The
only category of suppliers who are more likely to resist buyer power in the form of vertical
restraints remain those producers with a strong product identity that appeals to final
consumers and those who exert market power to counter buyer power. Despite their
harmful effects on producers' welfare nonetheless, the impact of vertical restraints on the
degree of price transmission is less clear. In fact, as far as we are aware, there is not
much done by way of research to analyze such an impact
Given the ability of buyer power both to extract discounts from and impose vertical
restraints on producers, it comes as no surprise that the issue of price transmission and
the social welfare implications that derive from it attracts a lot of attention in policy
and academic circles. In this thesis, we do not intend to analyze the impacts, on the
degree of price transmission, of both discounts and vertical restraints. For the purposes
at hand, we will rather limit ourselves to the analysis of the effects of buyer power on
price transmission only to the extent that such power manifests itself as the deviation
of price producers receive from the perfectly competitive outcome. The first step in the
analysis of the effects of buyer power on the degree of price transmission is to identify the
existence of such power and measure its extent. Traditionally, the degree of buyer power
has been measured using the elasticity of conjectural variations. And the derivation of
this elasticity is the task we turn to next.
5.2 The elasticity of conjectural variations assuming
oligopsony power
The major object in measuring oligopsony power is to see if firms in a particular industry
are setters of price in the farm input market rather than price takers as in a perfectly
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competitive model. Whenever firms are behaving as price setters, it means that any
changes they make regarding the quantity purchased of the farm input, through a price
change, affect industry level purchase of the input. But industry-level changes in the
quantity purchased of this input subsequent to a change in quantity purchased at the
firm-level can arise because of a change in the quantity purchased by anyone firm in
the industry. This suggests that conjectural variations is the appropriate approach to
measuring the degree of oligopsonypower in the farm input market.
Recalling from our exposition of the model of oligopoly power, conjectural variation
represents firms' beliefs about rivals' reactions to their choice of output assuming firms
are competing in quantity. In other words, conjectural variation measures the rate of
change in output of all other firms in response to a change in output of a representative
firm.
Applying the notion of conjectural variations to the analysis of market power in the
farm supply market is quite straightforward. We just simply measure the rate of change
in the farm input purchased of all other firms in response to a change in the quantity of
such input purchased by the representative firm. In this respect, conjectural variation
measures firms' beliefs about rivals' reactions to their choiceof farm input assuming firms
compete in quantity purchased of the farm input. Competition among firms based on
input price, as in the Bertrand model, is assumed away because, given the assumption
that all firms purchase a homogeneous farm input, such a type of competition compels
firms to set input price equal to the marginal revenue product thus making, superfluous,
the notion of a mark-down which is central to the analysis of oligopsonypower".
Sticking to the notation used in the basic model, and following in the footsteps of
oligopoly models (see Iwata op. cit.; Cowling and Waterson, op.cit.; and Applbaum,
op.cit., among others), denote the quantity demanded of the farm input by the ith firm
by ai and that demanded by the industry as a whole by a. Assume that all firms in
IThis conclusion derives from the application of the Bertrand model to an oligopsonistic competition
of firms. The algebra is not presented here because it mimicks that for oligopolistic competition which
we have presented in the literature review.
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the industry are identical. Then the conjectural variation in the factor market where
oligopsony power is present can be expressed as:
(5.1)
where Bal Bai denotes the change in industry-level purchase of the farm input in response
to a change in the quantity purchased of this input by the representative firm; The term
a( ~ai)
8 = i:~i denotes the firm's conjectural variation.
Multiplying both sides of equation (5.1) by ~, which denotes the firm's share in total
industry purchase of the farm input, the elasticity of industry farm input conjectured by
the ith firm, cPi can be derived as:
A. _ (1 ) a; _ (Ba) ai
'P' - +8 - - - -
, a Bai a (5.2)
The parameter, cPi' measures the firm's conduct and is shown to be a function of
both the firm's input conjectural variation, (8) and its input share (ai/a). For a value of
aalaai = 0 ==> 8 = -1, cPi = 0, indicating that the firm's decision to change the quantity
of farm input purchased has no impact on industry level purchase which is exactly what
obtains when the factor market under consideration is perfectly competitive. For a value
of Ba] Ba; = 1 ==> s = 0 and a, = a, cPi = 1, implying that there is either only one buyer
in the market, in which case we say monopsony power exists in the farm input market,
or all buyers have colluded. The intermediate case of 0 < cPi < 1 obtains when the input
market is characterized by oligopsony power with the special case of cP = ~ ==> 1+s = 1
and s = 0 representing Cournot competition.
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5.3 Deriving the measure of oligopsony power: the
price mark-down
In the presence of oligopsony power in the farm input market, the first-order conditions
for a maximum profit for the representative firm strictly depend on the assumption made
regarding the nature of production technology employed (Azzam and Pagoulatos, 1990).
If the production technology is such that the final product is related to the oligopson-
istically purchased input in a fixed proportion, so that firms face a constant marginal cost
for the marketing input, then the first-order condition requires that the marginal factor
cost and the marginal revenue product net of the marginal cost of the marketing input
be equal. This approach is evident in Schroeter (1988) and Rogers and Sexton (1994).
Since this approach assumes fixed input proportions technology, it imposes identical con-
jectural elasticities in both the imperfectly competitive output and input markets because
the final output and the oligopsonised input are represented by the same variable in the
profit function.
If, on the other hand, the production technology allows for variable proportions be-
tween output and the farm input, then the first-order conditions reflect specific conjec-
tural elasticities corresponding to the output and the oligopsonised input markets. This
approach is followed by Azzam and Pagoulatos (1990), and Chen and Lent (1992) and
recently by Kinnucan (2003).
In the manner of the latter approach, and in keeping with the assumption of vari-
able input proportions which we have shown to be characteristic of the models of price
transmission reviewed earlier, assume that an industry has n identical firms producing a
homogeneous product (x) using two inputs, l.e., the farm input, a and marketing services,
b.
Let the production function of the ith firm be denoted, by:
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(5.3)
where Xi represents quantity of the firm's final product; whereas a; and b, represent
the quantities purchased of the farm and marketing inputs respectively. The production
function, f (.) is assumed to be smooth, concave and twice continuously differentiable.
Technology is assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale and to combine inputs in
variable proportions.
Given the assumption of variable factor proportions, the ith firm's cost function can
be specified as separable in both inputs as:
(5.4)
where Pa and Pb denote prices of the farm and marketing inputs respectively.
Finally, let the industry's supply function of the farm input be specified, in inverse
form, as:
Pa = 9 (a) (5.5)
where
(5.6)
On the basis of the above specifications, the ith firm's profit function can then be
specified as:
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for i=L, ..., n (5.7)
where P x denotes the price of the final product.
Assuming that each firm's objective in the industry is to maximize profit, the problem
of the firm is to choose a; and bi in order to maximize profit as in equation (5.7) subject
to equations (5.3), (5.5) and (5.6).
The first-order conditions for a maximum of 1ri are then derived as:
(5.8)
and
(5.9)
where f ai and / bi are the first-order derivatives of the profit function with respect to the
farm and marketing inputs respectively. Assume that the second-order conditions for a
profit maximum are satisfied so that,
(5.10)
Equation (5.8) can be interpreted as stating that the marginal value product of the ith
firm obtained from employing an extra unit of the farm input, Px/ai, equals the perceived
marginal factor cost of employing this extra unit, Pa + (~ x g~) tu. Alternatively, it
can be interpreted as stating that once the level of farm input which maximizes profit is
attained, the sum of the firm's profit that comes from employing an extra unit of the farm
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input [i.e., marginal value product minus price of the farm input) and the magnitude by
which the price of the farm input has to increase in order for the extra unit of the farm
input to be supplied to the industry equals zero. Algebraically, this can be expressed as:
(5.8a)
Factoring out P a and multiplying the second term of the right-hand side of equation
(5.8a) by ~ and then division of the same by da and re-arranging we obtain:
(5.8b)
where ¢i is as defined in equation (5.2), and ea is the price elasticity of supply for the
farm input, (~~aX ~ ).
Equation (5.8b) can be manipulated to appear as:
(5.8c)
In the manner of 13huyan and Lopez (1997), the optimality condition in equation
(5.8c) is weighted by the firm's share of farm input purchased in total industry farm
input purchased, ~ =Si to obtain:
(5.8d)
which, when aggregated over i yields the aggregate analog of optimality condition (5.8c)
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for the industry as:
(5.8e)
where Pxfa and <p are weighted marginal revenue product and weighted elasticity of
conjectural variations in the farm input market respectively.
Aggregation over all firms to obtain the industry's measure of oligopsony power in
{5.8e} is made possible by applying, in the reverse order, the necessary and sufficient
consistent aggregation condition to derive the measure of oligopoly power at the industry
level as presented in Applebaum {1982,p. 292}.
This condition assumes that all firms have equal marginal costs which in turn requires
that all firms' cost curves intersect at the same level of marginal cost without each firm
having to have the same marginal cost curve. It also assumes that, in equilibrium, firms
choose their level of output such that the conjectural elasticity, (), is the same across
all firms. nut this does not require that all firms have identical conjectural elasticities.
Finally, given an homogeneous product and the same industry price, it assumes that all
firms face the same price elasticity of demand.
Applying the above condition for aggregation to derive an industry-level measure of
oligopsony power, the requirement for the necessary and sufficient condition to hold is that
all firms share the same marginal revenue product. This condition can only be satisfied
when all firms face the same market price of output and the same marginal product.
This also requires that all firms' marginal revenue product curves intersect at the same
level of marginal revenue product without these marginal revenue product curves having
to be identical. It also requires that all firms face the same input price, which together
with the assumption of an homogeneous input, makes reasonable the assumption that all
firms face the same elasticity of raw input supply. Finally, we assume that in equilibrium
firms choose input quantities at which the conjectural elasticity, <p, is common to all
firms. Again, this does not require firms to have the same conjectural elasticities.
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In (5.8e), s: measures the farm input price distortion (input price mark-down) in the
ea
industry brought about by oligopsony power. It is measured as the percentage deviation
of the marginal value product of the farm input (Px/a) from the marginal factor cost
(Pa). It is clearly shown that the mark-down is proportional to the conjectural elasticity,
¢, and inversely proportional to the elasticity of farm input supply, ea.
For a given supply elasticity, this suggests that the more the market for the farm
input gets oligopsonistic, the greater the price mark-down (the price distortion) becomes
and vice versa. But this conclusion only holds for a price elasticity of farm input supply
which is inelastic. When supply is perfectly elastic (i.e., when ea approaches (0), the
implication is that no matter how oligopsonistic the market for the farm input is, the
size of the mark-down becomes negligible approaching zero in the limit.
The measure of oligopsony power lies within the range of zero and .1...; taking the
ea
value of zero when ¢ = 0, suggesting a factor market which is perfectly competitive, and
a value of .1... when ¢= 1 snggesting a factor market which is monopsonistic or collusive.
ea
The intermediate values of <P between zero and one, on the other hand, suggest a factor
market which is oligopsonistic.
5.4 The oligopsonist firm's perceived marginal ex-
penditure
In this section, we apply the procedure used to derive the oligopolist firm's perceived
marginal revenue as in Quirmbach (1988) to the derivation of the oligopsonist firm's
perceived marginal expenditure.
Let the expenditure of firm i on the farm input, Ei, be given by:
(5.11)
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For a given Ei, the firm's marginal expenditure can then be calculated as:
(5.12)
For a firm which is the only buyer in the industry of the farm input, g~= 1, and a=ai.
Taking note of these facts, the monopsonist's marginal expenditure, ¥a;, can then be
written as:
BE = BPaa+PaBa Ba (5.13)
To derive the oligopsonist firm's perceived marginal expenditure, we first normalize
the first term of the right-hand side of equation (5.13) by ~, then add <PiPa - <PiPa, and
rearrange to obtain:
(5.13a)
Noting that the first bracketed term of the right-hand side of (5.13a) represents the
monopsonist firm's marginal expenditure and aggregating over all firms in the industry
subject to the consistent. aggregation conditions that we have discussed previously, the
oligopsonist industry's marginal expenditure can be expressed as a convex combination
of the monopsonist. firm's marginal expenditure (MME) and average expenditure, P a
(AE), as:
(5.13b)
Equation (G.13b) is a generalized form of the pricing rules that apply to different
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Figure 5-1: Pricing in an oligopsonistic factor market
market structures. When ¢i = 0, implying the market for the farm input is perfectly
competitive, perceived marginal expenditure equals average expenditure. For ¢i = 1,
implying the market for the farm input is monopsonistic, marginal expenditure is greater
than average expenditure (see 5.13a). On the other hand, when 0 < ¢i < 1, implying
that the market for the farm input is oligopsonistic, perceived marginal expenditure lies
between the monopsonist firm's marginal expenditure and average expenditure. Assum-
ing that the industry faces a linear supply function, this can be illustrated using Figure
5.1 where the horizontal axis represents the quantity purchased of the farm input, a while
the vertical axis represents the price of the farm input, P a the marginal value of the farm
input and the marginal expenditure on the same input.
As Figure 5.1 clearly indicates, an oligopsonistic industry prices below the perfectly
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competitive level. When the market for the farm input is perfectly competitive, the
industry maximizes profit by choosing that level of optimal purchase of the farm input,
aD, for which the marginal revenue product, MV, equals average expenditure, Po which
is in turn equal to marginal expenditure, ME.
When the market is oligopsonistic, on the other hand, the optimal level of farm input
the industry chooses to purchase, aI, is that level for which the marginal revenue product
equals perceived marginal expenditure. But at this level of optimal input, the price, P!,
paid the farm input is less than the marginal revenue product. It is thus evident that
relative to the perfectly competitive industry, an oligopsonistic industry buys a smaller
quantity of the farm input but at a lower price (average expenditure). The quantity
purchased of the farm input becomes even smaller and the price paid even lower when
there is a single buyer in the industry. The difference between the marginal revenue
product of the farm input and the price paid this input constitutes the price mark-down,
which, in the above figure, is shown as the rectangular area, MVORP!.
5.5 Modelling vertical price transmission in the pres-
ence of oligopsony power
We now extend the multi-stage model of price transmission first developed by Gardner
(1975) accounting for oligopsony power in the farm input market. As might be recalled,
this model considers an industry with many identical firms which combine two factors of
production (i.e., a farm input, a and marketing services, b) to produce a final product,
x. The major assnmptions underlying this model are that both the factor and output
markets are perfectly competitive, that the factors are combined in variable proportions,
and that the production fnnction exhibits constant returns to scale. The extension intro-
duced here will retain all these assumptions except that it will relax the assumption of
the market for the farm input being perfectly competitive. In lieu of this, it will assume
that this market is characterized by oligopsony power whereby there are only few buyers
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of the farm input
Given the measure of oligopsony power in the factor market derived in the preceding
section, then extending the basic model of price transmission to account for the presence
of oligopsony power in the farm input market is straight forward. This task proceeds
by specifying six equations which describe initial equilibrium in the markets for the two
inputs and for the final product.
The first equation describes industry production function as:
x = f(a, b) (5.14)
The second equation describes the demand function for the retail product as:
(5.15)
where N is the demand shifter.
The third and fourth equations specify, in inverse form, the input supply equations
for the farm and marketing inputs respectively as:
Pa = g(a, W) (5.16)
and
(5.17)
where, Wand T are exogenous shifters in their respective markets.
The fifth and sixt.h equations describe the demand functions in the markets for the
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farm and marketing inputs respectively as:
(5.18)
and
(5.19)
which, as might be recalled, are derived from the profit maximization problem of the
industry where the farm input market is assumed oligopsonistic. Note cp in (5.18) stands
for (1 + t).
It is quite evident from equation (5.18), where, clearly, for ¢ > 0, 1< 1, that when
'P
the farm input market is characterized by oligopsony power, then, unlike in the perfectly
competitive model, the price paid the farm input is only a proportion of its marginal
revenue product.
As a quick reading of the equations describing initial equilibrium in the industry
reveals, the only innovation introduced to this stage concerns the demand function for the
farm input which, unlike in the Gardner model, equalizes the marginal revenue product
and the perceived marginal factor cost of the farm input.
5.5.1 Effects of a farm input supply shift
In the preceding, we have described initial equilibrium in the industry. Now we show the
adjustment in initial equilibrium that follows an exogenous shock originating in the farm
sector. This follows the procedure of total differentiation of each of the six equations
describing initial equilibrium and then equating demand and supply equations in each of
the three markets.
Total differentiation of equation (5.14) yields:
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(5.20)
where dx", do", and db" denote percentage changes in the demand for output, those in the
demand for the farm input and those in the demand for marketing services respectively
while fa = Sa'P and fb = 1 - Sa'P are cost shares of the farm and marketing inputs
respectively in the presence of oligopsony power''.
Similarly, totally differentiating equation (5.15), we obtain:
dx* = 'T]dP; (5.21)
where 'T]denotes the price elasticity of demand which is normally negative and dP; is the
percentage change in the price of the final product following an exogenous supply shock.
Total differentiation of eqnation (5.16) gives:
1dP* = -da· + ew
a ea
(5.22)
where dP: is the percentage change in the price of the farm input which results from an
exogenous shock, ea is the elasticity of supply for the farm input whereas ew denotes the
elasticity of the farm input supply to changes in the exogenous supply shifter, (:~ x ~) .
Total differentiation of equation (5.17), on the other hand, yields:
2Recall from (3.3a) the Euler equation, x = faa + fbb. By virtue of (5.18) and (5.19), fa = Pal Pxr.p
and fb = niP x' Then the Euler equation can be written as:
x ='f';~a + 1ft! which on dividing through out by x can be re-written as :
1= '£BJ.2. + ill.P",x P.,x
Denoting "fa = 1~,~a= r.pBa and "fb = ;:;; = Bb, the Euler equation can be written as:
1= "fa + "fb which can equivalently be written as:
l=r.pBa + Bb'
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(5.23)
where dP; denotes the percentage change in the price of the marketing input subsequent
to an exogenous supply shock, while eb denotes the price elasticity of supply for the
marketing input.
The percentage change in demand for marketing inputs following an exogenous supply
shock is expressed as:
dR* = dP* + "fa da· - "fa db·
b x (T (T (5.24)
Finally, the percentage change in demand for the farm input following changes in its
supply conditions is specified as:
dP* dP; ["fb 1d • + ( "fb ) db·
a=(1+8)- a(I+8) a a(I+8) (5.25)
where (T is the elasticity of substitution between the farm input and marketing services.
The change in the price mark-down following changes in the conditions of supply for the
farm input is reflected by:
(5.26)
Obviously, a change in the price mark-down which results from changes in the condi-
tions of supply for the farm input derives directly from a change in the price of the farm
input which directly affects the supply elasticity for the farm input.
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5.5.2 Functional forms of supply and movements in the price
mark-down
As (5.26) clearly indicates, the change in the supply elasticity following a change in the
price of the farm input is critical in determining the direction of change in the mark-down
following changes in the conditions of supply for the farm input. In all normal cases, the
first bracketed term in (5.26) is negative because the mark-down is inversely related to
the supply elasticity. However, the sign of 8 cannot be determined a priori because ~
is signed differently for different functional forms of supply. It is therefore necessary to
identify the sign of ~ for different functional forms of farm input supply, i.c., for a linear
and non-linear specifications of the supply function.
We show this by specifying a generalized supply function for the farm input of the
form:
(5.27)
from which the supply elasticity is calculated as:
(5.28)
Differentiating ea with respect to P a, we obtain:
oea = (02g (Pa)) Pa + (Og (Pa)) _1 _ (89 (Pa)) (89 (Pa)) ( Pa )
er; oP; a er; 9 (Pa) or; or. g2 (Pa)
(5.29)
Equation (5.29) shows that the first and second-order derivatives of the supply function
for the farm input are the key determinants of the size and direction of change in the
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elasticity of supply for the farm input following a change in P a' We can show that these
derivatives vary for different forms of the supply function. But for the purpose of our
thesis, we will show this for the linear and constant elasticity demand functions.
First consider a linear supply function of the form:
(5.30)
where a and f3 are positive constants. The first-order derivative of 9 (Pa) with respect to
Pa is given by:
(5.31)
and its second-order derivative by:
(5.32)
Substituting these first and second-order derivatives into equation (5.29) and rear-
ranging, we obtain a measure of the farm supply elasticity's response to a change in P a
as:
De; (Pa)
- = 1- f3 - = 1- eaBPa a (5.29a)
The result in (5.29a) states that given a linear supply curve, the change in ea following
a change in P a varies with ea itself so that it is negative for an elastic supply curve,
positive for an nelastic supply curve and zero at the point of unit elasticity. Algebraically,
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this can be summarized as:
oeaoP
a
< 0 for ea > 1;
oea
oP
a
> 0 for 0 < ea < 1;
oea
-- = 0 for ea = 1BPa
(5.29b)
and
The implication of this result for movements in the mark-down following changes in
the conditions of supply for the farm input is that given a linear supply curve, the change
in the mark-down cannot be predicted a priori. This is because it changes in the same
direction as Pa when supply is elastic (Le., 8 > 0), in the opposite direction as P a (Le.,
8 < 0) when supply is inelastic, and remains unchanged (i.e., 8 = 0) when supply is
unitary elastic.
Now consider a constant elasticity supply function of the form:
(5.30)
where f3 and e are positive constants. The first order-derivative of this functional form
with respect to Pais given by:
(5.31)
and its second order-derivative is given by:
(5.32)
Substituting these first and second-order derivatives into equation (5.29), we obtain
ea's response to a change in Pa as:
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Be; [( ) f3pe-2] ( t; ) f3pe-l ( 1) (f3 e-l)2 ( Pa )DP
a
= C - 1 C a {3P:_ + C a f3P:_ - C Pa ({3P:,) 2 = 0
(5.29c)
Given a constant elasticity supply function, this result shows that the price mark-
down remains constant (i.c., 8 = 0) when P a changes. The intuitive interpretation is
that as the price of the farm input changes by a certain proportion so does the marginal
value product change by the same proportion thus leaving the mark-down unchanged.
As the above has made evident, the functional form of the supply function assumed
for the farm input is a key determinant of movements in the mark-down following an
exogenous shock to farm input supply. We can summarize the major predictions regarding
changes in the mark-down following an exogenous supply shock as follows. Firstly, given
a linear farm input supply function, the change in the mark-down cannot be predicted
a priori. This is because it changes in the same direction as P a when supply is elastic
[i.e., 8 > 0), in the opposite direction as P a (i.e., 8 < 0) when supply is inelastic, and
remains unchanged (i.e., 8 = 0) when supply is unitary elastic. Secondly, given a constant
elasticity supply function, the price mark-down remains unchanged (i.e., 8 = 0) when
P; changes.
In the following, we show how, in the presence of oligopsony power in the farm sector,
one can solve for new equilibrium values of the endogenous variables in terms of ew.
5.5.3 Solving for new equilibrium values for the endogenous
variables in terms of ew
Earlier, we have defined the percentage changes in the endogenous variables which result
from an exogenous shock to farm input supply. We can now solve for these percentage
changes in terms of the elasticity of farm input supply to the exogenous shock, ew. To
this effect, we equate equations (5.20) and (5.21) to reflect equilibrium adjustment in
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the product market; (5.22) and (5.25) to reflect adjustment in initial equilibrium in the
farm input market; and (5.23) and (5.24) to reflect equilibrium adjustment in marketing
services. This task yields the following three-equation system.
(5.33a)
(_1 ) st: _ [(_1 ) Ib + ..!:..] do" _ (_1 ) Ib db· = ew1+ b x 1+ b (1 ea 1+ b (1 (5.33b)
(5.33c)
This equation system can be solved using Cramer's rule. Solving the system thus,
the percentage changes in the endogenous variables of our interest, dP; and dP; can be
expressed in terms of ew:
(5.34)
(5.35)
where the denominator, D·, which is positive in all instances, is given by:
D· = =n bbea + (1+ b) eb/a + (1+ b) (1] + eaeb+
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5.5.4 The elasticity of price transmission in the presence of
oligopsony power
As might be recalled, for a given exogenous shock, the elasticity of price transmission
is defined as the percentage change in the price of the final product resulting from a
percentage change in the price of the farm input. Given a shock to the farm input
market, the transmission elasticity when this market is characterized by oligopsony power
is expressed as:
(5.36)
Comparison of the transmission elasticity in the presence of oligopsony power to that
in the perfectly competitive benchmark" reveals that the only difference between the two
concerns the inclusion of [) in the numerator of (5.36).
As has been hinted at above, the sign of the term, [) cannot be determined a priori
since g~:is signed differently for different functional forms of farm input supply. This
suggests that, relative to that in the perfectly competitive model, the magnitude of the
elasticity of price transmission allowing for oligopsony power in the farm input market
cannot be predetermined.
Thus, given a linear supply curve for the farm input, the transmission elasticity ac-
counting for oligopsony power is smaller than that obtaining in the perfectly competitive
3The elasticity of price transmission in the perfectly competitive model is derived by setting 8 = 0,to
obtain:
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case when supply is inelastic because ~ > 0 ===> 8 < 0; and greater when supply is
elastic because ~ < 0 ===> 8 > O. On the other hand, the transmission elasticities
for both the perfectly competitive and oligopsonistic models are equal when a constant
elasticity and a unitary linear supply functions are assumed because for these functional
specifications, Mt = 0 ===> 8 = o.
It thus follows from the above results that relative to when the perfectly competitive
model is considered, the elasticity of price transmission is smaller for an inelastic sup-
ply. In this particular instance, we say there is 'under-shifting' in the degree of price
transmission when oligopsony power is present. Furthermore, it follows that relative to
when the perfectly competitive model is assumed, 'over-shifting' in the degree of price
transmission occurs in the presence of oligopsony power when the elastic portion of a
linear supply curve is considered. Finally, when a constant elasticity and unitary elastic
linear supply functions are assumed, we say there is no shifting in the degree of price
transmission in the presence of oligopsony power relative to when a perfectly competitive
model is assumed.
It is to be recalled from our review of the literature that the price transmission elas-
ticity for the oligopolistic model is always smaller than that for the perfectly competitive
model when a linear demand function is assumed {McCorriston et al., 1998}. This means
that given a linear demand function and relative to when all markets are assumed per-
fectly competitive, there is always 'undershifting' in the degree of price transmission
when oligopoly power is present in the retail market. This suggests that results for the
elasticity of price transmission assuming oligopsony power are qualitatively the same as
those for a transmission elasticity assuming oligopoly power, only to the extent that an
inelastic linear supply function is considered.
When the elastic portion of the linear supply function in the oligopsonistic model
is considered, however, oligopsony and oligopoly power might be qualitatively differ-
ent so much so that they might counteract each other's impact on the degree of price
transmission. If overshifting in the oligopsonistic model outweighs undershifting in the
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oligopolistic model, then there will be overshifting, on net, in the degree of price trans-
mission when both oligopsony and oligopoly interact. If, on the other hand, under the
given assumptions undershifting in the oligopolistic model outweighs overshifting in the
oligopsonistic model, the presence of oligopoly and oligopsony will, on net, lead to un-
dershifting relative to when the perfectly competitive model is considered.
To show that this might indeed be the case, we need to extend the basic model of
price transmission allowing for both oligopoly and oligopsony power, and this is the task
we turn to next.
5.6 Modelling price transmission in the presence of
oligopoly and oligopsony power
The task of extending the basic model to account for market power both at the retail and
farm supply stages involves specifying the marketing industry's production and inverse
demand functions as:
x = f(a, b) (5.37)
and
P; = D{x,N) (5.38)
respectively, where,
(5.39)
and the industry's inverse supply functions for the farm and marketing inputs as:
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Pa = g(a, W) (5.40)
and
H = h(b,T) (5.41)
respectively; where, as might be recalled,
(5.42)
and the industry's cost function, which, when separated into its input components, can
be written as:
(5.43)
Having done this, the ith firm's profit maximization problem assuming firms compete
on the basis of quantity in both the output and the farm input sectors, can be formulated
as:
max 7ri P (x) Xi - Paai - Pbbi
a;,b;
(5.44)
where each firm in the industry maximizes profit choosing a, subject to equations (5.38),
(5.39), (5.40), and (5.42) and b, subject to equations (5.37) and (5.39). The first-order
condition with respect to the farm input is given by:
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(5.45)
MUltiplying the second term in the first bracket by ; and then factoring out Px, and,
similarly, factoring out P a from the second bracket yields:
(5.46a)
or, equivalently.
(5.46b)
where ()i and (A are the firm's conjectural elasticities in the final product and farm input
markets respectively whereas ~ and ~ are measures of the firm's oligopoly and oligopsony
power in the respective markets. Note again ry is in all normal cases negative.
Equation (5.46b) states that due to the presence ofmarket power in both the retail and
farm input markets, the perceived marginal revenue of the firm from using an extra unit
of the farm input equals the perceived marginal cost of using such a unit. In keeping with
the aggregation conditions suggested in Appelbaum op cit, we can write the aggregate
analogue of equation (5.46b) as:
(5.46c)
where ()fry and </>f € represent industry-level oligopoly and oligopsony power respectively.
Similarly, the first-order condition with respect to the marketing input, bi can be
obtained as:
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(5.47)
Multiplying the second term of equation (5.47) by ;,then factoring out Px and aggregating
over i firms and re-arranging, yields:
(5.47 a)
Assume that the second-order conditions for a maximum profit are satisfied such that,
(5.48)
As can be noted, relative to the oligopsonistic model, the only changes introduced
so far, on incorporating the oligopolistic model, relate to the factor demand functions
for the farm and marketing inputs as shown in equations (6.46c) and (6.47a). On intro-
ducing these changes, adjustment.s in the original equilibria in all markets to a change
in the conditions of supply in the farm input are expressed in the same way as in the
oligopsonistic model except that the changes in the factor demand functions for the farm
and marketing inputs are modified. The change in the inverse demand function for the
farm input is written, in total differential form, as:
dP*- [8(()/1]) (!!l)]dP*+df =dP*- [(8</J/ea)) (8ea)]dP*
x 81] 8Px x '.I a a Be; 8Pa a
(5.49)
which, on setting (8~~'TJ)) (If;;) = IL, and taking note of the definition of b can be re-
written as:
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dp. (1- f.L) dp. 1 •
a = (l+b) x + {l+b)dfa (5Aga)
which, again, on expanding dfa,becomes:
d.F" = (I - f.L) dp. _ (_1_) "Ibda*+ (_1_) "Ibdb*
a (I + b) x 1+ 15 a 1+ 15 a (504gb)
The parameter f.L reflects the change in the price-cost margin following changes in the
conditions of farm supply. Given a linear demand function, f.L is negative since (&~~ry)
is negative whereas (:fJ",) is positive. On the other hand, given a constant-elasticity
demand function, f.L is zero because (:fJ",) is zero.
Similarly, based on (5A7a), the change in the inverse demand function for the mar-
keting input is written, in total differential form, as:
dR· = dp· - Ildp· + dr·b x r x Jb (5.50)
which, on factoring out dP;, and on expanding df; ,can be expressed as:
(5.50a)
Note that in the presence of both oligopoly and oligopsony power in the industry, the
factor cost shares in (5Aga) and (5.50a) are represented bY"la = (1!'9}ry) and "Ib = (1:J/ry)
respectively".
4Recall from (3.3a) the Euler equation, x = faa+ fbb. By virtue of (5.46c) and (4.47a), fa = Px('f~~/rJ)
and fb = Px(lP_t:ol,,)' Then the Euler equation can be written as:
x p.,f/';:/'1) + p..(it~/'1)which on dividing through out by x can be re-written as:
1 ~p"a + P"b
= P~x 1+01'1) P..x(1+o/'1)·
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Having thus modified the changes in the factor demand functions for both inputs,
then the three-equation system can be specified as:
(5.51a)
(1- p,) dP* _ [(_1 ) "fb + _!_] da" + [(_1 ) "fb] db" = e(1+ b) x 1+ b a ea 1+ b a W (5.51b)
(1 - p,) at; + ; da" - [(;) + :J db" = 0 (5.51c)
Solving the system using Cramer's rule yields the following percentage changes for
the endogenous variables expressed in terms of the percent.age change in the supply of
the farm input.
dP* = ew (1+ b) ea"fa (a + eb)
x 1)** (5.52)
dP* = ewea [(1 - p,) (eb + "faa) - "fb17]
a 1)** (5.53)
Denoting "fa = p,x1i+~7'1) and "fb = P"x(~~oh)' the Euler equation can be written as:
1= "fa + "fb which can equivalently be written as:
1=(1+:'11) + (l.f-"h11)
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5.6.1 The elasticity of price transmission in the presence of
oligopoly and oligopsony
With the values of dP; and dP: at hand, the elasticity of price transmission under the
assumption of market power in both the retail and farm input supply sectors, rOLSNY is
derived as:
(5.54)
As perusal of equation (5.54) makes evident, the presence of 8 in the numerator,
and J-L in the denominator renders it impossible to compare, on prima facia grounds, the
magnitude of rOLSNY compares to the transmission elasticity in the perfectly competitive
model. This is because the values of 8 and f-L are determined by the functional forms of
demand for the final product and of supply for the farm input respectively. Therefore
prior to determining values for the transmission elasticity in (5.54), it is necessary to
determine the corresponding values of 8 and J-L.
First consider a linear supply curve for the farm input and a linear demand curve for
the retail product. Recalling from our analysis of the oligopsonistic model, we know that
for a given linear supply function 8 can take on values that are either positive, negative or
equal to zero. We also know, from our exposition of the oligopoly model, that f-L always
takes on negative values because (1+ 'f}) is always positive.
Given these functional forms, three implications follow for the relative magnitude of
the transmission elasticity when both oligopsony and oligopoly power interact. Firstly,
when (1 - ea) > 0 and (1+ 'f}) > 0, then 8 < 0; J-L < 0 implying that, relative to the size of
the price transmission elasticity that obtains in the perfectly competitive model, rOLSNY
is smaller because its numerator is smaller and its denominator greater. In this particular
instance, both oligopoly and oligopsony power reinforce each other to dampen the degree
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of price transmission from farm supply to the retail sector. Secondly, when (1 - ea) < 0
and (1+ 1]) > 0, then 8 > 0; J-L < 0, implying that, relative to the magnitude of the
price transmission elasticity that obtains in the perfectly competitive model, rOLSNY
is indeterminate because as the denominator gets greater so does the numerator. In
this particular instance, oligopoly and oligopsony power counteract each other's impact
on the degree of price transmission with the relative magnitude of each determining
whether rOLSNYis, on net, larger or smaller than the transmission elasticity obtaining in
the perfectly competitive model. Finally, when (1 - ea) = 0 and (1+ 1]) > 0, then 8 = 0
and J-L < 0, implying that oligopsony power is non-existent, with the result that relative
to the magnitude of the transmission elasticity that obtains in the perfectly competitive
model, rOLSNY is smaller because the denominator is greater. In this particular instance,
the degree of price transmission is weakened purely due to oligopoly power.
Next consider constant elasticity farm input supply and retail demand functions. As
we have pointed out elsewhere when these functional forms are assumed, then 8 = 0 and
J-L = O. The implication is that, rOLSNY equals the price transmission elasticity in the
perfectly competitive model regardless of the presence of market power in both the farm
input and output markets.
Consider now the supply function for the farm input is constant elasticity and the
demand function for the final product linear; then 8 = 0 and J-L < 0, implying that rOLSNY
is smaller than the transmission elasticity in the perfectly competitive benchmark because
the denominator is now greater because of the presence of oligopoly power. On the other
hand, when the supply function for the farm input is assumed linear and the demand
function for the final product constant elasticity, then J-L = 0 and 8 is indeterminate
implying that rOLSNY is indeterminate too.
A summary of the impact of changes in the price mark-up and in the price mark-
down on the transmission elasticity is shown in Table 5.1. Relative to the perfectly
competitive model (-) shows weakening whereas (+) shows enhancement of the degree of
price transmission.
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Table 5.1: Impact of changes in the mark- up and in the mark- down on the elasitic-
ity of price transmission: relative to the perfectly competitive bench-mark ( - ) shows
weakening; ( + ) shows enhancement; ( 0 ) shows neutral
Functional forms of retail demand and supply rUSNY ior; r(JLSNY
Linear demand and supply:
8 = 0; f-£ < 0 0 - -
8> 0; f-£ < 0 + - undefined
8 < 0; f-£ < 0 - - -
Constant elasticity supply and demand:
8 = 0; f-£ = 0 0 0 0
Constant elasticity supply and linear demand:
8 = 0; f-£ < 0 0 - -
Linear supply and constant elasticity demand:
8 = 0; f-£ = 0 0 0 0
8> 0; f-£ = 0 + 0 +
8 < 0; f-£ = 0 <0 0 -
5.7 Summary and evaluation
In this chapter we first developed a model to analyze the effects of oligopsony power
in the market for farm supply taking the degree of price transmission in the perfectly
competitive market as a bench-mark. The key finding is that depending on the farm
supply function faced by the industry, the degree of price transmission which obtains
in the presence of oligopsony power can be smaller (or greater) than or equal to the
transmission elasticity derived in the perfectly competitive benchmark. Technically, these
outcomes are derived from the first-order and second-order derivatives of the farm supply
function. The conclusion therefore is that, in the presence of oligopsony power in the
market for farm supply, the outcome for the degree of price transmission, relative to
that in the perfectly competitive benchmark, cannot be determined a priori without
knowledge of the first- and second-order derivatives of the supply function.
We then developed a more general model whereby we account for the combined ef-
fects of oligopoly and oligopsony power on the degree of price transmission. This model
predicts that depending on the nature of farm supply and retail demand functions the
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outcome for the interaction between oligopoly and oligopsony power cannot be deter-
mined beforehand. As this can be either to weaken the degree of price transmission in
the perfectly competitive benchmark or to strengthen it or in the extreme to mimic it.
The implication is that without prior knowledge of the relevant functional forms for farm
supply and retail demand, no meaningful conclusions can be drawn regarding the out-
come of the interaction between oligopoly and oligopsony power. Therefore any policy
recommendations regarding the effects of market power on the degree of price transmis-
sion need to start with a careful examination of farm supply and retail demand functions
faced by the indust.ry.
Our analysis in this chapter of the effects of market power on the degree of price
transmission has rest.ed on the assumption that other parameters which determine the
degree of price transmission, i.e., the substitution elasticity, demand elasticity, among
others, are kept unchanged. Obviously, this assumption is highly rest.rictive in that it does
not take account of the interactions which exist between anyone of these parameters and
market power. In the next chapter therefore we relax this assumption and take account
of the possible interaction between the degree of market power and other determining
parameters. We undertake this analysis by simulating the effects of market power on the
degree of price transmission subject to changes in anyone of the determining parameters.
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Chapter 6
Simulating the effects of market
power on the degree of price
transmission
6.1 Background
In the preceding chapter we have shown how under the assumption of market power at
both the supply and retailing sectors, our theoretical model predicts an elasticity of price
transmission that is determined by the cost shares of both the farm and marketing inputs,
'Ya and 'Yb respectively; by the elasticity of factor substitution, 0"; by the marketing supply
elasticity, eb; by the retail demand elasticity, 'T}; by the elasticity of farm input supply, ea
and by the market power parameters representing oligopoly, (), and oligopsony, cp.
As might be recalled from the preceding chapter, the elasticity of price transmission
is defined as the percentage change in retail price resulting from a percentage change in
the price of the farm input. For given degrees of oligopoly and oligopsony power in an
industry, it is defined as:
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(6.1)
where, as might be recalled, 8 and Jl denote changes in the mark-down and in the mark-up
respectively which result from an exogenous shock to farm input supply.
As might be recalled, they are signed differently for different functional forms of farm
input supply and retail demand respectively. For this reason, we are not in a position to
determine, a priori, the magnitude of rOLSNY taking the transmission elasticity in the
perfectly competitive model as a benchmark. In the special cases of 8 being positive and
Jl being negative, however, rOLSNY is always smaller than the transmission elasticity in
the perfectly competitive model.
Recalling from our analysis in the previous chapter, the necessary condition for these
special cases to arise is that the supply curve for the farm input and the demand curve
for the retail product be linear. Once these conditions are satisfied, again recalling from
our theoretical exposition, the values of 8 and Jl are then given by:
(6.2)
where as usual 7] is assumed negative.
Assume that these conditions are satisfied. We then want to show the relative effects of
changes in each of the determining variables on rOLSNY taking the perfectly competitive
model as a benchmark. This is the task we turn to in the subsequent sections.
6.2 The analytical framework
In the sections that follow, we simulate the relative effects of changes in the determining
variables on the elasticity of price transmission. In this exercise, we allow each of the
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determining variables to vary within a certain range, given a possible band of values
for certain other key parameters of our interest, while all other parameters are held
constant. We run three sets of experiments, one assuming the industry is oligopolistic,
another assuming the industry is oligopsonistic, and a final experiment assuming the
industry is both oligopolistic and oligopsonistic.
In the first set of experiments, we allow oligopoly power to interact with (J', with T/
and with "la. To this effect, we allow (J' to vary between 0 and 1; "l« to vary between
0.1 and 1; and T/ to vary between 0.75 and 2, for possible values of () ranging between 0
and 0.7 while holding all other parameters constant. In this set of experiments, we also
allow (J' to interact with eb and with 't« assuming ()=0.25. We do this by allowing (J' to
vary between 0.1 and 1, and eb to vary between 0.5 and 2, and by allowing "t« to vary
between 0.1 and 1.0 for a given range of values of (J' between 0 and 1 and again assuming
()=0.25. The choice of the lower bound of () in this category of experiments is intended
to show the possible minimum impact that oligopoly power can have on the degree of
price transmission
In the second set of experiments, we analyze the same set of interactions and use the
same parameter values as in the first set of experiments. The only exceptions are that
we assume the presence of oligopsony power and ignore oligopoly power.
In the third set of experiments, we analyze the combined effects of oligopoly and
oligopsony power on the degree of price transmission. In this set of experiments, we limit
our interest to the interaction of () and ¢ with (J' and "la. The parameter values that we
assume in this set of experiments will again be the same as those in the first and second
sets of experiments.
A quick note on the rationale for the choice of parameter values is in order here. The
parameter values for (), "la' eb, (J' and T/ are all adapted from McCorriston et al. (1998)
with a minor adaptation being made to T/. Whereas they consider parameter values for T/
ranging between 0.75 and 1.25, we consider a wider range of values between 0.75 and 2.
The application of these parameter values to our analysis is motivated by our interest to
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see whether, given the same range of values, oligopsony power works to the same effect
as oligopoly power does.
6.3 Simulating the effects of oligopoly power
6.3.1 The elasticity of price transmission allowing for the in-
teraction between e and a assuming "'la = 0.5; 'Yb = 0.5; eb =
1.0; 1] = 0.75
In this sub-section, we aim to examine the effects of input substitution on the degree of
price transmission when oligopoly power is present. To this effect, we allow (J to vary
on a scale of 0 to 1, keeping all other parameters unchanged, for a range of values of ()
between 0 and 0.7. The results of this simulation exercise are presented in Table 6.1.
Two major outcomes seem to emerge from this experiment.
Firstly, for any given degree of oligopoly power, allowing for increased substitution
possibility between the two inputs increases the elasticity of price transmission. Intu-
itively, this result follows because when the price of the farm input increases, retailers
are induced to substitute the relatively cheaper marketing input for the relatively more
expensive farm input. Suppose the supply of the marketing input cannot be increased at
the going price in the short run, because the marketing sector operates at full capacity;
then, the increase in demand for the marketing input raises the price of this input and
thereby reinforces the initial increase in the price of the farm input.
Secondly, for a given degree of input substitution and relative to a perfectly compet-
itive benchmark, an increase in ()works to weaken the degree of price transmission. In
fact, when () is large enough (in this case, () =0.7), the elasticity of price transmission is
forced down close to zero suggesting that a high degree of oligopoly power attenuates the
effect of (J. This stems from our assumption of a linear retail demand function which has
the inherent tendency to force the price mark-up to fall as the price of the farm input
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Table 6.1: The interaction between the substitution elasticity and oligopoly pwer
(J" 0= 0.0 0=0.25 0=0.5 0= 0.7
0.0 0.364 0.222 0.103 0.019
0.2 0.407 0.246 0.113 0.021
0.4 0.444 0.267 0.121 0.023
0.6 0.478 0.284 0.129 0.024
0.8 0.507 0.3 0.135 0.025
1.0 0.533 0.314 0.14 0.026
increases and to rise as the latter decreases thus rendering the retail price change, in
the presence of oligopoly power, always smaller than that under perfect competition. As
such, this result springs more from an a priori imposition of a specific functional form
on the demand function than from the nature of oligopoly pricing itself.
These results are shown diagrammatically in Figure 6.1. The solid line tracks the
transmission elasticity's response to changes in a when the industry is perfectly competi-
tive. The dashed, dotted and dash-dotted lines, on the other hand, track such a response
for different degrees of () (i.e., for ()= 0.25; ()= 0.5; ()= 0.7 respectively).
Evidently, all lines are rising over the entire range of a indicating the positive rela-
tionship between the transmission and substitution elasticities. Also manifest is the fact
that the solid line lies above the dashed line, the dashed above the dotted line and the
latter above the dash-dotted line highlighting that a growing power of oligopoly puts a
downward pressure on the elasticity of price transmission. Finally, lines corresponding
to successively higher degrees of oligopoly power are flatter than those corresponding to
smaller such degrees. This underlines what has been pointed out earlier already; that
as oligopoly power grows, the elasticity of substitution diminishes in importance as a
determinant of the transmission elasticity
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Figure 6-1: Interaction between elasticity of substitution and oligopoly power
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Table 6.2: Interaction between the cost share of the farm input and oligopoly power
"la 0=0 0=0.25 0=0.5 0=0.75
0.1 0.087 0.057 0.028 0.005
0.2 0.176 0.113 0.054 0.01
0.3 0.269 0.168 0.079 0.015
0.4 0.364 0.222 0103 0.019
0.5 0.462 0.276 0.125 0.023
0.6 0.563 0.329 0.146 0.027
0.7 0.667 0.381 0.167 0.03
0.8 0.774 0.432 0.186 0.033
0.9 0.885 0.483 0.205 0.036
1.0 1.000 0.533 0.222 0.037
6.3.2 The elasticity of price transmission allowing for the in-
teraction between "l« and e assuming a = 0.5; eb = 1.0; 'T] =
0.75;and lb = 1 -la'
The aim of this experiment is to evaluate whether allowing for oligopoly power in an
industry matters for the effects of fa on the degree of price transmission. With this
aim in mind, we let fa vary in the range of 0.1 to 1.0, for different degrees of oligopoly
power, while keeping all other parameters fixed. Table 6.2 summarizes the results of this
experiment.
The results show that for any given degree of oligopoly power, a large 'Ya enhances the
degree of price transmission simply reflecting the composition of inputs in the final good.
They also show that when the farm input is the only input used by the industry (i.e., for
fa =1), assuming perfectly competitive markets at all stages of the industry (I.e., () = 0)
produces an elasticity of price transmission equal to unity whereby a percentage change
in the price of the farm input translates, one-for-one, into the same percentage change in
the price of the retail product.
Conversely, relative to a perfectly competitive industry, and for a given fa' a higher ()
results in a smaller elasticity of price transmission. In fact, there seems to be a threshold
value of () for which the elasticity of price transmission is very close to zero regardless
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of the magnitude of fa. In our case, this appears to be the case for ()= 0.7. Given
an increase in the farm input price, the explanation is that the price mark-up falls in
proportion to an increase in the degree of market power.
As has been pointed out in the preceding chapter, the intuitive explanation as to why
oligopoly power works to depress the impact of fa on the degree of price transmission
has to do with the change in the price-cost margin in response to a change in the price
of the farm input. Given a linear demand function, this means an increase in the price
of the farm input cannot be passed on to the price of the final product, in proportion to
the share of the farm input, because the margin falls at the same time that the price of
the farm input increases. The magnitude of the fall in the price-cost margin is in direct
proportion to the market power parameter, ().
Figure 6.2 illustrates these simulation results. The solid line captures the effects of
the farm input's cost share on the transmission elasticity when the industry is perfectly
competitive (l.e., when () =0). The dashed, dotted and dash-dotted lines, on the other
hand, capture such effects for values of oligopoly power corresponding to 0.25, 0.5, and
0.7 respectively.
As can be observed from Figure 6.2, all the lines are increasing in the cost share of
the farm input. It can also be observed that not only does the solid line lie above the
dashed line, the dashed above the dotted line and the latter above the dashed-dotted line
but that the lower the lines go the flatter they get. This highlights that not only does
a given fa result in a larger value for the transmission elasticity but that an increasing
degree of oligopoly power has an increasingly dampening effect on the degree of price
transmission (I.e., the degree of price transmission weakens at an increasing rate for
incremental changes in the degree of oligopoly power).
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Figure 6-2: Interaction between cost share of the farm input and oligopoly power
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6.3.3 The elasticity of price transmission accounting for the in-
teraction between 1] and ()assuming "t« = 0.5;'Yb = 0.5;eb =
1.0; a = 0.5
In this experiment we aim to evaluate the effects of retail demand elasticity on the
degree of price transmission when the industry exercises oligopoly power. For a range of
possible values of () in the region of 0 to 0.7, this it does by allowing variations in the
elasticity of demand in the range of 0.75 to 2 while keeping all other parameters constant.
Table 6.3 summarizes these simulation results. Three major outcomes emerge from this
experiment.
Firstly, relative to the perfectly competitive benchmark (i.e., for e = 0), the elasticity
of price transmission falls consistently as consumer demand becomes more elastic. This
indicates that with a more elastic demand, firms' ability to increase retail price in response
to an increase in cost, is diminished.
181
Secondly, when oligopoly power is allowed for in the retail market, the transmission
elasticity does not move monotonically with the elasticity of demand. Consequently, for a
given degree of oligopoly power, the transmission elasticity gets larger as demand becomes
more elastic then reaches a threshold beyond which it starts to fall as the elasticity of
demand increases further. We might hasten to add that this threshold becomes higher
as () gets larger.
As might be recalled from our theoretical exposition, the ambiguous effect of the
elasticity of demand when oligopoly power is present has been well brought out by com-
parative statics. The explanation for this might be as follows. Starting with an inelastic
demand, oligopolist firms feel that they can widen their price-cost margin at the same
time that they increase the price of the final product, following an increase in the price
of the farm input, in spite of demand becoming more elastic. As a result, the elasticity
of price transmission increases since the widening of firms' price-cost margin compounds
the increase in the price of the final product.
But there is a point beyond which demand becomes very elastic such that they feel
they cannot widen their margin anymore at the same time that they increase the final
product price. At this stage, they decide to narrow their margin at the same time that
they increase ret.ail price with the result that the elasticity of price transmission falls
because the fall in the margin dilutes the increase in the final product price.
Thirdly, relative to when ()= 0, and for a given value of 'r/, the transmission elasticity
falls as oligopoly power increases. We have presented an intuitive explanation for this
earlier in relation to changes in the price-cost margin that follow changes in the price of
the final product. \Ve will therefore not repeat it here
We illustrate these results in Figure 6.3. The solid line captures the effects, on the
transmission elasticity, of changes in TJ for ()=O. The dashed, dotted and dash-dotted
lines, on the other hand, capture such effects for ()=O.25; ()=O.5; ()=O.7respectively.
It is clearly shown that the solid line is falling over the entire range of n, while lines
corresponding to the different degrees of ()are rising over a certain range, and, depending
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Table 6.3: I t b t d d 1 ticit d li poly powern .eraction e ,ween eman e as ,1CItyan o 19O
7J ()= 0.0 ()= 0.25 ()= 0.5 ()= 0.1
0.75 00462 0.276 0.125 0.023
1.0 00429 0.290 0.176 0.099
1.25 00400 0.291 0.200 0.137
1.50 0.375 0.286 0.213 0.151
1.75 0.353 0.278 0.214 0.170
2.0 0.333 0.269 0.214 0.176
Figure 6-3: Interaction between elasticity of demand and oligopoly power
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2
Table 6.4: Interaction between elasticities of substitution and marketing supply
a eb = 0.5 e, = 1.0 eb = 2.0
0.1 0.213 0.235 0.249
0.2 0.233 0.246 0.255
0.3 0.251 0.257 0.261
0.4 0.267 0.267 0.267
0.5 0.281 0.276 0.272
0.6 0.293 0.284 0.277
0.7 0.305 0.292 0.282
0.8 0.315 0.300 0.287
0.9 0.324 0.307 0.292
1.0 0.333 0.314 0.296
on the value of (), are either falling or tapering off over a certain other range, reflecting
the ambiguity of "1'seffect on the transmission elasticity when the market is oligopolistic.
It is also shown that, relative to the line which corresponds to a perfectly competitive
benchmark, lines corresponding to successively higher degrees of ()lie far lower than those
corresponding to smaller such degrees. The implication is that, even though generally, for
any value of "1,the degree of price transmission is higher when the industry is perfectly
competitive rather than oligopolistic, this degree of transmission is lowered as market
demand gets more elastic, when the industry is less oligopolistic.
6.3.4 The elasticity of price transmission allowing for the in-
teraction between (J and eb assuming T« = 0.5; 'Yb = 0.5; '" =
0.75; e = 0.25
In this exercise, we aim to examine movements in the elasticity of price transmission
allowing for the interaction between eb and (J for a degree of ()equal to 0.25. This we do
by allowing variations in a, assuming all other parameters are held constant, for a range
of values of eb between 0.5 and 2. The results are presented in Table 6.4.
Table 6.4 makes evident that in the presence of () (i.e., for ()=0.25), and for any given
value of eb, the degree of price transmission is enhanced as greater substitution is allowed
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for between the two inputs.
It also transpires that over a lower range of values for a (in our case, 0.1 ~ a < 0.4),
the elasticity of price transmission increases, as eb gets more elastic. When a reaches a
certain threshold (in our case, 0-=0.4), the transmission elasticity assumes a unique value
for any given value of ei: On the other hand, for values of 0- above this threshold (i.e., for
a greater than 0.4), it seems to be the case that, for a given value of es, the transmission
elasticity falls with eb. As might be recalled, the comparative static results that were
obtained in the theoretical literature review have very well anticipated the ambiguity of
eb's effect on the degree of price transmission.
The ambiguity of eb's impact on the degree of price transmission can be explained as
follows. For a given degree of market power, assume that firms' price-cost margin remains
unchanged as the price of the farm input changes, which is likely to be the case when 7J
is assumed to remain unchanged. It is then probable that, for a relatively lower degree
of input substitution, the price of the marketing input will decrease as the price of the
farm input increases if marketing supply is inelastic. For a given degree of substitution,
this results in the elasticity of price transmission being smaller than when a very elastic
marketing supply is assumed.
Conversely, if the degree of input substitution is very high, then an increase in the
price of the farm input induces retailers to demand more marketing input, which has
become relatively cheaper. Assuming the latter's supply is inelastic, this leads to an
increase in its price. As such, the increase in the price of the farm input is compounded
by the increase in the price of the marketing input. The upshot of this is that relative to
when marketing supply is very elastic, and given a very high degree of input substitution,
the transmission elasticity increases as marketing supply gets more inelastic.
Figure 6.4 brings out these interactions. The solid line tracks changes in the price
transmission elasticity when marketing supply is very elastic (i.e., for es =2); the dashed
line tracks these changes when marketing supply is unitary elastic (i.e., for eb =1) while
the dotted line tracks these changes when marketing supply is less elastic [i.e., for eb=0.5).
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Figure 6-4: Interaction between elasticities of substitution and marketing supply
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It is quite evident from Figure 6.4 that for a lower range of values for a (in our case for
a value of a up to 0.4), the solid line lies above the dashed line and the latter above the
dotted line, suggesting that a more elastic marketing supply is associated with a larger
price transmission elasticity. For a unique value of a (in our case for a=O.4), all lines
merge suggesting that, given this value, the elasticity of marketing supply does not have
any impact on the degree of price transmission. On the other hand, for an upper range
of values for a (in our case for a>O.4), the dotted line lies above the dashed line and the
latter above the solid line implying that a more elastic marketing supply is associated
with a smaller value for the elasticity of price transmission.
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6.3.5 The elasticity of price transmission allowing for the inter-
action between la and (J' assuming Ib = 0.5; "7 = 0.75; eb =
1; ()= 0.25
The aim here is to see whether, in the presence of oligopoly power, allowing for larger
"t« enhances the degree of price transmission given our assumption regarding a and the
demand elasticity. To this end, we run an experiment allowing for variations in "t«
between 0.1 and 1.0, for a range of values of a running from 0 to 1 and for 0=0.25 with
all other parameters held constant. Table 6.5 summarizes these simulation results. Three
outcomes are prominent and are summarized as follows.
Firstly, regardless of the proportion in which inputs are combined, allowing for larger
"t« increases the elasticity of price transmission. This is because changes in the price of
the final product following changes in that of the farm input are in direct proportion to
'Ya'
Secondly, relative to when the two inputs are combined in a fixed proportion (l.e.,
a=O), allowing for increased input substitution increases the elasticity of price transmis-
sion. To reiterate a point that we have made earlier, this is because an increase in the
price of the marketing input, which results from an increase in demand for this input, in
turn resulting from the farm input becoming relatively more expensive, compounds the
initial increase in the price of the farm input assuming marketing supply is inelastic.
Thirdly, as the share of the farm input approaches unity, so does the elasticity of
price transmission attain its maximum value no matter in what proportion inputs are
combined.
Figure 6.5 illustrates these results. The solid line tracks changes in the elasticity of
price transmission when inputs are combined in a fixed proportion (i.e., a = 0). The
dashed, dotted and dot-dashed lines, on the other hand, track such changes for different
cost shares of the raw input for a=0.25, a=0.5 and a=l.O respectively.
As the figure makes evident, all lines are rising over the entire range of the farm input's
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Table 6.5: Interaction between farm input's cost share and substitution elasticity
Ta 0'=0 0' = 0.25 0' = 0.75 0'=1
0.1 0.039 0.048 0.065 0.073
0.2 0.081 0.097 0.127 0.140
0.3 0.125 0.148 0.186 0.202
0.4 0.172 0.199 0.242 0.26
0.5 0.222 0.251 0.296 0.314
0.6 0.276 0.305 0.348 0.363
0.7 0.333 0.36 0.397 0.41
0.8 0.395 0.416 0.444 0.454
0.9 0.461 0.474 0.481 0.495
1.0 0.533 0.533 0.533 0.533
Figure 6-5: Interaction between cost share of farm input and elasticity of substitution
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cost share suggesting that larger shares of the farm input are associated with larger
values for the transmission elasticity. Furthermore, lines corresponding to higher degrees
of input substitution lie above those corresponding to lower such degrees indicating that,
for a given share of the farm input, a greater possibility for input substitution enhances
the degree of price transmission. Finally, the slope of the line tracking changes in the
transmission elasticity becomes flatter as the substitution elasticity increases from 0 to
1, suggesting that as the share of the farm input increases, the transmission elasticity
attains its maximum value for different values of the substitution elasticity. In fact, when
this share takes on the value of unity, then all lines vanish to a point on the right vertical
axis.
Under the given assumptions of all other parameters remaining unchanged, this result
comes as no surprise. In the absence of any possibility for input substitution, movements
in the elasticity of price transmission are exclusively driven by changes in the share of
the farm input.
6.3.6 The effects of oligopoly power on the degree of price trans-
mission: a summary of simulation results
The previous analysis has brought to light movements in the elasticity of price transmis-
sion which result, ceteris paribus, from the interplay between any two of the determining
variables (i.e., "fa, es, T}, a and 0) assuming all others remain constant. Apart from re-
sults for the interaction between the demand elasticity and oligopoly power, results for
the degree of price transmission that we have derived assuming oligopoly power in the
retail sector are identical to those found by McCorriston et al. (1998). From the repeated
simulation exercises that we have undertaken, the following conclusions seem to emerge
consistently.
Firstly, wherever the substitution elasticity, (1, interacts with either 0, or with eb,
its impact, for a given value of the latter, is always to strengthen the degree of price
transmission .
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Secondly, wherever () interacts with either a, fa or with 1], its effect, for a given value
of the latter, is always to weaken the degree of price transmission.
Thirdly, wherever "t« is observed interacting with either ()or with a, its impact always
appears to be to enhance the degree of price transmission.
Fourthly, wherever eb is interacting with a, its impact on the degree of price transmis-
sion always seems to be ambiguous for different values of the latter. For a certain range
of values for a, its impact is to strengthen the degree of price transmission; whereas for
a certain other range, its impact is to weaken it. However, there seems to be a unique
value of a for which eb does not have any impact on the degree of price transmission.
Fifthly, wherever the elasticity of demand, 1], interacts with oligopoly power (0)0),
its impact on the degree of price transmission always seems to be ambiguous for any
given value of the latter.
Finally, given our assumption regarding the functional form of demand, the presence
of oligopoly power affects not so much the qualitative outcomes for the transmission
elasticity under perfectly competitive markets as the quantitative outcomes.
In the following, we replicate the above simulation exercises allowing for oligopsony
power and see whether doing so produces similar results for the degree of price transmis-
sion as those produced by allowing for oligopoly power.
6.4 Simulating the effects of oligopsony power on the
degree of price transmission
In this section, we simulate the effects of oligopsony power on the degree of price trans-
mission assuming a linear farm input supply function which is inelastic. As pointed out
in the introduction, we carry out this experiment using the same parameter values as in
the previous set of experiments. Our major interest is to see if oligopsony power impacts
on the degree of price transmission in a qualitative manner which is any different from
that of oligopoly power.
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6.4.1 The elasticity of price transmission allowing for the in-
teraction between <p and a assuming fa = 0.5;fb = 0.5;eb =
1.0; 'TJ = 0.75.
The aim of this experiment is to see whether the presence of oligopsony power in the farm
sector of an industry attenuates the impact of a on the degree of price transmission, as
theoretically predicted by our model. To this end, we run an experiment whereby, ceteris
paribus, a is made to vary within the range of 0 and 1, for values of 4>running from 0
to 0.7. Table 6.6 presents the results of this simulation exercise. The major observations
that come out of this experiment can be summarized as follows.
Firstly, relative to that in the competitive benchmark, the elasticity of price trans-
mission in the presence of oligopsony power is smaller. This is because for a given change
in the price of the farm input, the change in the price of the retail product reflects as a
change in the marginal cost when the input market is competitive. When the market is
oligopsonistic, on the other hand, the change in the price of the retail product reflects
both as a marginal cost change and as a change in the price mark-down. Given the
inelastic portion of a linear supply curve, the latter moves in the opposite direction as
the change in the price of the farm input. Therefore, the net change in the price of the
retail product, following a change in farm input price, is smaller when the farm input
market is oligopsonistic than when it is perfectly competitive.
Secondly, taking the perfectly competitive market as the base case (i.e., for 4>=0),it
transpires that, for a given value of the elasticity of substitution, the elasticity of price
transmission falls as the industry becomes more oligopsonistic. This is because the more
oligopsonistic the industry is, the wider the mark-down and the larger the change in this
mark-down becomes when the price of the farm input changes and vice versa.
Finally, for any given value of oligopsony power, and relative to when inputs are
combined in a fixed proportion, the transmission elasticity increases as the possibility
for input substitution is greater. The explanation we provided with regard to the effects
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Table 6.6: lnt ti b t b tit ti 1 ticit d u opsony power.erac ,IOn e .ween S11 s I u IOne as ICI ~yan o 19
er ¢=O.O 4>= 0.25 4>=0.5 4>=0.7
0.0 0.364 0.342 0.273 0.258
0.2 0.407 0.339 0.305 0.289
0.4 0.444 0.371 0.333 0.316
0.6 0.478 0.398 0.358 0.339
0.8 0.507 0.423 0.38 0.36
1.0 0.533 0.445 0.4 0.379
of oligopoly power applies here as well. As might be recalled, we reasoned that for a
highly inelastic marketing supply, the increase in demand for the marketing input, as the
farm input becomes relatively more expensive, puts an upward pressure on its price thus
compounding the initial increase in the latter's price.
These results are very well highlighted in Figure 6.6. For different degrees of input
substitution, the solid line tracks changes in the transmission elasticity when perfect
competition is assumed in all markets (i.e., for <;0=0) while the dashed, dotted and dot-
dashed lines track such changes for <;0=0.25; for <;0=0.5; and <;0=0.7 respectively.
All the lines are rising over the entire range of a highlighting that, ceteris paribus,
higher degrees of input substitution produce larger values for the elasticity of price trans-
mission. It is also clearly shown that the solid line lies above the dashed, the dashed
above the dotted line and the latter above the dashed-dotted line illuminating the fact
that, given a linear farm input supply function which is inelastic, a higher degree of
oligopsony power depresses the degree of price transmission.
6.4.2 The elasticity of price transmission allowing for the in-
teraction between "'la and <p assuming "'Ib = 1 - "'la; eb = 1.0;
'f] = 0.75; 0' = 0.5.
In this experiment, we analyze the effects of Ia on the degree of price transmission when
the industry exercises oligopsony power. This we do by assigning different values to Y«
for a range of values of <;0 between 0 and 0.7. Table 6.7 summarizes the results of this
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Figure 6-6: Interaction between elasticity of substitution and oligopsony power
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simulation exercise. Three major outcomes are evident here.
Firstly, for any given "fa' and relative to when the industry is perfectly competitive
(Le., for 4>=0), the transmission elasticity falls as the degree of oligopsony power rises
[i.e., for 4»0). At the risk of repetition, the change in the mark-down moderates the
change in the price of the farm input so that, relative to when the market is perfectly
competitive, the change in the price of the retail product is smaller when the market is
oligopsonistic,
Secondly, in the absence of oligopsony power in the farm input market, there is a
one-to-one correspondence between farm input price and retail price when the cost share
of the farm input is unity so that a percentage change in the former leads to a percentage
change in the latter.
Finally, for any given value of oligopsony power, the transmission elasticity increases
as we allow for larger shares of the farm input simply reflecting the monotonic relationship
between "fa and the elasticity of price transmission.
The above results are illustrated in Figure 6.7. The solid line represents values of the
transmission elasticity for different shares of the farm input when 4>=0,while the dashed,
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Table 6.7: Interaction between the farm input's cost share and oligopsony power
""'la ¢=O ¢ = 0.25 c/J = 0.5 c/J=0.7
0.1 0.087 0.072 0.066 0.062
0.2 0.176 0.015 0.132 0.125
0.3 0.269 0.224 0.202 0.191
0.4 0.364 0.303 0.273 0.258
0.5 0.462 0.385 0.346 0.328
0.6 0.563 0.469 0.422 0.399
0.7 0.667 0.556 0.5 0.474
0.8 0.774 0.646 0.581 0.550
0.9 0.885 0.738 0.664 0.629
1.0 1.0 0.834 0.75 0.71
dotted and dash-dotted lines represent such values for 1> = 0.25; 1> = 0.5; and 1> = 0.7
respectively.
As is clearly shown in the figure, for any given degree of oligopsony power, all lines are
rising over the entire range of la' signifying the positive impact of larger farm input cost
shares on the elasticity of price transmission. Also evident is the fact that not only do
lines associated with larger values for oligopsony power fall below those associated with
smaller such values (e.g., the solid line above the dashed) but also that the lower the
lines get the flatter they become. This implies that not only does a more oligopsonistic
industry lessen the transmission elasticity for any given share of the farm input but that
every successive increase in this share contributes little to enhancing the transmission
elasticity.
6.4.3 The elasticity of price transmission allowing for the in-
teraction between ea and ¢ assuming Ta = 0.5;eb = 1.0;a =
0.5; 'TJ = 0.75
The main aim of this experiment is to examine the relative impact of the elasticity of farm
input supply on the degree of price transmission when the industry exercises oligopsony
power. With the view to achieving this aim, we allow ea, ceteris paribus, to vary within
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Figure 6-7: Interaction between farm input's cost share and oligopsony power
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a range of 0.1 and 1 given a range of values for if> between 0 and 0.7. Our choice of
values for ea is not arbitrary. As we have already pointed out earlier, when analyzing
oligopsony power, only the inelastic portion of a linear supply curve yields results that
are analogous to those for the model assuming oligopoly power, and since our aim is to
compare the relative effects of oligopoly and oligopsony power, this assumption serves a
good purpose here. We summarize the results of this simulation exercise in Table 6.B.
Two observations are worthy of note here.
Firstly, for a given value of ea, and relative to when perfect competition is assumed
(i.e., for 4>=0), the transmission elasticity falls as oligopsony power rises highlighting
that a higher degree of oligopsony power reduces the degree of price transmission. As we
have just explained in the preceding, this highlights the role of the price mark-down in
moderating movements in the transmission elasticity when the industry is oligopsonistic.
Secondly, as the industry gets oligopsonistic (i.e., for if> > 0), a relatively more elastic
ea works to enhance the degree of price transmission. This follows because, for a given
degree of oligopsony power, the more elastic farm input supply becomes, relative to
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Table 6.8: Interaction between farm input supply elasticity and oligopsony power
ea 4>=0 4>= 0.25 4>= 0.5 4>=0.7
0.1 0.462 0.165 0.116 0.046
0.3 0.462 0.315 0.26 0.236
0.5 0.462 0.385 0.346 0.327
0.7 0.462 0.425 0.404 0.393
0.9 0.462 0.452 0.446 0.441
1.0 0.462 0.462 0.462 0.462
its initial position, the less the oligopsonist's power over price of the farm input, and,
consequently, the narrower the mark-down becomes. When the industry is perfectly
competitive, on the other hand, the elasticity of price transmission becomes insensitive
to changes in ea. This is because when an exogenous shock arises in the farm input
market, ea does not enter the expression for the transmission elasticity as shown in
equation (6.1) early on in the chapter apart through the market power parameter, ¢.
This being the case, changes in ea do not affect the degree of price transmission.
These observations are illustrated in Figure 6.8 where, in the absence of oligopsony
power, i.e., for ¢=O, the solid line represents values of the transmission elasticity for
different values of ea whereas the dashed, dotted and dash-dotted lines represent such
values for ¢=25, ¢=0.5 and ¢=0.7 respectively.
As Figure 6.8 clearly shows, lines corresponding to larger values of oligopsony power
(e.g., ¢=0.7) lie lower than those corresponding to smaller such values (e.g., ¢=0.25)
indicating that, for any given value of ea, the price transmission elasticity is smaller for
a more oligopsonistic industry than for a less oligopsonistic one. The figure also shows
that as ea approaches unity, all lines tend to converge suggesting that, when this obtains,
oligopsony power does not have any impact on the elasticity of price transmission. This
can be interpreted as saying that, given a unitary-elastic supply of the farm input, any
change in the price of the farm input is matched by a proportionate change in the marginal
revenue product so that, on net, the mark-down remains unchanged.
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Figure 6-8: Interaction between farm supply elasticity and oligopsony power
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6.4.4 The elasticity of price transmission allowing for the in-
teraction between eb and a assuming 'a = 0.5; 'Yb = 0.5;
0.30.1 0.5 0.7 0.9
Farm supply elasticity
ea = 0.5; 7] = 0.75; ¢ = 0.25
Assuming oligopsony power is present in the industry, and for a given range of (I, the
effects of changes in the marketing supply elasticity on the degree of price transmission
are examined. To this end, a is allowed to vary, ceteris paribus, given a range of values
for eb running from 0.5 to 2 and for </>=0.25.Our choice of the lower range of values for
¢ is intended to bring out the minimum possible effects that oligopsony power can have
on the degree of price transmission. We summarize our simulation results in Table 6.9.
Under the given assumptions, the following patterns emerge for movements in the price
transmission elasticity.
Firstly, over the entire range of eb, a greater possibility for input substitution increases
the degree of price transmission. To repeat a point that we have just made elsewhere,
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Table 6.9: Interaction between substitution and marketing supply elasticities
0- eb = 0.5 eb = 1 eb = 2
0.1 0.27 0.322 0.361
0.2 0.299 0.339 0.371
0.3 0.326 0.355 0.38
0.4 0.349 0.371 0.389
0.5 0.371 0.385 0.397
0.6 0.391 0.398 0.405
0.7 0.408 0.411 0.413
0.8 0.426 0.423 0.421
0.9 0.441 0.434 0.428
1 0.455 0.445 0.435
this follows because the increase in demand for the marketing input, as a result of the
farm input becoming relatively more expensive, increases the price of this input in the
short-run and thereby enhances the degree with which the increase in farm input price
is passed on to the price of the retail product.
Secondly, for a certain range of values for a (in our case, for 0.1 :::;a :::;0.8), the degree
of price transmission is greater for a more elastic marketing supply than for a less elastic
such supply. For a certain other range of values (in our case, 0.8 :::;a :::;1), on the other
hand, the degree of price transmission is weaker for a more elastic marketing supply. A
possible explanation for the ambiguity surrounding the effect of eb on the degree of price
transmission has been offered earlier. We will not, therefore, repeat it here.
The patterns that we have summarized above are illustrated in Figure 6.9. The solid
line tracks values of the transmission elasticity for different degrees of input substitution
when eb=0.5 while the dashed and dotted lines track such values for eb =1 and eb =2
respectively.
Evidently, all lines are rising over the entire range of eb emphasizing the result that a
impacts positively on the transmission elasticity over the entire range of values for ei. It is
also apparent that the dotted line lies above the dashed and solid lines for some values of
a and below them for other such values. For different degrees of substitution, this shows
the ambiguity of the marketing elasticity's impact on the degree of price transmission.
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Figure 6-9: Interaction between substitution and marketing supply elasticities
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6.4.5 The elasticity of price transmission allowing for the inter-
action between "t« and a assuming 'Yb = 1- "Ya; ea = 0.5; 'fJ =
0.75; ¢ = 0.25; ei, = 1
In this experiment, we aim to show the impact of the cost share of the farm input on the
degree of price transmission, for a given range of values for a, when the industry exercises
a certain degree of oligopsony power. To this effect, we run a simulation exercise whereby
we allow la to vary within a range of 0.1 and 1, for a range of values of a between 0
and 1, and for ¢=0.25. Table 6.10 summarizes these simulation results. The most salient
features can be summarized as follows.
Firstly, for a given la' and relative to when factors are combined in a fixed proportion
(i.e., for 0'=0), the elasticity of price transmission increases as the possibility for input
substitution is greater. We have offered an intuitive explanation for this more than once.
So we do not repeat it here. Secondly, for any given combination of inputs (i.e., for any
given value of a), a larger la is associated with a higher degree of price transmission
indicating the composition of inputs in the industry. Finally, as "t« approaches unity, so
does the elasticity of price transmission approach its maximum value regardless of the
proportion in which inputs are combined. This is quite intuitive because if I a is unity,
then factor combination vanishes and 0'=0. Consequently, the maximum degree of price
transmission that is achievable when 0'=0.0 applies to all other factor combinations as
well.
These results are illustrated in Figure 6.10 where the elasticity of price transmission
is shown on the vertical axis and the farm input's cost share on the horizontal axis. The
solid, dashed, dotted and dash-dotted lines capture the transmission elasticity's response
to changes in '"'la for a = D;for O'=0.25j for 0'=0.75 and for 0'=1.
It is clearly shown that all lines are rising over the entire range of I a emphasizing the
point that, for any given value of a, the larger la' the more forceful the pass-through of
changes in the price of the farm input to the price of the retail product.
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Table 6.10: Interaction between farm input's cost share and substitution elasticity
Ta 0"=0 0" = 0.25 0" = 0.75 0"=1
0.1 0.05 0.061 0.083 0.095
0.2 0.104 0.127 0.167 0.186
0.3 0.164 0.196 0.25 0.274
0.4 0.23 0.269 0.334 0.356
0.5 0.303 0.347 0.417 0.445
0.6 0.385 0.432 0.501 0.527
0.7 0.477 0.521 0.584 0.607
0.8 0.58 0.618 0.667 0.684
0.9 0.699 0.722 0.751 0.76
1 0.834 0.834 0.834 0.834
The figure also shows that over the entire range of la' lines that correspond to higher
degrees of input substitution lie higher than those that correspond to lower such degrees
emphasizing the key role that input substitutability plays in price transmission. As the
cost share of the farm input becomes unity, however, all lines converge at a point on the
right vertical axis.
6.4.6 The effects of oligopsony power on the degree of price
transmission: a summary of simulation results
The simulated experiments that we have carried out to analyze interactions between any
two of the key determining variables, assuming the industry exercises oligopsony power,
seem to have generated a pattern of results, which, in qualitative terms, is similar to that
generated by assuming an oligopolistic industry.
Firstly, on interacting with the measure of oligopsony power, qy, the cost share of
the farm input, la' or the marketing supply elasticity, eb, the effect of the substitution
elasticity always appears to strengthen the degree of price transmission
Secondly, on interacting with, the elasticity of substitution, a, the elasticity of the
farm input supply, ea, or the farm input cost share, la' and for a linear farm input supply
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Figure 6-10: Interaction between farm input's cost share and substitution elasticity
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function, oligopsony power always appears to weaken the degree of price transmission.
Thirdly, on interacting with either ¢> or a, an increasing the cost share of the farm
input always appears to stand to strengthen the degree of price transmission.
Fourthly, on interacting with a, the effect of the marketing supply elasticity always
seems to be ambiguous; it being the case that for a relatively lower range of values for
a ; its effect is to strengthen the degree of price transmission while for an upper range of
such values, its effect is to weaken it.
Fifthly, on interacting with oligopsony power, a more elastic supply of the farm input
always appears to stand to enhance the degree of price transmission.
Finally, relative to the competitive benchmark, and assuming a linear supply func-
tion, the impact of oligopsony power on the degree of price transmission is not so much
qualitative as it is quantitative.
Abstracting from the theoretical model of price transmission that we have developed
in the previous chapter, we can therefore conclude that, for comparable values of the
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parameters that determine the elasticity of price transmission, the effects of oligopsony
power on the degree of price transmission are in qualitative terms similar to those of
oligopoly power. But in quantitative terms they are not identical. This is because
the determinants of changes in the mark-down and in the mark-up are different. For
comparable values of oligopsony and oligopoly power, the former is determined by the
elasticity of farm supply while the latter is determined by the elasticity of retail demand.
While the farm supply elasticity takes on values between 0 and 1, the elasticity of retail
demand takes on any value.
From this perspective therefore it can be conjectured that, given linear farm supply
and retail demand functions, the combined effect of both oligopoly and oligopsony power
is to weaken the degree of price transmission further. This is because at the same time
that the price of the farm input changes, both the mark-up and the mark-down change as
well. However, the extent to which they work to weaken the degree of price transmission
can be evident only when we simulate, in the manner we have just done in the previous
two sections, allowing for both forms of market power. And this is the task we turn to
in the following section.
6.5 Simulating the combined effects of oligopoly and
oligopsony power on the degree of price trans-
• •mISSIon
In this section, we set out to examine the combined effects of both oligopoly and oligop-
sony power on the degree of price transmission. In doing this, we adopt all parameter
values which we assumed in the previous sets of experiments. To see whether the assump-
tion of both forms of market power produces predictions, for movements in the elasticity
of price transmission, that are any different from those we derived in the previous sets of
experiments, it suffices considering only the interaction between market power and the
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elasticity of substitution and that between the former and the share of the raw input.
6.5.1 The elasticity of price transmission allowing for the in-
teraction between a and (0; ¢;) assuming fa = 0.5; fb = 0.5;
eb = 1.0; 7] = 0.75; ea = 0.5
The aim of this experiment is to examine how changes in input combination bear on the
degree of price transmission when both oligopoly and oligopsony power are present in the
industry. This it does by allowing a to vary, ceteris paribus, for a range of comparable
values of oligopoly power, (), and oligopsony power, ¢. Table 6.11 summarizes the results
of this simulation exercise. We abstract two major observations from this table.
Firstly, for a given degree of input substitution, and relative to when the industry is
perfectly competitive [i.e., for ()=O; ¢=O), the degree of price transmission decreases as
the degrees of bot.h forms of market power increase. In fact, for very large values of these
forms of market power (in our case, for f)=0.7 and ¢=0.7), the price transmission elasticity
is forced close t.o zero no matter what value is assigned the substitution elasticity. As
a result, the substitution elasticity is made neutral in its effect on the transmission
elasticity, and, as such, whether factors are combined in fixed or variable proportions
matters very little for the degree of price transmission. The intuition is that as the price
of the farm input increases, both the mark-down and the mark-up fall and vice versa
and thereby lower the elasticity of price transmission further than when either oligopoly
or oligopsony alone is assumed.
Secondly, for given comparable values of oligopsony and oligopoly power, and relative
to when a fixed input proportion is assumed, a greater possibility for input substitution
enhances the degree of price transmission.
The above results are plotted in Figure 6.11. The solid, dashed, dotted and dash-
dotted lines represent values of the transmission elasticity, given a range of values for
a between 0 and 1, and for ()=O, ¢=O; ()=0.25, ¢=0.25j () =0.5, ¢=0.5j and () =0.7,
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Table 6.11: Interaction between the substitution elasticity, oligopoly and oligopsony
power
a (}= 0; ¢ = 0 (}= 0.25; cp = 0.25 (}= 0.5; ¢ = 0.5 (}= 0.7;¢ = 0.7
0.0 0.364 0.185 0.077 0.014
0.2 0.407 0.205 0.087 0.015
0.4 0.444 0.222 0.091 0.016
0.6 0.478 0.237 0.096 0.017
0.8 0.507 0.25 0.101 0.018
1.0 0.533 0.262 0.105 0.018
¢=0.7 respectively. As this figure clearly shows, over the entire range of a, the solid line
lies above the dashed line, the dashed above the dotted line, and the latter above the
dot-dashed line signifying that large comparable values for () and ¢ work to dilute the
substitution elasticity's impact on the transmission elasticity. Also evident is the fact
that the lower the lines get, the flatter their slopes become, indicating that as () and ¢
grow in magnitude, subsequent increases in the substitution elasticity contribute little to
enhancing the degree of price transmission.
6.5.2 The elasticity of price transmission allowing for the in-
teraction between Sa and (0; ¢) assuming fb = 1 - fa; a =
0.5; eb = 1; 1] = 0.75; ea = 0.5
In this experiment, we simulate, ceteris paribus, and for different degrees of market
power, the effects of the raw input's cost share on the degree of price transmission. Table
6.12 summarizes these simulation results. The most important features are presented as
follows.
Firstly, relative to when all markets in the industry are competitive, and for a given
cost share of the farm input, the degree of price transmission decreases as the degrees of
both forms of market power increase due to the simultaneous movements in the mark-up
and in the mark-down. Secondly, for comparable degrees of market power, () and ¢, the
degree of price transmission increases as the cost share of the farm input increases again
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Figure 6-11: Interaction between oligopoly, oligopsony and substitution elasticity
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Ta 8=0;¢=0 8 = 0.25; ¢ = 0.25 () = 0.25; ¢ = 0.25 () = 0.25; ¢ = 0.25
0.1 0.087 0.047 0.021 0.004
0.2 0.176 0.094 0.041 0.007
0.3 0.269 0.14 0.059 0.011
0.4 0.364 0.185 0.077 0.014
0.5 0.462 0.23 0.094 0.017
0.6 0.563 0.274 0.11 0.019
0.7 0.667 0.318 0.125 0.022
0.8 0.774 0.361 0.14 0.024
0.9 0.885 0.403 0.153 0.026
1 1 0.445 0.167 0.028
suggesting the proportion in which inputs are combined.
These results are illustrated in Figure 6.12 where the effects of the farm input's cost
share on the transmission elasticity, for B=O,· ¢=O; B=0.25,¢=0.25; B=0.5, ¢=0.5 and
B=0.7 ¢=0.7 are shown by the solid, dashed, dotted and dot-dashed lines respectively.
It is shown that over the entire range of "'fa, the solid line lies way above the dashed, the
dashed above the dotted line and the latter above the dot-dashed line suggesting that
successively large values of oligopoly and oligopsony power dampen the positive effects
of "'fa. It is also shown that the slopes of the lines representing successively large values
of market power get flatter suggesting that every increment in "'fa results in a smaller
incremental change in the transmission elasticity as the degrees of both forms of market
power increase. In fact, as market power gets large enough (in our case, for B=0.7 and
B=0.7), the slope gets very close to zero.
6.5.3 Simulating the effects of oligopoly and oligopsony power
on the degree of price transmission: a summary of results
As the above simulation exercise has clearly shown, in qualitative terms, the presence of
market power at both the farm supply and retail sectors works to dampen the degree of
price transmission as does the presence of market power at only one stage. In quantitative
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Figure 6-12: Interaction between oligopoly, oligopsony and cost share of the farm input
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terms, however, the presence of market power at both stages of the industry stands to
dampen the degree of price transmission far more than does its presence at only one stage
of the industry.
6.6 Summary: the elasticity of price transmission
and the relative significance of its determinants
With the view to assessing the relative significance of each of the parameters which
determine the elasticity of price transmission under different market structures, this
chapter has run a series of simulated experiments which, ceteris paribus, control for
the interplay between any two determining variables. The results are summarized as
follows.
Firstly, for any given form of market structure (i.e., for any given degree of market
power either in the retail sector or in the farm sector or in both), ceteris paribus, in-
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creasing the degree of substitutability between the farm and marketing inputs increases
the elasticity of price transmission. However, not only are the effects of this parame-
ter diluted by higher degrees of market power but they are also ambiguous for different
magnitudes of the elasticity of marketing services. As such, the role of the substitution
elasticity as a determinant of the transmission elasticity cannot be considered of first-
order significance as this critically depends on the relative magnitudes of market power
and of the marketing supply elasticity.
Secondly, for any given form ofmarket structure, increasing the cost share of the farm
input increases, ceteris paribus, the elasticity of price transmission. In fact, for a cost
share of the farm input equal to unity, a one-to-one correspondence arises between the
transmission elasticity and the cost share of the farm input when perfect competition is
assumed in the input and output markets. However,like that of the substitution elasticity,
the effect of the cost share of the farm input is sensitive to the presence of market power
with the latter's increase resulting in smaller values for the transmission elasticity. And
yet, for any form of market structure, its impact is always to enhance the degree of price
transmission. Therefore the role of the cost share of the farm input as a determinant of
the price transmission elasticity can be considered of first-order significance.
Thirdly, the elasticity of retail demand impacts negatively on the elasticity of price
transmission, ceteris paribus, when the input and output markets are perfectly competi-
tive. Once market power is allowed for in the retail market, however, its impact cannot
be predicted a priori. This also seems to be the case with the elasticity of farm input
supply which enters into the expression for the transmission elasticity when oligopsony
power is present in the farm input market. It appears that when this market is assumed
perfectly competitive, the farm input supply elasticity plays no role as a determinant of
the transmission elasticity. When oligopsony power is assumed, however, a more elas-
tic farm input supply impacts positively on the transmission elasticity over the relevant
range. The roles of both the farm supply and retail demand elasticities, as determinants
of the transmission elasticity, are therefore conditional on the forms of market structure.
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As such, they cannot be considered of first-order significance.
Fourthly, for any given form of market structure, the impact of the marketing supply
elasticity cannot be determined a priori as it critically depends on the range of values
other parameters take on. We have shown this for a wide range of values for the substi-
tution elasticity. This means, as the supply of the marketing input becomes more elastic,
the elasticity of price transmission can either increase or decrease depending on the range
of values for the substitution elasticity. This being the case, the role of the marketing
supply elasticity as a determinant of the price transmission elasticity is indeterminate.
Finally, the effects of market power in both the retail and farm supply sectors are,
ceteris paribus, and assuming linearity in the demand function for the retail product
and for farm supply, to consistently weaken the degree of price transmission; and, this,
regardless of the range of values other parameters take on. But caution needs to be
exercised when making this assertion.
The outcome for the effect of market power arises more from an a priori imposition
of specific forms of retail demand and farm supply functions than from the nature of
market power as such. Otherwise, we have shown that market power's impact on the
degree of price transmission is ambiguous. Given these irregularities in the behavior of
market power, its effects can be considered of a first-order significance only to the extent
that we assume a linear demand function for the retail product and the inelastic portion
of a linear supply function for farm supply.
To this stage of the thesis we have accomplished several tasks. First, using a simple
diagrammatic approach, we have shown in chapter 2 how, given perfectly competitive
input and output markets, and given different assumptions regarding input proportions,
we can predict changes in the marketing margin and the degree of price transmission
following changes in the conditions of demand for the retail product and of supply for
the farm and marketing inputs. Second, we have shown, through our exposition of the
theoretical literature in chapters 3 and 4, how price transmission works theoretically
in vertically-related markets. Third, building on existing theory, we have developed in
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chapter 5 a model of price transmission accounting for seller power in the retail sector of
the vertical market and for buyer power in the purchase of the farm input. We then have
carried out a simulated experiment in chapter 6 to evaluate the effects of market power
on the degree of price transmission controlling for its interaction with other determining
parameters.
In the following we embark on an attempt to see if there exists a link between the pre-
dictions of the theoretical model that we have developed in chapter 5 and cointegration.
In the literature there seems to have been no attempt to identify, based on the predictions
of price transmission models, the conditions under which a cointegrating relation exists
between the prices of the farm and retail products. There seems to be a widespread
perception that on the basis of information relating to the prices of the farm and retail
products alone one can establish a cointegrating relation. Against this backdrop, we set
out to make a contribution to the literature by attempting to make inferences about a
co-integrating relation between the farm and retail product prices based on the predic-
tions of the theoretical model of price transmission that we have developed in chapter
5.
To the build up to our theoretical development of a model of price transmission allow-
ing for the interaction between oligopoly and oligopsony power, we have been preoccupied
solely with the exposition of the theoretical framework of price transmission given dif-
ferent market structures. Indeed, to this stage we have not looked into the literature
dealing with the empirical estimation of the degree of price transmission. However, now
that we have set ourselves a task of establishing a link between the theoretical models of
price transmission and cointegration, we need to explore the extant empirical literature
with the view to introducing the theory and application of cointegration. As the review
will show, the literature offers a wide range of empirical methodologies that have been
employed to measure the degree of price transmission. In the following chapter, we make
an exposition of these methodologies and present results of selected studies which utilize
each of these methodologies.
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To lay bare our plans for the rest of the thesis, we set out in chapter 8 to build on what
we have learned about co-integration in chapter 7 and attempt to make inferences about
a co-integrating relation between the prices of the farm input and of the retail product
based on the predictions of our model in chapter 5. Once we identify the conditions under
which a co-integrating relation arises between the price pair, we then test, in chapter 9,
for the existence of a co-integrating relation between a time series of 11 price pairs in the
UK to evaluate whether our predictions in chapter 8 are borne out. We then conclude
our thesis in chapter 10.
212
Chapter 7
Price transmission in vertical
markets: a review of the empirical
literature
7.1 Background
Following the seminal work of Gardner (1975) which set out the basic determinants
of changes in farm input and retail level prices, a huge body of empirical literature has
developed revolving around the issue of price transmission in vertical markets. This body
of literature has made use of different methodological approaches depending on the level of
sophistication attained in econometric techniques. We can categorize these approaches
into four. The approach followed by the early models, the structural approach, the
approach advocated by co-integration (or the error-correction model) and the approach
which combines the structural modelling approach and co-integration. In the following,
we discuss these modelling approaches each in detail.
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7.2 Early models of vertical price transmission
Early empirical work on vertical price transmission focuses on testing the direction of
causality in price transmission and (or) on estimating a correlation coefficient for prices
at different stages of the marketing chain using time series data.
Examples of this approach for the US food industry include Heien (1980) who consid-
ers monthly data over the period 1960-1976,and Lamm and Westcott (1981) who consider
quarterly data over the period 1968-1977 and Kinnucan and Forker (1981) who consider
monthly data over the period 1971-1981. Examples for the UK along this methodological
line include those by Bacon (1986) who considers monthly data for the oil industry over
the period 1977-1985, and Trail and Hansen (1994) who examines the yellow fats market
over the period 1980-1990 using monthly data.
The empirical strategy followed by these studies involves estimation of a regression
equation to test causal direction and of another regression equation to estimate the raw
input-retail price relationship.
The former task implements the causality test developed by Sims (1972) based on
a concept of causality first formulated by Granger (1969). This test proceeds by first
filtering the distributed lag model to achieve serially uncorrelated regression residuals.
This involves measuring all variables used in the regression equation as natural logs and
then pre-filtering (i.e., first-differencing) them.
Once this is achieved, then the filtered dependent variable, Y is regressed on lagged
and future values of the filtered independent variable, X. For expository purposes, let
the lagged and future values of X, be set to two. The regression equation can then be
written as:
where Ut is a white noise residual. A unidirectional causality from X to Y is said to
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exist if the coefficients on the future values of X do not enter the regression equation;
i.e., when f31= f32=0, or when both are insignificantly different from zero. To evaluate
whether causality runs from Y to X as well, then one can run the reverse regression.
Once causality is established, the next task involves specifying retail price as a dis-
tributed lag in raw input (or wholesale) price as:
In Tt = f30 + f311n Wt + ...+ f3k In Wt-k + Ut (7.2)
where ri and ui, represent retail and raw input (or wholesale) prices respectively and k
is the lag period. Given equation (7.2), ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of the
price transmission coefficient are then obtained and standard significance t and F tests
conducted.
7.2.1 Evaluation of the early models
The procedure for making inferences about the transmission coefficient using conventional
t and F significance tests is quite legitimate providing that the price series considered
are stationary (i.e., have zero mean and constant variance) and form a long run economic
relationship. However, these requirements are mutually exclusive, in that for two or more
variables to const.itute a long run relationship, they must be non-stationary.
Indeed the limitation of these econometric approaches emanates from the fact that
the time series data of interest are usually non-stationary, i.e., their mean and variance
changes over time. While this allows for the possibility of long run relationship between
them, it invalidates hypothesis testing. Given the recurrence of non-stationarity among
economic time series, regressions involving these series are likely to be spurious and the
resulting inferences from the standard significance tests misleading. In other words, as
Granger and Newbold (1974) have shown, it is possible for the regressions to establish
correlation when in fact such does not exist.
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Even if these series can be made stationary by differencing, so that the regression
residuals are serially uncorrelated, the process which induces stationarity is liable to
removing any critical long run information that may link the price series. As such, getting
around the problem of serially correlated residuals involves a loss of critical long-run
information. This 'mis-match' between the econometrics used to estimate the economics
remained until the seminal works of Granger in the 1980's.
Time series econometrics had long recognized the need to avoid loss of long-run price
information to achieve serially uncorrelated residuals, and it was in response to this
critical need that the error correction model was formulated by Phillips (1957), Sargan
(1964), and Salmon (1982), among others. The practical advantage of this model is that
while the long run components of the variables are made to obey equilibrium constraints
dictated by the underlying economic theory, the short run components are made to follow
a flexible dynamic specification.
But it was not until Granger (1981) introduced the concept of co-integration that it
was recognized that not only does the error correction model generate co-integrated series
but also that the co-integrated series have an error correction representation. Granger
(1983) proved the duality between co-integration and the error correction mechanism in
the Granger Representation Theorem.
Following the work of Engle and Granger (1987) which suggested a formal procedure
for testing and estimation of a co-int.egrated series, testing for co-integration prior to
regressing any price relationships has become almost mandatory in empirical work. The
rat.ionale for doing this is to ensure that only variables which are tied to each other in
a long run relationship enter the regression equation. In other words, a co-integration
test advises the analyst. against running regressions that involve variables which are not
locked in a long run relationship. To clarify this point, we need to undertake a brief
exposition of co-integration and the error-correction mechanism implied therein, a task
we set ourselves next.
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7.3 Co-integration and the error-correction mecha-
nism (ECM)
In keeping with the notations that we have used elsewhere in the thesis, consider two
price series representing producer's price, Pat and retailer's price, P xt,. Now assume that
these price series are integrated of order 1 ( i.e., Pat, P xt '" 1(1)) so that, in their raw
form, they are non-stationary. This means that they need differencing once to make them
stationary (Le., !J.p at, !J.P xt '" 1(0)). Granger (1981) shows that a linear combination of
two 1(1) series is in general 1(1). But there can arise a special case whereby, for a given
a constant, m, a linear combination of these series, specified as,
Z, = m + aPat + bPxt (7.3)
is both 1(0) and has a zero mean. When this obtains, Pat and P xt are said to be
co-integrated.
To clarify this point, consider the following example by Engle and Granger (1992)
which runs thus:
Pat - AWt + Pat
Pxt - Wt + Pxt
(7.4)
where Wt is 1(1), Pat and r; are 1(0) and A is a constant term. Given that a linear
combination of an 1(1) and an 1(0) series is 1(1), it follows that Pat and Pxt are 1(1). To
show that their linear combination can be 1(0), multiply P xt in (7.4) by A. Subtracting
P xt from Pat, one then obtains:
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(7.5)
Since Pat and P xt: are 1(0) from (7.4), it follows that their linear combination, Z t is also
1(0). Co-integration between Pat and P xt arises because they share an 1(1) common
factor, Wt, which makes them both 1(1). In other words, Pat and Pxt co-integrate
(i.e., possess a linear combination that is of lower order of integration than the variables
themselves) where A is the co-integrating parameter.
As might be recalled, if pre-testing establishes that two series are co-integrated then
there is an error- correction mechanism through which the analyst can capture both the
short run dynamics and the long run relationship. To see this clearly, consider, in the
manner of Harris (1995), a simple dynamic model of the form,
(7.6)
where Ut is a white noise residual, i.e., Ut -NI(0,a2).
Subtracting P xt-l from the left-hand and right-hand sides of (7.6), we obtain:
(7.7)
Now adding and subtracting (at - l)Pat-t from the right-hand side of equation (5.7)
and re-arranging yields,
b. Pxt = ao + 'Yo8. Pat + h'o + It) Pat-1 + (at - 1) Pxt-1 +Ut (7.8)
which, upon grouping like terms, may be reparametrized as an ECM formulation of the
dynamic model in equation (7.6) as:
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(7.9)
where /30 = 1~~1; and /31 = ('Yo + 'Yl) / (1 - (1) .
The parameter 'Yo in equation (7.9) measures the short run response of P xt to a change
in Pat, as indeed can be seen from (7.6). The coefficient (1 - ad measures the speed at
which Pxt adjusts to long-run equilibrium. The term in bracket, [Pxt-1 - /30 - (31 Pat-I]
measures the system's deviation from long run equilibrium in any period t and represents
the error correction term. If the system is in equilibrium, this term will be zero. On the
other hand, if the system is out of equilibrium, it will be non-zero. As such, the error
correction model incorporates both short run and long run effects of a shock.
Now conjecture that P xt and Pat, which have been assumed to be 1(1), are co-
integrated. Then it follows that the error correction term in (7.9) will be stationary,
as a linear combination of two non-stationary variables that are co-integrated is station-
ary. The term, 'Yo !::'P at is stationary because the first difference of an 1(1) series is
stationary. For the same reason, so too is !::,P xt. Thus clearly, an error correction model
allows the dependent variable, which is stationary, to be explained purely by a stationary
process. The corollary of this is that if P xt and Pat are not co-integrated, then the error
correction term will no longer be stationary, and, consequently, a stationary dependent
variable will not be explained by non-stationary variables, i.e., by (1 - al).
Thus it follows that the error-correction mechanism is valid only when the variables
in levels in (7.9) are co-integrated. When such is the case, it also follows that the
error correction model is free from the spurious regression problem. In this instance,
the application of ordinary least squares regression is valid. In fact, Stock (1987) has
shown that if two non-stationary series co-integrate, the OLS estimator of the long run
co-integrating parameter, /31 in (5.9) converges in probability to its true value at a much
faster rate than the usual OLS estimator of the same parameter that is obtained using
stationary 1(0) variables. As the sample size, T,grows, then for any positive a, this speed
219
of convergence is T1-a as opposed to a conventional rate of asymptotic convergence
which is Tl/2. That's why, the OLS estimator for a co-integrating parameter is called
'superconsistent' .
Note also that (7.8) and (7.9) are equivalent, in that each has the same error term
Hence, the economic formulation 'squares the circle' alluded to previously in that it
may legitimately estimate by OLS (since all terms are stationary) and yet contains all
the long run information contained in the 1(1) components of the variables.
7.3.1 The test for co-integration
The two most popular tests for the existence of co-integration between two non-stationary
variables are the Engle-Granger two-step procedure (Engle and Granger, 1987) and the
Johansen full information maximum likelihood procedure (Johansen, 1988). Whereas
the former assumes prior knowledge of the endogenous and exogenous variables, the lat-
ter does not require such knowledge and instead assumes all variables to be potentially
endogenous. Since the Engle-Granger procedure assumes the existence of a single en-
dogenous variable, it proceeds by estimating a single co-integrating regression. On the
other hand, the latter estimates as many equations as there are endogenous variables.
The test for stationarity: the unit root test
A feature which is common to these two procedures is that they proceed by first testing
for stationarity of the individual time series. The test for stationarity is equivalent to
testing whether there is a unit root in the level of each individual series. Despite the
plethora of test procedures to detect a unit root in economic time series, the procedure
by Dickey and Fuller, DF (1979,1981) has come out the most popular in empirical work".
To see how it is implemented in practice, consider the following autoregressive process
of the first order, AR(1).
IFor other unit root tests, see, among others, Phillips and Perron (1988); Kwiatkowski, Phillips and
Schmidt (1990).
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Pxt = PPxt-1 + Ut (7.10)
which, when converted into its lag polynomial equivalent, can be written as:
b:. Pxt = (p - 1) Pxt-1 + Ut (7.10.1)
where Ut is iid(O, (]"2).
Given equation (7.10.1), the test for stationarity proceeds by setting the null and the
alternative hypotheses as:
Ho p= 1
HI - -1 < p < 1
(7.10.2)
If the null hypothesis of a unit root is true, P xt is a non-stationary 1(1) series with no
drift the implication being that the first difference is stationary. If the null is rejected in
favor of the alternative hypothesis, then P xt is said to be stationary.
The underlying data generating process (d.g.p.) in equation (7.10.1) is assumed to
have a zero mean. If it has a non-zeromean, then it is necessary to modify this equation
to allow for a constant, /-L. Modifying this equation thus yields:
b:. Pxt = /-L + (1 - p) Pxt-I + Ut (7.10.3)
Given this modification, the null and alternative hypothesis of the test are as shown
in equation (7.10.2). Non-rejection of the null shows that the original series, Pxt, are
non-stationary while their first-differencesare stationary.
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If pre-testing suggests that the drift in the original series is significant, it is recom-
mended to include a trend component in the maintained model. Doing this modifies
(7.10.3) as:
!:::. Pxt = J.L + {3t + (1 - p) PXt-1 + It (7.10.4)
where t is a time trend. If given (7.10.4), the null hypothesis of non-stationarity cannot
be rejected, then this suggests that the original series, Pxt. are non-stationary with a
drift while their first differences are stationary.
If a simple AR(l) model is used when Pxt follows an AR(p) process, a problem
arises in testing whereby the error term will be autocorrelated to make up for the mis-
specification in the d.g.p. of P zt» When such is the case, the specification in equation
(7.10.4) is augmented with lagged differences so that the residuals are white noise. The
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) representation of equation (7.10.4), as it is called, is
thus written as:
p
!:::. Pxt = J.L + {3t + (1 - p) Pxt-I +I)ic: Pxt-i + Ut
i-I
(7.10.5)
where p is the number of lags which is large enough to make the residuals white noise.
Having chosen the right specification, then OLS regressions can be run to test the
null hypothesis of a unit root. It should, however, be noted that the t and F tests of the
null hypothesis do not follow the standard distributions. They rather follow the Dickey-
Fuller distributions. Therefore the tests for the null hypothesis of non-stationarity must
be carried out using the t and F critical values constructed by Fuller (1976) and Dickey
and Fuller (19S1).
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The Engle-Granger two-step procedure
Once the unit root test is carried out in the manner shown above, the next step is to test
if the two series co-integrate. The Engle-Granger procedure for testing co-integration
involves two steps.
The first step determines the long-run steady state relationship between the variables
in the model. This proceeds by estimating the co-integrating regression involving non-
stationary series using OL8 as:
(7.11)
The second step involves the test for stationarity in the residuals which result from
(7.11). Assume the estimated residuals, ~t, follow an AR(l) process without any drift,
then this step involves running a standard unit root test on the residuals,
).. )..
et = Pet-l (7.11.1)
There have been alternative procedures to testing for co-integration using (7.11.1).
Of these the most popular are the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test suggested by
Dickey and Fuller (1981) and the Co-integrating Regression Durbin-Watson (CRDW)
statistic suggested by I3hargava (1983).
Given its popularity, only the ADF is considered here. This procedure modifies
equation (7.11.1) by allowing for lagged residuals as:
q
A s: '"" s:!J. e = 'ljJet-l + L...J'ljJi !J. et-i + J-L + 8t +Wt
i=l
(7.11.2)
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where q is the number of lags large enough to produce white noise Ut, J.L is a constant
term and t is a time trend.
As in a standard unit root test, the null hypothesis tests whether the residuals in
levels, ~t, have a unit root (i.e., Ho: 1/J=O). If the null cannot be rejected, then the
model's variables are not co-integrated. If on the other hand, the null is rejected, the
residuals in levels are stationary implying the variables are co-integrated. To repeat a
point that has been made earlier on, the null hypothesis is based on a t test that has a
non-normal distribution. Hence, modified Dickey-Fuller tables of critical values are used,
i.e., critical values that depend on the number of regressors in equation (7.11).
In spite of its simplicity in application, the Engle-Granger two-step procedure has
been criticized on many counts. Lloyd (1992) summarizes these criticisms as follows.
Firstly, even though the OLS estimator of the true long run parameter is superconsistent
in large samples, the bias in small samples could be substantial, and for a bivariate case
is related to (1-R2) as suggested by Banerjee et al.. (1987). Secondly, when there are
more than two non-stationary variables in the model, the co-integrating vector may not
be unique. Consequently, any vector that is detected may not be identified and thus
not have economic interpretation but merely represents a linear combination of multiple
stationary vectors. Thirdly, the procedure makes a prior assumption as to which variable
is endogenous and which one is exogenous. Even though this assumption might have been
inspired by economic theory, in practice, all the variables can be potentially endogenous.
The Johansen full information maximum likelihood procedure
To (at least partially) overcome the limitations of the Engle-Granger approach to testing
for co-integration, Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1992) propose a full
information maximum likelihood procedure. This approach first proceeds by forming
a multivariate vector autoregressive (VAR) model containing n potentially endogenous
non-stationary variables, Zt, regressed on lagged values of themselves and on those of
others as:
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(7.12)
where Zt is (nx1) and A1-k is an (nxn) matrix of parameters and k is the number of
lags.
In its vector error-correction (VECM) form, equation (7.12) can be written as:
(7.12.1)
where (ri = -I-A1- ... -Ai for i=L, ..., k-l); and TI= -(I-Ai - ...-Ak) and D represents
A A
deterministic variables (e.g., seasonal dummies, shocks). The estimates of I', and TI
represent the short and long-run adjustments to changes in Zt. The vector TIrepresents
a{3', where a denotes the speed of adjustment to disequilibrium, while (3 is a matrix of
long-run coefficients such that TIzt-k represents up to (n-l) co-integrating relationships
in the model. For non-stationary 1(1) variables in the vector z, that form co-integrating
relationships, then equation (7.12.1) can reduce to a stationary process only when TIzt-k
are stationary. Given that ri~Zt_i is stationary by assumption, then the stationarity of
the former can only be guaranteed when {3'Zt-k forms (n-l) co-integrating relationships.
The fact that there are at most (n-l) co-integrating vectors in f3 means that there are
at least T (T~n-1) columns of (3 that form stationary linearly independent combinations
of the variables in Z t- nut this also means that there are (n-r) vectors in {3 that do not
form linearly independent combinations in the variables and as such are non-stationary.
Now coming back to the requirement that equation (7.12.1) be a stationary process
containing both short- and long-run element.s, it follows that this can be guaranteed
when (3 contains only T=n-l linearly independent vectors and zero (n-r) vectors.
Thus according to the Johansen maximum likelihood procedure, the test for co-
integration constitutes the test for finding the rank (i.e., the number of T linearly in-
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dependent columns) of II. This proceeds by running a reduced rank regression which
A A A A
yields n eigen values, >'1 > .A2... .An, and the corresponding eigenvectors V. Those r el-
A
ements in V which form the (n-l) co-integration vectors correlate with 6.zt, which are
A
stationary. On the other hand, the last (n-r) elements in V do not correlate with the
stationary, 6.zt since they form 1(1) combinations. This being the case, the reduced rank
A
regression produces zero values for .A for those eigen vectors that correspond to (n-r) ele-
A
ments of {3 and non-zero values of .A for those eigen vectors that correspond to r elements
of {3.
The null hypothesis for the reduced rank regression can therefore be formulated to
test whether there are (n-r) unit roots, i.e.,
Vi=r+l, ... , n (7.13)
The statistic used to test the null hypothesis is called the trace statistic. It is a
standard likelihood ratio test computed using the log of the maximized likelihood function
for the restricted model, which requires that the first r eigenvalues be non-zero, and the
log of the maximized likelihood function for the unrestricted model. Having a non-
standard distribution, the trace statistic is expressed as:
n A
.Atrace= -2Iog(Q) = -T L log(1 - .Ai)r=O,1,2, ... , n-2, n-l
i=r+l
(7.14)
where Q is the ratio of the restricted maximized likelihood to the unrestricted maximized
likelihood. If the null can be rejected, at a given significance level, there are at least r
co-integrating vectors in the model. If on the other hand, the null cannot be rejected,
there is no co-integrating vector in the model.
Once r co-integrating vectors are detected in the model, then a test is carried out
whether there are r+ 1 co-integrating vectors. This is carried out using the maximal-
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eigenvalue or A-max statistic:
J..
Amax = -Tlog(1 - Ar+1) 1'=0,1,2, ... , n-2, ti-l (7.15)
The null hypothesis of r co-integrating vectors is rejected if there are 1'+1 co-integrating
vectors. If such do not exist, the null cannot be rejected.
Testing restrictions on a and f3 So far, the Johansen maximum likelihood reduced
rank regression procedure only determines how many co-integration vectors there are in
the co-integration space. However, it does not say whether these are unique, i.e., whether
they can explain the structural relationship of the model. Having detected the number of
co-integrating vectors, therefore a final step in the Johansen maximum likelihood estima-
tion involves testing whether these are unique. This is carried out by imposing various
restrictions on the co-integrating matrix, f3 that are motivated by economic arguments
and then testing whether the column vectors are identified.
For instance, we might be interested to test whether the predictions of economic
theory are borne out by the estimated values of some of the parameters in the co-
integrating matrix. This can be done either by setting some of the column vectors
of the co-integrating space, f3ij' to zero or by imposing homogeneity restrictions so that
any two variables of the co-integrating space are made to enter this space with a unit
coefficient but with opposite sign. Formally, these hypotheses about f3 can be formulated
as:
(7.16)
where the set of matrices II, denotes a (n x Si) linear restrictions to be tested on each of
the r co-integrating relationships and <p is a (Si X 1) vector of parameters to be estimated
in the ith co-integration relation.
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To clarify this point, consider an example from Doornik and Hendry (2001). Assume
the Johansen procedure identifies two co-integrating vectors with a rank, r = 2. Then
the unrestricted vectors can be written as:
Suppose we wish to test that the first two variables enter the co-integrating vector with
opposite signs. We can then impose /321= -/311' /322= -/312 to obtain:
H= (1
-1
o ) , 'P = ( 'Pn
o 'P21
'P12 ) , 'P'H' = ('P11 - 'P11
'P22 'P12 - 'P12
Next, given the above example, i.e., for r=2, suppose we wish to impose known co-
integrating vectors. Suppose that the first vector is Yl, Y2, Y3. Then the hypothesized
restriction can be formulated as:
1
, (H : 'P)' = ( 1
'P11
-1
-1 )
'P31
H= -1 ,'P=
-1 'P31
Once these restrictions are imposed, we then wish to test whether these restrictions
are supported by the data. This is carried out using a likelihood ratio test given by:
(7.17)
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where ~HiS are the eigenvalues of the VAR estimated under the null hypothesis. The test
statistic follows a X2r (n - s) distribution under the null as specified in (7.16). If the null
cannot be rejected, we say the restrictions are congruent with the data.
In a similar fashion, we might wish to impose restrictions on the loading vector, a of
the long-run relationship, II = af3' as shown in (7.12.1) above to see if some of its rows
are all zeros. By way of an example, suppose, in the manner of Harris, op cit., a VAR
of three equations, Zt=(Ylt, Y2h Y3t)' and r=2. Further suppose the length of lag, k=2.
Then the vector error-correction mechanism can be modelled as:
f3n f312
f331 f312
f322 f332
Y2t-l
b,. Ylt-l Ylt-l
t::. Xt-l Xt-l
Say the last row of the a vector contains all zeros, i.e., a31 = 0; a32 = O. Then, we
wish to test if this restriction is admitted by the data. If it is, then it means that the
equation for b,. Xt can be excluded from the left-hand side of the system as this contains
no information about the long-run vector, f3. When such is the case, we say the variable,
x, is weakly exogenous, and, hence, can be used as a conditioning variable.
The test procedure for imposing a restriction on a is the same as the hypothesized
restriction on f3. First, set the null hypothesis, Ho:aij=O for j=l, ..., r, i.e., row i contains
all zeros. Then calculate the likelihood ratio statistic, as shown in (5.17) to test if
the resulting estimate of the parameters in the restricted model occupy the same co-
integrating space as the unrestricted model. To repeat a point that we have made earlier,
this test statistic has a X2 distribution. If this statistic is smaller than the corresponding
critical value, the null cannot be rejected and therefore the restriction is admitted by the
data.
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7.4 Price transmission studies based on the error-
correction model.
Following the introduction and adoption of co-integration recent years have seen a bur-
geoning of research on vertical price transmission. The two major hypotheses this research
has set out to test are (i) whether producers' and consumers' prices in vertically-related
markets are tied in a long run economic relationship; i.e., whether they are co-integrated;
and (ii) whether price changes in the raw input stage are fully transmitted to the retail
stage in this form of market where full (or perfect) transmission is understood to occur
when the coefficient on the long run co-integrating parameter is equal to unity.
Palaskas (1995) seeks to test these hypotheses for the food marketing system in seven
countries of the EU. Using a monthly log of consumer and producer price pairs for
five commodities over the period 1971.1- 1990.12, the author applies the Engle-Granger
(EG) two-step procedure to test for co-integration and to estimate the corresponding
error correction model. The only modification the author introduces is that the EG
is enhanced with a third step, in the manner of Engle and Yoo (1987)2, whereby the
estimated error term from the ECM, ~, is regressed on the short-run price transmission
elasticity, QI,and on the product of a lagged producer's price and the estimated coefficient
J..
of adjustment to disequilibrium ( /3P x Pt-I) as:
(7.18)
where Vt is a white noise residual.
On the basis of this procedure, the author finds that for five countries out of seven,
all the price pairs are co-integrated at the 5 per cent level of significance, while for two
2The object is to obtain a three-step estimator of the cointegrated system with t ratios having
limiting normal distributions. These t-ratios can be compared with the maximum-likelihood t-ratios
when testing the hypothesis relating to the cointegrating parameter.
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countries, all the price pairs are co-integrated at the 10 percent level of significance.
He also finds that for seventeen pairs of prices out of thirty-five, the hypothesis of a
unit coefficient on the long-run co-integrating parameter cannot be rejected whereas
the hypothesis of a unit coefficienton the short-run adjustment parameter is uniformly
rejected suggesting that short run adjustment of consumer price to changes in producer
price is sluggish.
Using a monthly log of prices for the beef market in Australia, for the period,
1971-1994, Chang and Griffith (1998) implement the Johansen procedure to test for
co-integration among the farm-gate, wholesale and retail prices of the market and to
estimate the corresponding ECM. They find that not only are the three price series co-
integrated, with one co-integration relation being identified, but that the coefficientson
the wholesale and beef price series sum to one suggesting that there is a long run perfect
price transmission in the market. But they find that two-thirds of the estimated short-
run coefficientsare statistically insignificant suggesting that farm-gate price changes take
time to transmit to wholesale and retail prices. In fact, they find that it takes 15months
for an initial price shock to be fully transmitted to the wholesale and retail price series.
Using a triplet of logs of monthly price series for crude oil, four-star petrol and the
dollar-sterling exchange rate for the UK over the period 1982.1-1995.6,and assuming
exogeneity for crude oil and for the exchange rate, Reilly and Witt (1998) estimate an
unrestricted dynamic error correction model and then test for co-integration using the
resulting error correction term. This is in keepingwith the procedure advocated by Kre-
mers et al. (1992). Their results showthat the triplet price series are co-integrated. They
do not, however, identify a unity coefficientfor the long run co-integrating parameter.
In its investigation into the relationship between monthly real producer, wholesale,
and retail prices for beef, lamb and pork in the UK over the period 1990.1- 1998.12, a
report commissioned by the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF, 1999)
applies the Johansen procedure to test for co-integration and for the degree of price
transmission in this particular market. The report finds that, on their own, the triplet
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price series are not co-integrated, but are co-integrated when a food publicity index is
incorporated into the regression. The food publicity index measures the response of meat
retail price to stories in the press about food scares, more particularly about BSE.
As far as the dynamics of price transmission is concerned, the report finds that for all
the product categories, between a third and 40 per cent of the initial change in producer
price is transmitted to the retail price in the first one month. On the other hand, in the
long-run, the initial change in the producer price is either fully transmitted, as in the
case of pork, or largely transmitted as in the case of lamb and beef (with a transmission
coefficient of between 0.70 and 0.80). They find that, it takes between 4 and 6 months
before 90 % of the initial change in producer's price feeds through to the retail stage.
Building on the report's findings, Lloyd et al.. (2001) examine the role of the food
publicity index in price formation. They perform this by formulating the impulse response
functions of the three beef prices to a unit shock in the index. They do this by imposing
a recursive structure on the moving average representation of the VAR in equation (7.12)
above. This is in keeping with Liitkepohl and Reimers (1992) who show that the impulse
response function of a VAR representation is given by:
8
<1>8 = (IPij,S) = E<I>s-lAl s=1,2, ...n
l=l
(7.19)
where <I>o=In, A[=O for l >k. Assuming all other variables at the time of the shock and
earlier are held constant, the impulse response function of variable i with respect to a
unit shock to variable j, s periods ago is given by a plot of IPij,s.
The results for the impulse response function are sensitive to the order in which the
variables appear in the VAR. Taking this into account, they treat the food publicity index
as exogenous to prices in the impulse response analysis. They find that even though in
the short-run heightened publicity regarding food safety initially increases beef prices
at all stages of the marketing chain, in the long-run it leads to a reduction in all the
three prices. The degree of price reduction at the retail, wholesale and producer stages
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in response to a percentage change in the index are 1.70p/kg, 2.25p/kg and 3.0P/kg
respectively.
Using monthly data for beef, lamb and pork in the UK over the period 1986.1 -
2000.12, Sanjuan and Dawson (2003) test for co-integration and for the degree of trans-
mission between producer and retail prices allowing for structural breaks in the co-
integration space in keeping with the procedure suggested by Johansen et al. (2000).
Allowing for the structural breaks that occurred in February 1996 for beef, in Decem-
ber 1992 and August 1998 for lamb and in April 1997 for pork, their study identifies a
long-run relationship between producer and retail prices for each meat item. The study
further finds that whereas in the beef relationship this long-run relationship obtains in
spite of the occurrence of a structural break at the height of the bovine spongiform en-
cephalopathy (BSE) crisis, in the lamb or pork relationships this long-run relationship
obtains in the absence of any evidence of BSE-related breaks.
Applying the structural error correction model following Boswijk (1992) and Johansen
(1992), a recent study by Feuerstein (2002) investigates the degree of price transmission
in the coffee market in Germany over the period 1971.1- 1995.12.
The study first specifies and estimates, by OLS, a structural error correction model
considering the price of roasted coffee (P t) as the endogenous variable and the price of
green coffee beans (GATT) as the conditioning variable as follows,
n
+I::~ib.CATTt-i +L 7ri b. Pt-i + et
i=O
(7.20)
(7.1)
It then goes on to test the model for stability using the Wald-type test as in Boswijk
(1994) with the null hypothesis of instability being). = O. If the null hypothesis is rejected
based on the relevant critical values tabulated by (Boswijk,1994), then the model is
considered stable, and consequently, co-integration is implied between the price series.
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Based on the above test, the study finds that the null hypothesis of instability is re-
jected at the 1% significance level implying that the above pair of prices are co-integrated.
The study also finds that not only are the pair of prices co-integrated but also that the
long run price transmission coefficient is not significantly different from unity suggesting
the complete shifting of costs to consumer prices in the long run. The short-run price
dynamics are such that current cost changes (i.e., first month changes) do not have any
impact on consumer price and it takes more than a year before the cost shock to green
coffee prices is completely passed through to roasted coffee prices.
Applying the Johansen procedure to logs of a monthly series of ex-vessel prices of cod
and those of domestic fresh consumption, exported dried salted cod and exported frozen
fillets, Asche et al. (2002) set out to test for co-integration among these series and for
price proportionality, i.e., for a unity coefficient on the co-integrating parameter. They
find that the ex-vessel price is co-integrated with all other prices. On the other hand,
they find that whereas the hypothesis of price proportionality cannot be rejected for the
bivariate relation between ex-vessel and domestic prices and between ex-vessel and dried
salted cod prices it is rejected for the bivariate relation between the former and frozen
fillets prices.
More recently, Asche et al. (2003) apply the Johansen procedure to test for co-
integration among logs of monthly prices of crude oil and four major refined oil products,
i.e., gas oil, fuel oil, kerosene and naphta in north-west Europe over the period, 1992.1-
2000.11. They find that crude oil price is co-integrated with gas oil, kerosene and naphta
but not with heavy fuel oil. They also find that the null hypothesis that the coefficient
on the long-run co-integrating parameter is unity is rejected for the bivariate relationship
between crude oil and naphta while it cannot be rejected for the relationship between
crude oil and kerosene and between the former and gas oil.
To sum up, application of the Engle-Granger and Johansen procedures for testing
co-integration and for estimating the error-correction model to price data for various
products in different countries seems to bring out three major characteristics of the
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degree of price transmission. First, it suggests that in most cases, price series at different
levels of a vertical market are tied in a long run economic relationship as the test for
the existence of co-integration testifies. Second, in many instances, the existence of co-
integration seems to be associated with a unit co-integrating parameter. Whilst in some
special cases this suggests that in the long-run cost changes at the raw stage are fully
transmitted to the retail and (or) wholesale stages, in general the unit co-efficient does
not have this interpretation. Third, for many products, the transmission of price from
the producer to consumers is not instant. In fact, for the food industry, it is sluggish as
it takes between 6 and 15 months for the initial price change in producers' price to fully
or largely be transmitted to the retail and (or) wholesale price.
These results seem to be consistent with findings from spatial market models (for
instance, Goodwin and Schroeder, 1991) and those from a present value model (for
instance, Lloyd, 1994).
7.4.1 Co-integration analysis and the error-correction model:
an evaluation
It goes without saying that the application of co-integration techniques has dramatically
improved the analysis and understanding of price transmission in vertical markets. Of
critical significance of these techniques has been their ability to identify and quantify the
short-and long-run retail price adjustments to changes in producer price. As such, their
usefulness in bringing to the open the nature of price relationships at different levels of
vertically-related markets has been substantial. But the findings concerning the nature of
such short- and long-run adjustments need always be accepted with caution. The major
reasons for sounding this caution have to do with the sensitivity of these findings to
seasonal integration (i.e., seasonal unit roots), to data periodicity and to whether prices
are rising or falling.
Palaskas (1996) points to the widespread tendency for studies to assume that only
one unit root obtains at the zero frequency and that there are not any unit roots in the
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price series that occur at seasonal frequencies. He sounds warnings about the dangers
of undertaking unit root tests at zero frequency without first checking the price series
for seasonal integration. From a theoretical perspective, these dangers had already been
sounded by Hyllberg et al. (1990) who pointed to the lack of power and consistency of
unit root tests at the zero frequency.
To make his point that the consequences of overlooking the test for seasonal unit
roots could be serious, Palaskas examines quarterly price series for bread and soft wheat,
butter and milk and cheese and milk for seven countries in Europe over the period 1971.1
to 1994.4 and tests for seasonal unit roots. His test rejects the existence of seasonal unit
roots in the consumer price series but fails to reject seasonal unit roots for some producer
price series.
He next tests for co-integration at zero frequency in the presence of seasonal unit roots
using the Engle-Granger methodology. He finds that, where without filtering the seasonal
components from the original series co-integration was established for many price pairs,
on filtering the seasonal components, three sets of co-integration results come out. First,
for three countries and for two price pairs, co-integration was not established at all where
previously it was; second, for two price pairs, the number of countries where the pairs
co-integrated fell relative to when there was no filtering; and third, for two countries and
for a price pair, co-integration was established where previously it did not exist. It is thus
evident that the test for co-integration not allowing for seasonal unit roots can provide
misleading information regarding the nature of long run price transmission. However,
caution is warranted here since filtering (such as that involved in seasonal unit roots) will
also distort the performance of standard unit root tests if the variables do not actually
contain seasonal unit roots. Given that unit roots in seasonals imply 'unusual behavior'
not normally observed in economics, their application should only be motivated by strong
information rather than adoption as a general pre-test.
Even if seasonal integration is not considered a serious problem as is often the case
with most economic time series, the issue of data periodicity poses a potential challenge to
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the credibility of co-integration results based on standard unit root tests. The importance
of this challenge has been noted by Bernard and Willet (1998) who evaluate the robustness
of tests for a unit root, Granger causality and asymmetry to data periodicity on the basis
of weekly and monthly data for the broiler industry in the US over the period, 1983- 1992.
They find that for all weekly prices in levels, the hypothesis of a unit root at the zero
frequency is rejected at the 0.05 significance level, whereas for monthly data, rejection
of such a hypothesis is achieved at the 0.10 level. Their causality test also points to
differing results for weekly and monthly data. For the former, causality runs from the
farm, through wholesale, to the retail sector while for the latter, it runs from the farm to
the retail sector directly without affecting the wholesale sector. The results for asymmetry
tests are also mixed; the weekly data rarely suggest asymmetry while the monthly data
do. On the basis of these comparisons, they thus make the point that specific policy
recommendations based on a single data set are misleading.
The implications of this study for co-integration results are clear. While the weekly
price series are co-integrated as they are all stationary, the monthly series may not be so
at significance levels below 0.10 as all depends on whether the linear combination of the
series is stationary.
It is also a well recognized fact that the existence of a co-integrating relation between
prices can be due to some exogenous common factor such as inflation and not due to a
change in the data generating process, as much as its absence can be due to the non-
inclusion of a non-stationary common factor. This does not, however, emanate from the
inherent weakness of co-integration. As is well known, co-integration is merely a mis-
specification test. Prices need not necessarily be co-integrated in a pair (in general they
will not be) but may need other variables to co-integrate. For instance, Lloyd et al..,
2001, show that, where, without the inclusion of a food publicity index, co-integration is
not established among the producer, wholesaler and retail price series for beef, pork and
lamb, in the presence of this index, co-integration is established among the series.
Another major criticism is that the price transmission coefficient on the long-run co-
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integrating parameter does not provide much information on the degree of price transmis-
sion. This is because the parameter does not contain information regarding the structure
of the industry, particularly the cost share of the raw input. Recalling from our theo-
retical exposition in the earlier chapters, the elasticity of price transmission, for a given
exogenous shock, is defined as the percentage change in the price of the retail product in
response to a percentage change in the price of the farm input, i.e., as (~~:) x (*).
For a given exogenous shock originating in the farm sector, producer price changes are
said to have been fully transmitted to retail price if farm input cost changes are passed-
through to the price of the retail product in proportion to the cost share of the farm
input in total industry cost (McCorriston et al.., op cit.). But this shouldn't necessarily
imply a price transmission elasticity which is unity. The latter is a special case arising
when there is only one input, in our case the farm input. This means the elasticity of
price transmission can take on any value irrespective of the degree of price transmission.
To explicate this point, consider the following simple example. Let the farm-gate
and retail prices, F; and P; take on the values of £10 and £15. Assume that due
to an exogenous shock, farm-gate price has doubled to £20 resulting in an absolute
change, t::. Pa= £10. Also assume that this change is fully passed through to P; so that
t::. Pr=£lO. Clearly, this is what we can describe as full price transmission. But since the
relative changes, t::. Pal Pa and t::. Prl P; are not identical because the starting values (or
the price levels) are not identical, the elasticity of price transmission is not going to be
unity. Rather, it will be 0.67. If for a unit quantity of the farm input and of the final
product, we evaluate the transmission elasticity is exactly the same as the cost share of
the farm input in total industry cost, then we say price changes at the producer level
have been fully transmitted to the retail level. In this particular case, a co-integration
co-efficient of unity is in no wayan indication of full price transmission. This is a clear
indication of how a mere look at the elasticity of price transmission without an adequate
knowledge of the structure of market can be misleading.
The implication which follows from the above example is therefore that by merely
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looking at the price transmission coefficient and without first having looked into the
structure of the market (i.c., the cost share of the farm input in our case), we cannot
make inferences about the extent of transmission between retail and producer prices in
that market. And most often, the analysis of price transmission carried out within a
co-integration framework is not likely to take account of market structure.
From this vantage point, now evaluate the interpretation that can be attached to
the long-run coefficient of the co-integrating parameter. Consider the following long-run
co-integrating relation for the UK energy sector found by Reilly and Witt, op. cit.
p = -0.639 + 0.580 [c - xl + 0.02t
where at the cost of repetition p denotes net four-star petrol price, c denotes crude oil
price and x is the sterling-dollar exchange rate and t is a time trend.
Allowing for the sterling-dollar exchange rate, we can interpret the above relation as
saying that, relative to a one percent change in the price of crude oil, the change in the
price of petrol is 0.58%. However, we cannot say anything about whether the degree of
price transmission is complete. This is because we cannot tell whether the percentage
change in the price of petrol is in proportion to the cost share of crude oil in total industry
cost. This is not surprising because co-integration analysis operates within the framework
of a reduced form model. As such, it can only identify and quantify the short- and long-
run components of price transmission and not its structural determinants. For instance,
it does not say anything concerning why price adjustment in the short run is sluggish,
as it were, with reference to market structure. We can therefore say that co-integration
analysis provides little by way of information relating to market structure that is vital
to interpreting the degree of price transmission. That is why it is advocated that co-
integration analysis be supplemented with structural analysis of the market. Thus, in
the following, we introduce the structural approach to modelling price transmission in
vertical markets.
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7.5 The structural modelling approach
Following the emergence of the New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) beginning
in the early 1980s, there have been attempts to develop a structural model of price
transmission in vertically-related markets whereby not only are analysts able to measure
the degree of such transmission but they are also able to identify its determinants'', Early
attempts in this direction include Holloway (1991); Wann and Sexton (1992); Suzuki et
al.. (1993). In this review, we do not aim to present a comprehensive inventory of studies
which have applied the structural modelling approach as our aim is more to highlight the
major features of the approach and less to do such an inventory. With this in view, we
opt to present the structural model of price transmission as it is applied in Bettendorf
and Verboven (2000).
With the objective of understanding the determinants of coffee bean price transmis-
sion to consumers in the Netherlands, they estimate an econometric model which consists
of demand for and supply of the final product (i.e., roasted coffee). Assuming coffee is an
homogeneous good, they estimate an aggregate demand function homogeneous of degree
zero in prices and in income of the form,
(7.21)
where Qt represents total coffee demand in period t; Pt is the retail price of coffee;
p: represents the price of tea, which is coffee's close substitute; pf is the price of other
goods; and Y t is consumers' income.
The functional form of demand which they specify is of the form,
3For a comprehensive review of the literature see Bresnahan (1989)
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(7.22)
where D~ denotes a seasonal dummy (for i=2,3,4); A is a parameter which captures the
curvature of demand through the Box-Cox transformation, taking the value of unity for a
linear demand, a value of zero for a logarithmic demand and a value of two for a quadratic
demand.
Their aggregate supply relation assuming constant marginal costs and a fixed input
proportions technology is specified as:
(7.23)
where p' (Qt) is the marginal revenue; ()t is an average industry conduct parameter to be
estimated; 7" is a tax parameter; and MC is marginal cost which is also to be estimated
using the following specification:
(7.24)
where w?, w~, and w~ represent the prices of coffee beans, the wage rate and the price
of other inputs.
Re-writing the retail price of roasted coffee as,
(7.24.1)
where et represents the elasticity of demand which is to be estimated. Computing the
derivatives of demand from (7.21) and substituting for MC, the supply relation in (7.23)
can then be re-written as:
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Adding error terms to (7.22) and (7.24.2) they next estimate the system simultane-
ously using a generalized method of moments (GMM). The estimator that is obtained is
believed to be consistent and asymptotically efficient and takes into account the endogene-
ity of price and quantity using the exogenous demand and cost shifters as instruments.
Using monthly data on green beans and roasted coffee for the Netherlands over the
period 1992-1996, they then evaluate the changes in the price of roasted coffee that
followed the jump in coffee beans price after the frost in Brazil in 1994. This proceeds,
in the manner of McCorriston et al. (1998), by decomposing a retail price change into a
marginal cost change and into a change in the mark-up as,
!:::'Pt !:::.MC e !:::'Et
--= ----- (7.25)
Pt-l MCt-1 E - () Et-l
Assuming a linear retail demand function and a 60 per cent cost share of coffee beans
in average industry cost, they find that, in one year's time (Le., Jan 1994 to Jan 1995),
roasted coffee price rose by little above 44.5 per cent in response to a 100per cent increase
in the price of coffee beans. Evidently, relative to the given cost share of coffee beans in
total average industry cost, the increase in the price of roasted coffee beans is smaller.
This suggests that the degree of price transmission from green coffee beans to roasted
coffee prices is incomplete.
The explanation for the incomplete price transmission observed during the reference
period is that at the same time that marginal cost rose by 57 per cent mark-up fell by
8.1 per cent. The weak relationship between green beans price and roasted coffee price
is thus explained by the relatively large share of costs other than bean costs.
But given the long time it takes for coffeebean cost changes to feed through to roasted
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coffee price, as pointed out earlier (see Feuerstein op cit.), it can be said that it might
not be so much that price transmission is incomplete as that a year is not long enough
to observe price adjustment in the long-run.
In a similar exercise, Coterill and Dhar (1999) build a structural model to estimate the
cost pass-through rate (CPTR) for individual firms in the US assuming an oligopolistic
market for differentiated milk products. They estimate CPTRs for four supermarket
retailers and processors assuming firm-specific as well as industry-wide shocks. They
find that for raw milk price increases at the industry level, the estimated pass-through
rates for retailers are not significantly different from 0.90. For processors, they are higher
than 0.9 but slightly less than one. On the other hand, for a given shock to the wholesale
sector, the processor to retailer CPTRs for two supermarket retailers are one but for
the other two they are less than one. The results for firm-specific unobservable shocks
indicate that the CPTRs vary widely.
7.5.1 The structural modelling approach: an evaluation
On counts of its ability to decompose retail price changes into cost and mark-up changes,
the structural model fares better than the error correction model which focuses exclusively
on the short- and long-run price adjustment to the neglect of the structural components
of price adjustment.
But on the other hand, the structural modelling approach neglects the short- and
long run components of price adjustment which the error correction model works towards
identifying. As such, this modelling approach is inherently static as it neglects the time
dimension of price transmission. It is also highly sensitive to the assumption made
regarding demand and supply functions. The corollary of this is that the structural model
can produce different predictions concerning the degree of price transmission depending
on the specific assumptions that are made regarding demand and supply functions.
The structural modelling approach also assumes that changes in the mark-up are
influenced by, among other things, market power. The problem with this assumption
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is that market power can be identified unambiguously only under the assumption of
constant returns to scale. As Milan (1999) has shown, for an industry characterized by
non-constant returns to scale, market power cannot be identified unambiguously. This
means, given a non-constant returns to scale technology, the mark-up too cannot be
identified. And in the face of growing evidence that vertical markets are characterized by
non-constat returns to scale technology (see, for instance, Milan op cit., and Bhuyan an
Lopez, op cit.), the task of identifying the degree of price transmission using information
related to cost and the mark-up is made all the harder.
Even if market power is identified, Wohlgenant (1999) warns that for a heterogeneous
product market, attributing a change in the mark-up purely to market power resulting
from imperfect competition can be misleading. The reason is that in such a market, mark-
up (margin) changes could as well result from substitution of inputs following changes in
raw input price.
To see Wohlgenant's point clearly, let n firms produce differentiated products and
engage in Bertrand price-setting. In this environment, the profit maximization problem
faced by the ith firm is to choose optimum price pi so as to maximize
i (i i ( )) Di ( 1 i-I i n) Ii7r = P - c w p , ... ,p ,p , ... ,p - (7.26)
where ci(w) denotes the cost function of the i th firm for a given input vector w. Di
denotes the ith firm's output demand function for a given nx 1 vector of prices associated
with the differentiated prices whereas Ii denotes fixed cost of the ith firm. Given certain
restrictions on consumer preferences across commodities within the product group, the
ith firm's pure-strategy Bertrand-Cournot equilibrium price can be specified as:
(7.27)
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where (1+ (Ji) denotes the itk firm's markup over marginal cost and (Ji is the ith firm's
market power arising from its selling of a differentiated product.
It is also assumed that the ith firm purchases factors whose input demands are derived
from Shephard's lemma:
x~ = c~(w) yi for k=L, ... , m. (7.28)
where x~ is the ith firm's demand for the kth factor; c~( ) denotes the partial derivative
of the ith firm's cost function with respect to the kth factor price; whereas yi denotes
demand for the ith firm's differentiated output.
Consistent aggregation condition in an imperfectly competitive market requires that
(pi / P)/ci=(pj / P)/cj, which, given (7.27), implies that pi / ci=(1 +(Ji) and pj / cj=(1 +(Jj).
And, for this to hold, it is necessary that {Ji={Ji, or {Ji={J for all i. Given these require-
ments, aggregation over firms yields industry analogs of (7.27) and (7.28) which can be
written as:
P = (1 + (J)c(w) (7.29)
and
(7.30)
Let the marketing margin be defined as:
m = P - (xdY) WI (7.31)
which, using (7.29) into (7.30) can be re-written as:
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m (w) = (1 +,8) C (w) - cr(w) WI (7.31.1)
where CI(') denotes the industry's marginal cost with respect to WI, the raw material's
pnce.
Differentiating (7.31.1) with respect to WI assuming W2,,,., Wm are exogenous yields
the marketing margin's response to a change in the raw input's price. This is written as:
(7.32)
where cnrepresents the partial derivative of Cl with respect to WI'
The function Cll can be defined in terms of the Allen elasticity of substitution, O'n,
as:
Solving for Cll and substituting into (7.31) yields,
(7.33)
where S1 = w1xdc (w) Y = w1xd PY is the cost share of raw materials in total costs
and xd Y =C1 from (7.30).
Assuming that the Allen elasticity of substitution is non-positive, it is clear that for
a given degree of market power which the industry exercises, and for 1 0'11 ~ 0 I, (7.33)
clearly indicates that the marketing margin is positively related to the price of the raw
material. An interesting result is that when the composite product is produced with
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variable input proportions, both imperfect competition and input substitutability can
account for movements in the mark-up. For instance, for a given {3, an increase in the
price of the raw input increases the mark-up if factor substitutability, all, is large. On
the other hand, for a given au, an increase in the raw input price increases the mark-up
as market power, {3, increases. Finally both market power, f3 and all can compound each
other to increase the mark-up as the raw input price increases.
This result hinges on the assumption that consumer demand at the retail level has
a steeper slope than derived demand at the farm level. In other words, it hinges on the
assumption that the price spread narrows as retail or raw input price falls.
A final criticism of the structural modelling approach is that it estimates a single
elasticity of price transmission assuming the existence of a relationship between the re-
tail and raw input prices without first empirically establishing this relationship. And,
this, disregarding the number of possible transmission elasticities that could be derived
depending on the origin of exogenous shocks. Even if the origin of shocks is identified
when estimating the elasticity of price transmission, the direction of causality in the
transmission process is imposed rather than identified by testing. Often, causality is
assumed to be from the raw input to the retail sector rather than the other way around.
Currently, there seems to be no single model which incorporates the strengths of the
structural modelling approach and those of the error correction modelling approach. But
by themselves, results from either model cannot be fully informative of the degree of price
transmission. Evidently, results from the structural model provide information on the
structural determinants of price transmission, and as such, they can inform on the extent
of market failure, by drawing attention to the size of the mark-up (and market power),
for instance. But they do not provide information on the speed of price adjustment. On
the other hand, results from the error correction model are informative in terms of the
speed of price adjustment. But they cannot provide information on the determinants of
price transmission.
Given that a single model is not able to provide full information regarding the degree
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of price transmission, the most feasible strategy seems to be to use both models side by
side. Apart from its utility to provide information on the structural determinants, speed
and degree of price transmission, this strategy helps the analyst to compare the price
transmission elasticities which these models independently yield. Any discrepancy can
then be accounted for.
In the spirit of Wohlgenant and Haidacher (1989) and Wohlgenant (1999), which we
have already reviewed in the theoretical part of the thesis Reed and Clark (2000) develop
an empirical model that inputs information on retail, farm and non-farm prices, and such
structural information as cost share of the raw input in total industry cost, oligopsony
power as proxied by the supply shifter, and technology. Using data for seven major U.S.
food markets, they use the model to test for market power, for co-integration between
the retail and producer prices of these markets, and to estimate consumer demand, factor
cost shares, and the elasticity of price transmission.
To briefly highlight their model, they estimate a quasi-reduced-form system of two
equations,
In Prj - A~flnFj + Atw InW + Atz ln Z, + e;j
InPfi - A~flnFj+A~wlnW+A~zlnZ+eJj
where In? Ij and In? rj represent the natural logarithms of farm input and retail prices
used in the jth market respectively. W is a vector of logged non-farm input prices, Zj is
the consumer demand shifter, whereas erj and eIi are error terms for the retail and farm
input price equations respectively.
Based on this model they undertake several tests. The first of these tests is whether
oligopsony power exists in the industry. To run this test, they re-formulate the quasi-
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reduced form,
where Sj is a vector of supply shifters and vr is the error term.
This test is based on the premise that if the industry exercises market power in
purchasing the farm input, this will show up as a gap between the farm price and the
industry's demand for the farm input. Then this gap will be defined by the supply shifters,
Sj' In other words, if market power exists, the null hypothesis of no market power will
be rejected implying B~j)1 = O. Based on this test, they fail to reject the null that in
national markets the selected food industries purchase farm inputs competitively.
They run a second test to see if the retail and producer price pairs for the seven food
industries are co-integrated. To run this test, they apply the Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-
Perron tests of spurious regression based on a specification that includes six stochastic
regressors, a constant, and a deterministic time trend for each retail and farm price
equation. According to these tests, a model is said to be spurious (or not stochastically
co-integrated) if the residual errors follow a unit process, i.e., they are non-stationary.
If, on the other hand, the residual errors are stationary, then the model is said to be
stochastically co-integrated. They find that whereas the Dickey-Fuller test fails to reject
the null of spurious regression for each of the retail and farm price equations for the
seven food industries, and thereby rejects the null of co-integration for these series, the
Phillips-Peron t.est reject.s the null for 6 out of the 14 price equations at reasonable levels
of rejection and thereby finds co-integration for 8 out of the 14 price equations.
They run a third test to estimate the degree of price transmission. According to this
test, if the joint hypotheses of symmetry and constant returns to scale in technology
cannot be rejected, then in the long-run, a 1-percent increase in the price of a farm
commodity results in an increase in the price of the retail product by a percentage equal
to the cost share of the farm commodity used in the retail product. On counts of this
test, they find that in 2 out of 7 industries, the joint restriction of symmetry and constant
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returns to scale is rejected. These results suggest that full transmission of farm price to
retail is a characteristic feature of industries in which final products undergo a minimal
amount of food processing (in this case, fresh fruit and fresh vegetables).
They run a fourth test to estimate the quasi-reduced system of equations to assess
long run responses of the farm input and retail prices to changes in the stochastic and
deterministic regressors which appear therein. They find, in keeping with the predictions
of theory, that, for each of the industries, the long run industry demand for farm ingre-
dients is negatively sloped; that positive shifts in the consumer demand function trace
an upward sloping long run industry schedule; that a contraction in farm supply raises
consumer food prices just to name few among others.
They run a final test to determine whether a particular industry operates with fixed-
or variable-input proportions technology. This test is carried out by evaluating whether
the restriction, A}, =l/(S} ejj) (which we have explained earlier in the thesis) holds
for a particular industry or not. ejj represents the own-price elasticity of consumer
demand for the j th consumer product. If this restriction holds, then the industry is
said to operate with fixed input proportions technology. They find that across the seven
food industries, the above restriction does not hold for all the seven food industries as
significant substitution possibilities exist.
As can be seen from this methodological approach, by undertaking the structural and
the co-integration models side by side, one is in a position to evaluate not only whether
the price pair relating to the farm and retail prices are co-integrated but also whether
the degree of price transmission that is estimated can be explained with reference to such
market structure parameters as market power, returns to scale, input proportions and
share of the farm input in total industry cost.
7.5.2 Summary and evaluation
This chapter has attempted to review the existing empirical literature on price trans-
mission in vertically-related markets. It has identified four strands of methodological
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approaches to analyzing the degree of price transmission.
The first strand of methodology focuses on determining the direction of causality and
on estimating a correlation coefficient for prices at different stages of a marketing chain.
This methodology was shown to be limited in its usefulness to inform on the degree of
price transmission. This is because prior to estimation, it does not evaluate whether
these prices are tied in a long run economic relationship. As such, it has been shown to
be susceptible to the spurious regression problem. Consequently, any estimates of the
price transmission elasticity have been shown to be not robust.
The second strand of methodological approach is the error correction model. This has
been shown to be a useful tool for analyzing the degree of price transmission. Not only
is it able to identify the long-run relation between prices but it is also able to identify
the short-run price adjustment. A such, it nests both short- and long-run information
in a single model. Furthermore, it is not susceptible to the spurious regression problem
because prior to estimation, it identifies a co-integrating relation among the variables of
interest. Empirical findings using this approach show that most often prices at different
levels of vertically- related markets are co-integrated, that shocks from the raw input
sector transmit fully to consumers in the long-run, and that price adjustment in the
short run is sluggish.
However, the methodological approach based on the error-correction model has been
shown to have its limitations. Firstly, it is sensitive to seasonal integration and data
periodicity. Secondly, it does not identify the key structural factors which determine the
speed and degree of price transmission. And, thirdly the existence of co-integration may
be due to the presence of a common factor non-stationary variable in the co-integration
regression as its non-existence can be due to the latter's absence. Of these limitations,
the second is thought to be the most critical.
The third strand of methodological approach is structural modelling. The major
advantage of this approach is that the key structural parameters which determine the
degree of price transmission are identified. However, in its own, it offers limited inforrna-
251
tion regarding the degree of price transmission. Firstly, the price transmission elasticities
that are obtained using this approach have been shown to be sensitive to the assumptions
that are made in relation to demand and supply functions. Secondly, it does not identify
the time path of the adjustment process into its short- and long-run components, and,
as such, remains a static model. And, thirdly, it assumes the existence of a relationship
between the price series rather than prove it by testing.
The fourth methodological approach is a marriage between the structural modelling
approach and co-integration analysis. This has been shown to fare better than either of
the partners. This is because not only is it capable of showing whether the price pair of
interest are co-integrated but is also able to explain the degree of price transmission with
reference to such market structure parameters as market power, returns to scale, input
proportions and the cost share of the farm input in total industry cost.
As far as we are aware, there seems to have been no attempt in the price transmission
literature to make an inference about a co-integrating relation between the farm and retail
prices based on the predictions of economic theory. However, the literature is replete
with studies reporting a co-integrating relation between the farm and retail prices on the
basis of information supplied by the price pair alone. A potentially important avenue
of research to pursue is therefore to evaluate whether this claim is consistent with the
predictions of the theoretical models of price transmission that we have reviewed so far
and which we will extend further in the subsequent chapter. To give a snapshot of this
research avenue, recall the Gardner model of price transmission. It predicts that the
elasticities of price transmission that derive for given retail demand and input supply
shocks are in all normal cases different. On the other hand, the theory of co-integration
predicts that the co-integrating parameter in a regression of two prices does not vary
for different sources of shock. Now assume a co-integrating relation between the price
pair has been discovered; then the intuition is that the elasticities of price transmission
which derive from the price transmission models for different sources of an exogenous
shock are identical. As we will show later, the whole exercise involves identifying the
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conditions under which the elasticities of price transmission that derive for demand and
input supply shocks.
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Chapter 8
Theoretical models of price
transmission and inferences about a
co-integrating relation between
retail and farm input prices
8.1 Background
Our review of the empirical literature has highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of
the major methodological approaches to estimating the price transmission coefficient.
As might be recalled, one of these methodological approaches applies the concept of co-
integration. As we have explained in our review of the empirical literature, co-integration
analysis advocates that any estimation of a price transmission coefficient from regressions
involving any two or more price series in a vertical market should proceed conditional
on the existence of a co-integrating relation between these series. In the following, we
evaluate whether it is possible to make inferences about the existence of such a co-
integrating relation on the basis of information about price transmission elasticities that
are derived from the theoretical models of price transmission assuming different exogenous
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shocks. We then derive implications for the validity of price transmission elasticities that
are estimated from a structural modelling approach.
By way of restating the meaning of co-integration following Granger op cit., consider
two stochastic price series P et and Pat, both of which are of the same order of integration,
I(d). Then it is generally true that any linear combination of these series,
Ut = P xt - 13Pat (8.1)
will be I(d). There can, however, arise a situation where, for a constant 13, such a linear
combination is of a lower order of integration, I( d-b), where b>O. When this situation
holds, Pxt and Pat are said to be co-integrated of order CI( d,b) with 13 representing the
co-integrating parameter.
Co-integration presumes that the two series are intertwined in a long-run economic
relationship. This means that even if the series are characterized by stochastic trends,
i.e., they are non-stationary, they can nevertheless move together over time so that the
difference between them will be stable, i.e., stationary. In other words, they share the
same stochastic trend.
In (8.1), the eo-int.egrating parameter, 13, describes an equilibrium and not a nor-
mal functional relation between the price series. Therefore, regardless of the source of
causalit.y, it assumes the same unique value. This is because the decomposition of the
movement of two series is symmetric so that if Pat and P xt are co-integrated, then P xt
and Pat are co-integrated as well (Engle and Yoo, in Engle and Granger, 1991).
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8.2 Empirical estimation of price transmission coef-
ficients
As the review of our empirical literature has shown, early empirical models of price
transmission used OLS regressions on price levels to estimate the price transmission
coefficient for a set of price series in vertically-related markets. Often inferences about
the parameters of interest were made using the standard t and F significance tests. To
reiterate a point that we have made earlier on, the procedure for estimating the price
transmission coefficient using the conventional t and F significance tests is valid only to
the extent that these price series are stationary (Le., have constant mean and variance).
However, price series which enter such regression equations are often non-stationary,
1(1), and, in general, regressions involving two non-stationary series are very likely to
produce apparently significant relationships when there is none. It is now a well known
fact that statistical relationships involving 1(1) variables are likely to be spurious and
inferences from the standard significant tests misleading (Granger and Newbold, op cit).
Recent years have witnessed the widespread application of co-integration techniques
to price regressions. The major motivation for using these techniques emanates from
the belief that any price series in vertical markets which enter price regression equations
should be tied in a long-run economic relationship so that, even if independently they
are 1(1) as indeed many of them are, the difference between them can be 1(0). Un-
der these circumstances, conventional OLS regressions are believed to yield estimates of
price transmission coefficients that are 'superconsistent' (Stock, op cit.) although the et'
distribution is non-standard. Consequently, the spurious regression problem is overcome.
Consider the following simple example whereby, for a given farm input price Pa, and
proportional marketing costs (et'), the retail price can be specified as Px = Pa (1 + et').
In this example, the retail and farm input prices are believed to be tied together with a
constant margin. 110re generally, for a given time, t,
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(8.2)
where a represents proportional (constant) marketing costs. Given (8.2), estimation of
(31 by OLS yields the long-run price transmission coefficient since (3 = l~~~' in the
dynamic specification,
n m
Pxt = ao + aiEPxt-i + (3iEPat-i
i=l i=O
(8.3)
In such simple cases, we might expect, a priori, that prices are co-integrated because
the difference between Px and Pa, namely, et, is constant (or at least stationary). How-
ever, as we will demonstrate, a number of factors may be responsible for the absence of
a co-integrating relation between two or more price series. Indeed, as we will show later,
finding such a co-integrating relation in vertical markets is very much a special case.
Prior to making such inferences, however, it is necessary that we restate the definition of
the pass-through elasticity,
8.3 Pass-through and pass-back elasticities defined
For given farm input and retail output prices in a vertical market and for a given exoge-
nons shock originating in anyone stage of this market, the pass-through elasticity (i.e.,
d:f: +1:.f:), is defined as the percentage change in the price of the retail product associated
with a percentage change in the price of the farm input. Note that this pass-through
elasticity can be calculated for shocks originating from each sector; i.e., we may calculate
it when shocks originate from the retail, farm and marketing sectors. Theoretically, it is
also possible to measure a pass-back elasticity (i.e., 1:J: -;- 1:f:), with respect to a shock
originating in anyone stage of the market (McCorriston et al., 1999). It is defined as the
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percentage change in the price of the farm input associated with a percentage change in
the price of the retail product.
In empirically estimating the pass-through elasticity, the source of shock is an issue
that has not received much attention. Implicitly, it has been assumed that the same
pass-through elasticity is derived for all sources of shock. However, as theory has shown,
the pass-through elasticity cannot be identical for all sources of shock. In fact, corre-
sponding to each of the three exogenous shocks three different pass-through elasticities
are derived. The only instance when the source of the exogenous shocks does not mat-
ter and consequently when these elasticities are identical arises under highly restrictive
assumptions. As we will show in the following, this special case arises when the pass-
through elasticity for each source of shock takes on the value of unity. In all other cases,
the three pass-through elasticities will not be identical.
An interesting question to ask is whether the special case for which all the three
sources of shock generate an identical pass-through elasticity is also a case for which
there exists a co-integrating relation between the price pair. This is a question which we
set out to answer next.
8.4 Making inferences about co-integration
Theory tells us that the source of an exogenous shock determines the degree of price
transmission, as proxied by the pass-through elasticity. As we have just pointed out,
in general, the pass-through elasticities corresponding to each of the three exogenous
shocks are not identical. However, there are special conditions under which all three
elasticities are identical. From an empirical point of view, identifying these conditions is
important because in theory there are several theoretical price transmission coefficients
that can be estimated each corresponding to the pass-through elasticities that are derived
for different shocks. But in practice, there is only one empirically estimable parameter,
and estimation of this single parameter by OLS is legitimate only if there exist conditions
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under which the pass-through elasticities for all exogenous shocks are identical.
As might be recalled, we pointed out that when any two price series in a vertical mar-
ket co-integrate, the co-integrating parameter, /3 (i.e., the price transmission coefficient),
in equation (8.1), is unique regardless of the source of shock. It is now possible to eval-
uate whether any inferences can be made regarding the uniqueness of the co-integrating
parameter from the pass-through elasticities derived for different exogenous shocks.
For a start, let us state that the co-integrating parameter, /3, does not represent the
pass-through elasticity. The reasoning is because whereas /3 is derived from a reduced
form model, the pass-through elasticities are derived from a structural model. To clarify
the latter point, consider the pass-through elasticity which is derived for an exogenous
shock originating in the farm sector and assuming that the input and output markets are
perfectly competitive.
Clearly, all right-hand side terms are structural parameters. To start with, the cost
share of the farm input in total industry cost, Sa, is a function of output and farm
input quantities and their price (i.e., Sa = ~::,where a and x denote farm and retail
quantities respectively). The marketing supply elasticity, eb, is a function of price paid
the marketing input, Pi; and quantity purchased of this input, b (i.e., eb = d~b X It
). The cost share of the marketing input is a function of output and marketing input
quantities and their price (l.e., Sb = ;:~). Finally, the Allen elasticity of substitution, a ;
is a function of the first and cross-partial derivatives of x with respect to a and b and of
x itself [i.e., a = LJ..JJ., ).
X ab
However, even if /3 and the pass-through elasticity are not identical, inference about
/3's occurrence can be made on the basis of information pertaining to the relative mag-
nitudes of the pass-through elasticity for different exogenous shocks. Evidently, if these
magnitudes are not identical, then our conjecture is /3 does not exist, and, hence, is not
estimable. If, however, these magnitudes are identical, then /3 exists and, consequently,
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its estimation is possible. This inference is made possible because by definition (3 is
thought to be unique regardless of the source of shock.
From this, it follows that the only instance when the co-integrating parameter, (3, can
inform on price transmission is when the pass-through elasticities for different sources of
exogenous shock are identical. For all other cases for which they are not identical, then
(3 is not identified, and, hence, cannot inform on price transmission.
To make inferences about the existence of (3, therefore, we need to identify the condi-
tions under which a pass-through elasticity arising from an exogenous shock to anyone
sector in the vertical market is identical to that arising from an exogenous shock to any
other sector. If any such conditions exist, then our conjecture is that, regardless of the
source of the shock, there is a unique value to which the pass-through elasticities tend
to converge. The existence of this unique value to which the elasticities tend is what we
conjecture would imply the existence of a co-integrating relation between the retail and
farm input prices, and, hence, the existence of a co-integrating parameter, {3.
In the following, we consider different market structures and technologies to identify
the conditions under which the pass-through elasticities corresponding to different ex-
ogenous shocks are identical; and, hence, the co-integrating parameter is identified. We
first consider a model whereby the input and output markets are perfectly competitive,
inputs are combined in variable proportions and industry technology exhibits constant
returns to scale.
8.4.1 Price transmission under perfect competition, variable in-
put proportions and constant returns to scale and condi-
tions under which pass-through elasticities for different
exogenous shocks are identical.
Before we identify the conditions under which the pass-through elasticities corresponding
to different sources of shock are identical, such that the co-integrating parameter is
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identified, first define the pass-through elasticities for different sources of shock given our
assumptions regarding market structure and industry technology.
Given the assumptions of perfectly competitive markets, variable input proportions
and constant returns to scale, the pass-through elasticities that are derived given ex-
ogenous shocks which originate in the raw, retail and marketing sectors respectively are
given by:
(8.4)
dP; IdN= Sbea + Saeb + ()"
dP; eb+ a (8.5)
dP; I _ ea + ()"
dP; er= 7] + a (8.6)
As equations (8.4) - (8.6) clearly show, the measures of pass-through elasticities are
different for different exogenous shocks. Only under special conditions is the source of
the shock irrelevant with the result that all three pass-through elasticities are identical.
Note that under no normal condition is the pass-through elasticity derived for an
exogenous shock originating in the marketing sector, as in (8.6) identical to the pass-
through elasticities that are derived for exogenous shocks which originate in the retail and
farm input. supply sectors. This is because in all normal cases, the former is indeterminate
because 7] is in all normal cases negative, while the latter two are positive. For this reason,
in the subsequent analysis we will disregard the pass-through elasticity for a marketing
shock and instead focus on those for farm supply and retail shocks.
Under the given assumptions, the necessary condition under which (8.4) and (8.5) .
are identical states that the cost share of the farm input in total industry cost be unity
(i.e., Sa = 1). Recalling from our exposition of the theoretical model, the condition that
Sa=1 is one for which the t.ransmission elasticities in (8.4) and (8.5) are equal to unity.
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It is worth emphasizing the fact that even if we relax the assumption of variable input
proportions and instead hold the assumption of fixed input proportions, this result still
holds. As such, it is robust to the assumption made regarding the proportion in which
inputs are combined. On the other hand, the result does not hold if the assumption of
constant returns to scale is relaxed and instead non-constant returns to scale are assumed.
The implication which follows from the above result is that under the given assump-
tions of a perfectly competitive vertical market whose technology is characterized by
variable input proportions and constant returns to scale, and for given exogenous shocks
that originate only in the farm input and retail sectors (i.e., not in marketing sector), the
co-integrating parameter is identified when conditions are present in both pass-through
elasticities for which Sa = 1. For all other conditions, it appears that it is not identified.
While this result is important in itself, it has also a very important corollary for
empirical testing. In general, estimation of a single price transmission parameter will not
be possible since for any given model structure, the parameter obtained by estimating
a price regression such as (8.2) will depend on the proportion of shocks emanating from
each sector. Since different proportions will lead to different estimates, estimates obtained
empirically will not be unique, i.e., they will be unidentified. Since co-integration defines
a unique relationship between two prices, regressions such as (8.2) should not co-integrate
in general unless the above condition is satisfied. FUrthermore, even this is only true if
it can be shown that the marketing sector does not shock the vertical market.
Next, we evaluate whether relaxing the assumption of perfect competition at all stages
of the industry invalidates the above result. With this aim in mind, we assume that the
retail stage is dominated by few sellers, then identify the conditions under which the
pass-through elasticities for farm supply and retail shocks are identical and hence the
co-integrating parameter is identified.
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8.4.2 Price transmission assuming oligopoly power in the retail
sector and conditions under which pass-through elastici-
ties for different exogenous shocks are identical
Given the assumption of oligopoly power in the retail sector, variable input proportions
and constant returns to scale in technology, we can now identify the pass-through elas-
ticities resulting from farm supply and retail sector shocks.
Given price changes for the farm input and for the retail product, the pass-through
elasticities that are derived for exogenous shocks which originate in the farm and retail
sectors respectively are given by:
dP; la(eb + 0-)
dP; IdW = (1 - J-L) (eb + laa) - Ib'fJ (8.7)
(8.8)
where the parameters I a and Ib represent the value shares of the farm and marketing
inputs in the presence of oligopoly in the retail sector (see chapter 4, eqns. 4.15a and
4.15b for defini tion],
Given a model whereby the retail sector of an industry is oligopolistic, the conditions
under which the pass-through elasticities in (8.7) and (8.8) will be identical is when
the industry's demand function is constant elasticity, i.e., for J-L = 0 and when the cost
share of the farm input in total industry cost is unity, i.e., for T« = 1. Recalling from
our exposition of the theoretical model, given that J-L = 0 the condition, "t« = 1 is one
for which the transmission elasticities in (8.7) and (8.8) are unity under an oligopolistic
market, i.e., when the oligopolist firms act as if they were perfectly competitive.
A result that follows from the above is therefore that given exogenous farm input
and retail sector shocks to which the industry is subject, and given the assumptions of
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oligopoly power in the retail sector, variable input proportions and constant returns to
scale in technology, a constant elasticity demand function facing the industry seems to
be the only scenario under which fa=l leads to the pass-through elasticities in (8.7)
and (8.8) being identical. The implication is that, under the given assumptions, the
only instance when farm input and retail prices might co-integrate is when the demand
function facing an industry is constant elasticity and when the share of the farm input in
total industry cost is unity. The corollary of this is that, for other forms of the demand
function, i.e., for /l. > 0 ( or /l. < 0), the farm input and retail price pairs, on their own,
will not co-integrate when oligopoly power is present in the retail sector.
8.4.3 Price transmission assuming oligopsony power in the farm
input sector and conditions under which the pass-through
elasticities for different exogenous shocks are identical.
Consider now the conditions under which the pass-through elasticities are identical for
given exogenous shocks in the farm and retail sectors assuming that, ceteris paribus, the
farm input sector is oligopsonistic.
For given changes in the farm input and retail product prices, the pass-through elas-
ticities that are derived for exogenous shocks which originate in the farm and retail sectors
respectively are given by:
(1+ 8) fa(eb + 0')
eb + f aO' - fb'"
(8.9)
dP; IdN= fbea + (1 + 8) haeb + 0')
dP: eb + (1 + 8) 0' (8.10)
where the parameters fa and Tb represent the value shares of the farm and marketing
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inputs in the presence of oligopsony in the farm sector (see chapter 5, eqn. 5.20)
Given a model whereby the farm input market is oligopsonistic, the conditions under
which the pass-through elasticities in (8.9) and (8.10) are identical arise for 15=0 and
"Ya=1. Recalling from our exposition of the theoretical model, for 15=0, the condition
"Ya=l is one for which the transmission elasticities in (8.9) and (8.10) are unity. And,
the condition, 15 = 0 obtains when the supply function for the farm input is either linear,
where the supply elasticity is unity, or constant elasticity.
The result which follows from the above is therefore that given the assumptions of
oligopsony power in the farm sector and variable input proportions and constant returns
to scale in technology and given exogenous farm and retail shocks to which the industry
is subject, a constant elasticity supply function facing an industry or a linear supply
function for which the supply elasticity is unity seems to be the only scenario under
which the condition, "Ya=lleads to the pass-through elasticities in (8.9) and (8.10) being
identical.
The implication which follows from the above result is therefore that in the presence
of oligopsony power in the farm sector, the condition, "Ya=l can only lead to the iden-
tification of a co-integrating relation between the farm input and retail output prices if
there is a unitary linear (or constant elasticity) supply function for the farm input i.e., for
15 = O. For other functional forms of farm supply, i.e., for 15 > 0 (or 15 < 0), however, the
condition, "Ya = 1, on its own, will not be sufficient to identify a co-integrating relation
between the price pair when oligopsony power is present in the industry.
To this stage, we have assumed the existence of market power either in the retail or
farm sector of a vertical market. In the following, we assume the existence of market
power in both the retail and farm sectors at the same time that we hold the assumptions
of variable input proportions and constant returns to scale in industry technology.
265
8.4.4 Price transmission assuming both oligopoly and oligop-
sony power and conditions under which the pass-through
elasticities for different exogenous shocks are identical
Finally, consider the conditions under which the pass-through elasticities for given exoge-
nous shocks in the farm input and retail sectors are identical assuming, ceteris paribus,
the farm input sector is oligopsonistic and the retail sector is oligopolistic.
Given these assumptions, and for given changes in the farm and retail product prices,
the pass-through elasticities that are derived for exogenous shocks which originate in the
farm and retail sectors respectively are given by:
(1 + 6) fa(eb + (1) (8.11)
dP; IdN= fbea + (1 + 6) ({aeb + (1)
dP: (1 - J-l) {eb + (1 + 8) (1) (8.12)
where the parameters fa and fb represent the cost shares of the farm and marketing
inputs in the presence of oligopoly power in the retail sector and oligopsony power in the
raw input sector (sce chapter 5, eqn. 5.50a).
Given the assumption of market power in the farm and retail sectors, three conditions
can be identified as being necessary for the pass-through elasticities in (8.11) and (8.12)
to be identical. These conditions are that the demand function facing the industry is
constant elasticity, i.e., J-l = 0; that the supply function facing the industry is either
constant elasticity or a linear function for which the supply elasticity is unity, i.e., 8 = 0;
and that the cost. share of the farm input in total industry cost is unity; i.e., fa = 1.
The implication of this result is that in the presence of market power in both the retail
and farm sectors, and given the assumptions of variable input proportions and constant
returns to scale in industry technology, a co-integrating relation between retail and farm
input prices can only be identified, given exogenous shocks to the farm input and retail
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sectors, if and when the retail demand function facing an industry is constant elasticity,
i.e., 11 = 0 and the farm supply function is constant elasticity (or unitary linear); i.e.,
8 = 0 and when the cost share of the farm input in total industry cost is unity; i.e., "fa = 1.
The corollary of this is that for other forms of farm supply and retail demand functions,
the condition, "fa = 1 would not in itself be sufficient for a co-integrating relation to be
identified between the prices of the farm input and the retail product following exogenous
shocks originating in the farm and retail sectors.
8.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have attempted to show how a co-integrating relation between the
industry's retail and farm input prices can be inferred from the existing models of price
transmission for given assumptions that are made regarding market structure and indus-
try technology.
Given the assumptions of perfect competition at all stages of a vertical market, of
variable input proport.ions and of const.ant returns to scale in industry technology, and
for given exogenous shocks that originate in the farm and retail sectors, a co-integrating
relation between the industry's retail and farm input prices would be identified under
a condition whereby the cost share of the farm input in total industry cost is unity,
i.e., when Sa = 1. This implies that the pass-through elasticities are all equal to unity.
No other value seems to be theoretically consistent. This result assumes no exogenous
marketing shocks exist. Where there are marketing shocks, then even the special case is
denied.
Given the assumptions ofmarket power in the farm and (or) retail stages of the vertical
market, of variable input proportions and of constant returns to scale in technology, on
the other hand, a co-integrating relation between retail and farm input prices can only
be identified if, further to the condition that "fa = 1, constant elasticity (or linear) farm
supply and constant elasticity demand functions are assumed for the industry, i.e., if the
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price mark-up and price mark-down are constant. For other forms of supply and (or)
demand functions, the condition, "fa = 1 on its own is not sufficient for a co-integrating
relation between retail and farm input prices to be identified. Therefore, for these other
functional forms, the co-integrating relation is unidentified when market power is assumed
in a vertical market.
One major implication which follows from these results is that, given a particular
market structure, the price transmission coefficient implied by different models, i.e., per-
fect competition, oligopoly, and (or) oligopsony will not be unique except in very special
cases, as it depends on the source of the shock. In other words, it is unidentified in the
co-integration relation in all cases except where markets are perfectly competitive (or
imperfectly competitive but with constant mark-up and (or) mark-down) and the value
share of the farm input is unity. Consequently, under the given assumptions, farm input
and retail prices will never co-integrate in general.
This implication follows because for any given market model, there are several theo-
retical pass-through elasticities measuring the degree of price transmission. These theo-
retical elasticities correspond to the exogenous shocks originating in the farm and retail
sectors of the market. Given these theoretical elasticities, estimation of a single price
transmission coefficient is only valid if all these elasticities are equal to unity. And
when this obtains, one can identify a co-integrating relation between the price pair. The
corollary of this is that, when these theoretical elasticities are not identical, one cannot
identify a co-integrating relation between the price pair. Consequently, one is not able
to estimate a price transmission coefficient from the co-integration regression.
Another major implication which follows from the above result concerns the way
structural modelling is practiced. As our review of the empirical literature has shown, the
structural modelling approach to estimating the degree of price transmission assumes the
existence of a relationship between the retail and farm input prices rather than establish it
by testing. It also estimates the existence of a single elasticity of price transmission from
the farm to the retail sector. nut as the above inference suggests, the existence of a single
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price transmission elasticity can only be assumed if the pass-through elasticities which
correspond to different exogenous shocks are identical. As the above results suggest,
these elasticities are identical only if they take on the value of unity regardless of the
source of the exogenous shock, and it is only under this condition that one can assume
the existence of a relationship between the price pair.
This suggests that estimation of the elasticity of price transmission should be carried
out conditional on the existence of a co-integrating relation between the prices of the
farm input and of the retail product. This means that, in the course of structural
modelling, estimation of the degree of price transmission has to be preceded by a test
for co-integration. If the test identifies a co-integrating relation between the price series,
then estimation of a single price transmission elasticity is legitimate. If, however, the test
fails to identify any such a co-integrating relation between the price pair, then estimation
of a single price transmission elasticity is not possible. Because several such elasticities
can exist simultaneously for different shocks.
8.6 Caveat
In the preceding, it has been shown that given information related to a price pair, coin-
tegration arises much as a special case rather than in general. However, this inference
should be interpreted with caution. The fact that a price pair do not cointegrate by
themselves does not necessarily imply that inherently they do not cointegrate. What it
probably suggests is that the model on which the the cointegration test is based is not
adequately specified. It is generally believed that the empirical test for cointegration
in vertically related markets is sensitive to model specification and particularly to om-
mission of industry-wide shocks. It is thus not uncommon, in empirical work, to find
no cointegration between a price pair in the absence of shocks when in fact they are
cointegrated when the regression is re-estimated allowing for these shocks. The theo-
retical price transmission models we have reviewed are explicit about the importance of
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industry-wide shocks in determining the degree of price transmission. Thus any empiri-
cal test for cointegration between a price pair in vertically related markets that does not
allow for these shocks is likey to be misspecified. In this respect, it is not difficult to
see that the price equation (8.2) is not adequately specified. as it does not incorporate
shocks that originate in the retail, supply and marketing sectors. Consequently, given
(8.2), one should expect to find a cointegrating relation between the price pair in only
rare cases.
Given that it is misspecified as it stands now, Wohlgenant and Haidacher (1989) and
Wohlgenant (1999) (see 7.5.1) have suggested that the price equation in (8.2) be refor-
mulated to allow for industry-wide demand, supply and marketing shocks as explanatory
variables, as:
(8.13)
where, Zt, Wt and S, are denote the demand, marketing and supply shocks respectively.
In the empirical chapter that follows, we run two sets of tests for cointegration using
11price pairs from the UK food and energy industries. In the first set, we undertake a test
using only informat.ion related to the price pair. If we find cointegration, then that means
the price pair by themselves provide adequate information for a test suggesting that (8.2)
above is well specified. Ifwe do not find cointegration on the basis of information provided
by the price alone, then this means the price pair by themselves do not provide adequate
information for a test suggesting that (8.2) is misspecified. Thus in the second set, we
run a cointegration test based on (8.13) using not only information relating to the price
pair but also information relat.ing to industry-wide shocks.
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Chapter 9
A Test for co-integration: the case
of price series from the UK food and
energy sectors
9.1 Background
As we have shown in our empirical literature review, in recent years establishing a rela-
tionship between two or more price pairs in vertically related markets using co-integration
analysis has become widespread. This has been motivated by the realization that when
estimating a coefficient.for a price pair early models of vertical price transmission regres-
sion were prone to the spurious regression problem such that they established a correla-
tion between the price pair when in fact there was none (Granger and Newbold, op cit.).
They suffered from this problem because they made a prior assumption that there was
a long-run economic relationship between the price pair without first investigating the
time series properties of the pair.
Applying the concept of co-integration when estimating price transmission coefficients
is believed to free any regressions that involve two or more series from the spurious re-
gression problem because prior to estimat.ing the long-run regression equation, it ensures,
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unlike the practice followed by the early models, that the price pair which enter the price
transmission regression are tied to each other in a long-run economic relationship.
As we have made evident in our review of the literature, studies for different countries
have shown that many price pairs in the food and energy sectors are co-integrated,
such that, over time, a movement in one price series triggers a movement in the other
such that both series move in the direction of a new equilibrium once the original has
been disturbed. The presence of cointegration implies that there is a constant linear
relationship between the two variables. But as predictions from the existing models of
price transmission suggest, by themselves time series of final product and farm input
prices in vertically related markets do not in general have a constant linear relationship
except under highly restrictive assumptions. These assumptions are that (i) the given
markets operate with constant returns to scale; (ii) that their downstream and upstream
sectors are perfectly competitive, or if they are not, they operate with a constant elasticity
demand function and (or constant elasticity farm supply function) so that the price mark-
up and the price mark-down are constant; and (iii) that the cost share of the farm input
is unity.
This chapter will test empirically the hypothesis that a time series of farm input
and retail product prices will co-integrate by themselves. To test the validity of this
hypothesis, the Johansen maximum likelihood test for co-integration is applied to a time
series of eleven price pairs in the UK food and energy sectors. These price pairs represent
the retail and producer prices (or price indices where appropriate) for milk, fresh fruits,
sugar, potato, eggs, coffee, beef, pork, lamb, chicken and petrol.
9.2 Empirical Strategy
As might be recalled, the chapter dealing with the empirical literature review has dwelt
at length on the concept of co-integration and its empirical implementation. We do not
therefore repeat it here. Our plans for the remaining part of the chapter are as follows.
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First, we describe the sources and nature of our data. Next, we present a graphical
description of the data. \-Vethen finally examine the time series properties of the data.
This task will involve testing each price series for stationarity using the ADF unit-root
test and then testing them for co-integration using the Johansen FIML procedure.
9.3 Sources and nature of data
For the purpose of our analysis, we use 11 pairs of price series relating to the UK food
and oil industries. These series represent monthly retail and producer level prices for
milk, fresh fruits, sugar, potato, eggs, coffee, beef, pork, lamb, chicken and
petrol.
The price series for fresh fruits, sugar (sugar beet and retail granule sugar), potato
and eggs represent monthly retail and producer price indices over the period, 1988.1-
1998.12 as extracted from the Monthly Digest of Statistics published by the UK Office
for National Statistics.
The farm-gate prices for milk represent monthly prices paid to farmers in pence per
litre of fresh milk while the retail prices represent the milk equivalent of cheese in pence
per litre! charged by supermarkets. They cover the period, 1995.1-2000.12. The retail and
farm-gate prices are extracted from various issues of the Annul Report of the UK Dairy
Council and of the Annual report of Agricultural Prices issued by the UK Department
of Environment, Fisheries and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) respectively.
The monthly series for retail instant coffee price and those for imported green bean
coffee price over the period, 1996.1-2000.8 are made available to us by the Office of Na-
tional Statistics and DEFRA respectively. The series for instant coffeeprice are measured
in pence per 200 gram pure instant coffeejar, while those for imported green bean coffee
IThe conversion factor for the milk equivalent of cheese is kindly provided to us by the Food Standards
Agency. The equivalence is arrived at by assuming 2 million litres of fresh milk makes 196 tonnes of
hard cheese.
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price are measured in pence per 200 gram jar of instant coffee equivalent. The equiva-
lence is worked out using a conversion factor as stipulated in Annex 1 of the International
Coffee Agreement, 2001 (International Coffee Organization); i.e., 1kg instant=2.6 kg of
green bean coffee. The average coffee retail price series are derived from the UK Retail
Price Index (RPI). As such, they represent an average of prices that are charged by all
retail outlets covered by the RPI, which include supermarket multiples and a number
of small stores. They represent purchase prices as apply to consumers in retail outlets
thus are inclusive of tax and a profit margin. They also include special promotions and
discounts (e.g offers of 50 pence off an item). However, they do not include 'three for
the price of two' type of offers. It is worthy of note here that average prices derived from
the RPI are calculated on the basis of actual prices charged in January which are then
updated each month using the relevant item index. The monthly average price series for
green coffee bean imports reflect the CIF value of such imports. They are sourced from
HM Customs and Excise and prepared by DEFRA.
The monthly price series for crude oil and motor spirit for the UK over the pe-
riod, 1982.1-1995.6 have been provided to us by Dr Robert Witt of Surrey University.
The monthly price series for motor spirit expressed in pence per litre constitute the net
monthly average price of four-star leaded petrol paid at the pump by consumers on ap-
proximately the 15th day of the montlr'. The average is worked out on the basis of
information collected from major oil companies by the Department of Trade and Indus-
try (DTI) and published in the Monthly Digest of Energy Statistics. The monthly crude
oil price series, expressed in pence per litre, reflect the monthly average price of Brent
crude oil originating from the UK continental Shelr.
The retail and producer price series for beef, pork, lamb and chicken cover the period
19!J0.1-2000.12and are provided by the Meat and Livestock Commission (MLC). The
2The net petrol price is arrived at by subtracting from the gross retail price of four-star leaded petrol
excise duty and value added tax. The value added tax has been either 15% or 17% of gross retail price
whereas excise duty is revised annually with the budget.
3The price of Brent crude oil for each month in pence per litre has been arrived at by multiplying
the price in US cents by the sterling-US dollar exchange rate for that month.
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producer price for each category is derived from a survey of auctions and abattoirs in
Great Britain and reflects the farm-gate price. All live prices are converted to carcass
weight equivalent (CWE) using the proportion of carcass meat in the live animal. The
retail prices for all meat categories reflect a representative retail price for each meat as
charged by supermarkets, by butchers and regional meat retailers. They are constructed
by aggregating over prices recorded for individual cuts according to the share they have
in the MLC's basket which in turn reflects the proportions of the meat cuts obtained
from the carcase. Retail prices do not account for discounts such as buy-one-get-one
free and exclude loyalty card bonuses and other effective discounts. Both the producer
and retail price series are expressed in real terms by adjusting the nominal prices for the
Retail Price Index (all items)".
9.4 Graphical description of the data
In the following, we describe graphically the temporal behavior followed by each of the
selected price pairs. Figure 9.1 plots the monthly prices of fresh milk and cheese over the
period, 1995.1-2000.12. As the plot clearly indicates, over the sample period, both price
series have followed a general downward trend. But this trend has not been so smooth as
both series have shown marked fluctuations over the period. As is evident from the plot,
this fluctuation has been more marked for the milk price series. The plot also clearly
shows that fresh milk prices have been at their all-time low in the first half of 2000 while
they have been at their all-time high in the second half of 1996. On the other hand,
cheese prices have been at their all-time low in the first half of 2002 while they have been
at their all-time high in the first half of 1996. The plot also seems to suggest that, over
the sample period, both price series have moved together over time.
Figure 9.2 plots the retail to producer price spread for UK milk over the reference
period. As the plot makes evident, the fluctuations observed for the raw price series have
4For details of the construction of the price series and their characterstics, refer to MAFF (1999):
Supply of Groceries from Multiple Stores
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Figure 9-1: UK retail and producer milk prices, 1995.1-2000.12
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been reflected in a price spread which seems to be highly unstable.
Figure 9.3 plots the monthly retail and producer price indices for UK fresh fruits
over the period 1988.1-1998.12. As the plot clearly illustrates, there has been a general
upward trend in the retail and producer price indices for the UK fresh fruits. Despite this
general trend, nevertheless, both indices have exhibited fluctuations over the reference
period. The graphical evidence seems to suggest that the UK retail and producer price
indices for fresh frui t have moved together over the reference period.
Figure 9.4 plots the retail to producer price spread for UK fresh fruits over the refer-
ence period. As shown by the plot, the price spread for this period has been characterized
by structural break.
Figure 9.5 plots the monthly retail and producer price indices for granulated sugar
and sugar beet respectively over the period 1994.1-1999.7. As the plot clearly indicates,
over the sample period, both price indices have followed different patterns. The pattern
exhibited by the retail price index has been one of decline in the first half of 1994, of a
recovery in the second half of the same year, of a persistent rise into mid-1996 and then
of a persistent decline afterwards. On the other hand, the pattern of the producer price
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Figure 9-2: The price spread: UK milk prices, 1995.1-2000.12
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Figure 9-3: Retail and producer price indices: UK fruits, 1988.1-1998.12
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Figure 9-4: The price spread, UK fresh fruit prices, 1988.1-1998.12
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index has been one of a step-wise rise until the second half of 1996, of a step-wise decline
until the second half of 19D8 and then of a recovery afterwards. There thus seems to
exist no indication of the price indices moving together.
Figure 9.6 plots the retail to producer price spread for sugar over the reference period.
Over the sample period, the spread has generally shown an upward trend. But this trend
has not been smooth. As the plot clearly indicates, it fluctuates between 1994 and the
second half of 1DD6 then suddenly rises in a step-wise fashion until the late second half
of 1DD7 only to fall afterwards.
Figure D.7 plots the monthly retail and producer price indices for UK potato over the
period 1D88-1DD8. As the plot clearly indicates, the most prominent characteristic of both
price indices through out the period seems to have been random fluctuation. But this
characteristic seems to have been more prominent during the period into 1994, during
which time the fluctuations occurred at short intervals, than in the subsequent period
when these fluctuations occurred at long intervals. This being the general observation,
in mid-1DD5the retail price index plummeted to its all-time low while the producer price
index shot. t.o its all-time high. But as the plot makes evident, there seems to be an
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Figure 9-5: Retail and producer price indices: UK sugar, 1994.1-1999.7
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Figure 9-6: The price spread: UK sugar prices, 1994.1-1999.7
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Figure 9-7: UK retail and producer potato prices, 1988.1-1998.12
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indication that both price indices have co-moved over time over the reference period.
Figure 9.S plots the retail to producer price spread for UK potato for the reference
period. As the plot clearly shows, the spread has been characterized by random flue-
tuations, obviously refiecting the observed fluctuations in both price indices during the
reference period. It might be worth noting that the sudden dip in the retail price index
observed in mid-19n5 comes out prominent in the plot of the price spread as well.
Figure n.n plots the UK monthly retail and producer price indices for eggs for the
period, 19S5-19ns. As the plot clearly shows, while the retail price index has followed a
general upward trend over the reference period, the producer price index does not seem
to have followed such a trend; it rather has fiuctuated at long intervals. Therefore except
for the short interval between 1990 and late second half of 1991, both retail and producer
price indices have generally drifted apart.
Figure 9.10 plots the retail to producer price spread for UK eggs for the reference
period. As the plot. illustrates, even though generally the price spread has followed an
upward trend over tho period, it has been characterized by a mix of trends. Evidently,
the period 1n88-1nnOwitnessed a general decline in the spread with the next two years
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Figure 9-9: UK retail and producer egg prices, 1988.1-1998.12
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Figure 9-10: The price spread: UK eggs, 1988.1-1998.12
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witnessing a relative stability in the spread which was only interrupted by the sudden
spike in mid-19!J2. The period beginning 1994, however, has been characterized by un-
interrupted widening of the spread.
Figure 9.11 plots the average monthly prices of both instant coffee and imported green
coffee beans over the period, 1996.1-2000.8. As the plot makes evident, over the sample
period, both price series seem to have followed a general downward trend. But this seems
to have been a particularly characteristic feature of the price series for imported coffee
beans. The plot also shows that the price series for coffee beans have shown more frequent
fluctuations than those for retail instant coffee, which seem to have remained relatively
stable, and t.his because they are subject to the vagaries of nature and to fiuctuations in
the international market.
But it is quite dear that both series seem to have followed paths which are typified by
swings. For instance, over the period into 1997, the retail price series for instant coffee
remain stable, rise to a peak in the first quarter of 1997, then stabilize until mid-1999
only to fall afterwards. The price series for coffee beans, on the other hand, decline in
the first two years of the sample period, rise to a new peak in the first quarter of 1997
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Figure 9-11: UK instant and green coffee beans prices, 1996.1-2000.8
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then suddenly plummet to a new level in mid-1997 and further decline afterwards with
frequent swings along the way. Generally, however, judging from the plot, there is a
rough indication that the retail and producer price series have moved together over the
sample period.
Figure 9.12 plots the retail to producer price spread for UK coffee. Mirroring the
erratic behavior of both price series, the price spread has been volatile over the reference
period. In general, it has followed an upward trend. But the trend's path has been
characterized by frequent swings reflecting the fiuctuations observed in the price series
for imported coffee beans.
Figure 9.13 plots the average monthly real beef and cattle prices for the UK over the
period 1990.1-2000.12. As the plot dearly indicates, over the reference period, the prices
of beef and cattle have shown a general downward trend. But this downward trend has
been more prominent. for real cattle prices than for beef prices. The exceptions are the
sudden peaks observed in mid-1993 and during the first half of 1996 and the sudden dip
in the real producer price observed during the second half of 1998. The peak observed
during the first half of 19aG is associated with the announcement of the link between BSE
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Figure 9-12: The price spread: UK instant and green coffee bean prices, 1996.1-2000.8
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and new variant CJD. At the most preliminary level, the plot suggests that the retail
and producer price levels have co-moved over the reference period.
Figure 9.14 plot.s the ret.ail to producer price spread for UK beef. As the plot makes
evident., the ret.ail t.o producer price spread has generally shown a rising trend over
the reference period. This reflects the relatively rapid decline in real prices for cattle
observed for this period. The plot also shows that the widening of the spread has been
st.ep-wise mirroring the relative stability in the price series during 1990-1993 and the
general downward trend in the series afterwards.
Figure 9.15 plots the monthly averages of the UK real pork prices over the period,
1990.1-2000.12. The plot shows that over the reference period, the retail and producer
prices of pork have followed a downward trend. The exceptions are the spike observed
for both series in mid-199G and the dip observed in late 1998. But evidently, relative
to the trend observed for beef prices, the real prices for pork seem to have shown more
volatility. But judging from the plot, there is a strong suggestion that both the retail
and producer price series have moved together over time.
Figure 9.16 plots the retail to producer price spread for UK pork. The plot clearly
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Figure 9-13: UK retail and producer beef prices: 1990.1-2000.12
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Figure 9-15: UK retail and producer pork prices, 1990.1-2000.12
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indicates that, over the reference period, the spread for this meat category has been
volatile.
Figure 9.17 plots the monthly average real retail and producer lamb prices for the
UK over the period 1900.1-2000.12. As the plot clearly indicates, the lamb market is
characterized by frequent seasonal fluctuations. This reflects the fact that in this market
prices peak in the spring and plummet in the autumn. However, beginning in 1997, the
fiuctuation in the real producer price of lamb has followed a downward trend while that
in the real retail price has remained relatively stable. From the plot, however, there
seems to be an indication that, over the sample period, the price series have co-moved.
Figure 9.18 plots the retail to producer price spread for lamb meat over the reference
period. As illustrated by the plot, over the reference period, the price spread seems
to have exhibited fluctuations around a time trend. But clearly, the mean of the price
spread seems to have grown over the period around a time trend.
Figure 9.19 plots the average monthly retail and producer prices of chicken meat for
the UK over the period 1900.1-2000.12. As the plot clearly shows, while the producer
price has generally declined, the retail price has consistently remained volatile. But
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Figure 9-16: The price spread: UK pork prices, 1990.1-2000.12
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Figure 9-18: The price spread: UK lamb prices, 1990.1-2000.12
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beginning in the second half of 1996, while retail price levels have increased slightly, the
decline in producer price has been more dramatic. A cursory look at the plot shows that
the retail and producer price series have drifted apart over the sample period.
Figure 9.20 plots the retail to producer price spread for chicken meat over the refer-
ence period. While generally, the spread has been volatile, it has grown since mid-1996
reflecting the growth in retail price levels during this period. It is quite evident that over
the reference period the spread has trended upwards.
Figure 9.21 plots the monthly average series for UK crude oil and four-star petrol
prices over the period 1982.1-1995.12. As the plot makes evident, over the reference
period, both price series have been subject to severe short-term fluctuations (or volatil-
ities). Their behavior follows no set pattern. It rather varies for different time periods.
Evidently, the first five years witness a general upward trend in the price series while the
subsequent years witness mixed trends with the spike observed in the first half of 1990
and the sudden dip observed in the first half of 1986 being the exceptions. Despite these
peculiarities, the price series seem to have moved together over the reference period.
Figure 9.22 plots the retail to producer price spread for the UK four-star petrol over
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Figure 9-19: UK retail and producer chicken prices.
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Figure 9-21: UK crude and petrol prices, 1982.1-1995.12
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the reference period. As the plot clearly shows, the price spread for this industry has
trended upwards over the sample period in a step-wise fashion. This is an indication
that, over the sample period, the mean for the price spread has been variable.
9.4.1 Graphical description of data: a brief summary
As the graphical description has shown, apart from the price pairs for sugar and eggs,
the most important characteristic of all other price pairs seems to be the apparent co-
movement of the pairs. This might be a pointer to the potential existence of a co-
integrating relationship between each of the price series in the pairs. However, as we
will show in the following section, the fact that two price series have co-moved over time
does not mean that, by themselves, the price series co-integrate. In fact, the apparent
co-movement might have been due to variables which relate to each series independently
but about which we have no information available at the moment. Therefore the co-
movement suggested by the plots for many price pairs should not be taken for any guide
to inferences about. a co-integrating relationship between the price series in a pair as
the nature of this relationship can only be picked out by investigating the time series
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Figure 9-22: The price spread: UK oil prices, 1982.1-1995.12
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properties of the series. In the following section therefore, we undertake a formal test to
evaluate whether the above price pairs are co-integrated by themselves.
9.5 Time series properties of the price pairs
9.5.1 Stationarity
As has been pointed out elsewhere, the first step in the test for co-integration involves
the test for unit-roots in the levels of the price series. The test for unit-roots helps one
to evaluate whether, as they appear in their raw form, any two price pairs are stationary
or non-stationary. As is very well known, if the unit-root test confirms that the series
are stationary, then it follows that ordinary OLS estimation can be applied to establish
a relationship between the two series. However, this relationship is short run. If, on the
other hand, the test confirms that both price series are non-stationary, then whilst this
allows for a possible long run relationship the most appropriate tool to apply in such
circumstances is rather co-integration.
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In the following, we apply the Augmented Dickey-FUller (ADF) unit-root test to
evaluate whether the selected price pairs are stationary. The statistical package we use
to run this test is PcGive 9 (see Doornik and Hendry, 2000). Prior to undertaking this
test we select the most appropriate lag length using the Akaike information criterion
which is readily run by the statistical package. For all price series, we start from a lag
length of 13, which the package uses as a default for monthly series and then choose that
length of lag which corresponds to the smallest value of this information criterion. The
ADF regression relating to the price in levels includes a constant, a trend and seasonals
while such a regression for the differences includes a constant and seasonals but not a
trend. Table 9.1 summarizes the results for the choice of lag length and for a unit-root
test. Whereas double asterisk indicates rejection at the 99% significance, a single asterisk
indicates rejection at the 95% level of significance.
As results in Table 9.1 show, all prices are non-stationary 1(1) in levels while they
are stationary, 1(0) in first differences at the 1% significance level of the test. This
suggests that co-integration is the most appropriate tool for studying the nature of long-
run economic relationship between the price series in the selected pairs. As we have
explained elsewhere, if any two price pair are co-integrated by themselves, then this
means that, on grounds of the information provided by the price pair alone, and without
the need for any other information, one can establish a long-run economic relationship
between the series in the pair. If, on the other hand, one cannot establish a co-integrating
relationship between a price pair based on information provided by the price pair alone,
then this means that either the price pair do not co-integrate at all, or, if they do, they do
so in the presence of other relevant information. In this particular instance, the analyst
needs to look for a list of variables that are not only related to each of the price pair
independently but also are of the same degree of integration as the price pair themselves.
This is not an easy task unless the analyst has prior knowledge of this 'extra marital'
relationship between the price series and this other information.
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Price variable In levels Lag In first differences Lag Order of integration
raw milk -2.2384 6 -6.1024** 8 1(1)
cheese -2.1338 1 -5.1599** 0 1(1)
farm fresh fruits -2.3485 3 -9.5022** 2 1(1)
retail fresh fruits -2.4283 1 -8.9955** 0 1(1)
sugar beet -1.5011 0 -6.2450** 0 1(1)
granule sngar -2.4246 0 -3.0106* 1 1(1)
raw potato -1.8916 0 -10.211** 0 1(1)
retail potato -1.9299 1 -12.376** 0 1(1)
raw eggs -4.0054 11 -3.380* 12 1(1)
retail eggs -2.4554 3 -13.072* 0 1(1)
green coffee beans -4.0432 0 -6.6058** 0 1(1)
instant coffee -3.8995 0 -5.7063** 0 1(1)
farm beef -2.4051 1 -5.1256** 2 1(1)
retail beef -1.5549 0 -6.4519** 1 1(1)
farm pork -2.1955 1 -6.5742** 1 1(1)
retail pork -1.4470 0 -9.2744** 0 1(1)
farm lamb -1.5027 6 -6.9143** 5 1(1)
retail lamb -2.2695 3 -6.6684** 3 1(1)
farm chicken -2.1198 2 -4.7656** 1 1(1)
retail chicken -3.1534 10 -3.3720* 11 1(1)
crude oil -1.8066 4 -6.6761** 3 1(1)
petrol -2.4112 0 -11.262** 0 1(1)
Table 9.1: ADF Unit Root Tests: Assorted UK product prices,
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Table 9.2: C I I th VAR f UK b f 1990.1-2000.12ommon ag eng, : 0 ee prIces,
Common lag length SBC HQ AIC
0 10.668 10.335 10.107
1 5.5686 5.1802 4.9147
2 5.3545 4.9107 4.6072
3 5.4918 4.9925 4.6511
9.5.2 Co-integration test in the absence of shocks
As the above unit-root test results indicate, all the price series are non-stationary 1(1) in
levels. This suggests that co-integration is the most appropriate tool for investigating a
long-run economic relationship between a price pair. In the following therefore, we apply
the Johansen Maximum Likelihood test for co-integration to each of the 11 selected price
pairs and test whether, on grounds of information provided by the retail and producer
prices alone, one can establish a co-integrating relationship between prices in any pair.
This test is carried out on the basis of a multivariate Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model
in levels allowing for a constant, seasonal dummies but not for a time trend. Our rationale
for excluding the time trend from the VAR is to ensure that only information provided by
the retail and producer price information enter the VAR and not any other information
that can be proxicd by the time trend. It is possible that a deterministic trend term in
a VAR may proxy for omitted 1(1) variables and thereby lead to the conclusion that the
price pair arc co-integrated by themselves when they are not.
The UK beef price pair
As we have pointed out earlier, the test for co-integration between a price pair requires
that a common lag length be identified for the VAR of prices. As Table 9.2 shows, on
counts of the snc, HQ and AIC selection criteria, the most appropriate lag length chosen
for the UK VAR of beef price pair is 2. This is because, as perusal of the results reveals,
the selected information criteria attain their smallest value for 2 lags.
To ensure that the chosen lag length produces vector error terms that are white noise,
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Table 9.3: Serial correlation test: VAR of UK beef prices, 1990.1-2000 12
Common lag length Test for serial correlation, ChP'2(4), AR 1-1
2 2.49 [0.6464]
Table 9.4: C . t ti t t VAR f UK b f 1990.1-2000.12o-m .egra .ion es ,: 0 ee pnces,
Ho: rank=p Atrace 95% Amax 95%
p=o=Il 9.667 15.4 9.245 14.1
p<=1 0.4226 3.8 0.4226 3.8
we next test the VAR errors for serial correlation. The results are presented in Table
9.3. Clearly, the null hypothesis of no serial correlation cannot be rejected for a VAR
with a common lag length of 2. This is because for the given lag length the probability
with which the null can be accepted is reasonably high. Hence, a VAR(2) is a congruent
approximation of the data and we perform the test for co-integration on this basis.
Table 9.4 summarizes the co-integration test results. Clearly, on grounds of our VAR
specification for this pair, the null hypothesis of no co-integration cannot be rejected in
favor of the alternative of co-integration on counts of both Atrace and Amax statistics This
implies that given information provided by the price pair alone, no long-run economic
relationship can be established for this pair.
The UK pork price pair Table 9.5 presents the results for the choice of common
lag length for the VAR of UK pork price pair on the basis of our selected information
criteria. As the results clearly show, the SOC and HQ criteria choose 2 lags. But the
AlC chooses 3 lags.
To evaluate whether the chosen lag lengths produce VAR error terms that are white
Table 9.5: C th VAR fUK k 1990.1-2000.12ommon ag eng" : 0 por pnces,
Common lag length SBC HQ AlC
0 10.139 9.8059 9.5783
1 4.6316 4.2432 3.9777
2 4.5969 4.1530 3.8496
3 4.6816 4.1823 3.8409
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Table 9.6: Serial correlation test: VAR of UK pork prices, 1990.1-2000.12
Common lag length Test for serial correlation, Chi.A.2(4), AR 1-1
2 4.4076 [0.3536]
3 3.3118 [0.5071]
Table 9.7: C . to-m .egra .ion es: 0 por pnees,
Ho: rank=p >'trace 95% >'max 95%
p=s=Il 30.53** 15.4 27.13** 14.1
p<=l 3.402 3.8 3.402 3.8
t t t VAR f UK k 1990.1-2000.12
noise, we undertake a diagnostic test for serial correlation for each chosen lag length. The
results are summarized in Table 9.6. Evidently, for both lag lengths, the null hypothesis
of no serial correlation cannot be rejected. However, the probability of accepting the null
when it is true is greater for a lag length of 3 than that for a lag length of 2. We therefore
undertake the co-integration test based on a lag length of 25•
The co-integration test results are presented in Table 9.7. As the >'trace and >'max
statistics clearly show, for the pork price pair, the null hypothesis of no-eo-integration is
rejected at 1% significance in favor of the alternative of co-integration. Furthermore, the
null of a single co-integrating vector against the alternative of more than one such vector
cannot be rejected. This suggests that on the basis of information provided by this price
pair alone, and without recourse to any other information, one can establish a long-run
economic relationship for this pair.
The UK lamb price pair Table 9.8 presents results for the choice of a common lag
length for t.he VAn of UK Iamb price pair based on the aforementioned information
criteria. As a look at tho results reveals, the SI3C chooses 2 lags while the HQ and AIC
choose 3 lags.
To sec whether choice of these lag lengths is supported by the data, we undertake a
diagnostic test for serial correlation for different lags. The test results are summarized in
Table 9.9. As the results dearly show, the null hypothesis of no serial correlation is not
5A lag length of 2 also confirms a co-integrating relation between the pair.
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Table 9.8: Common lag length: VAR of UK lamb prices 1990.1-2000.12,
Common lag length SBC HQ AIC
0 13.542 13.209 12.981
1 9.5792 9.1908 8.9253
2 9.1829 8.7390 8.4356
3 9.2221 8.7227 8.3813
4 9.3713 8.8165 8.4372
Table 9.9: Serial correlation test: VAR of UK lamb prices, 1990.1-2000.12
Common lag length Test for serial correlation, ChiA2(4), AR 1-1
2 4.4076 [0.3536]
3 2.6249 [0.6224]
rejected for the lag lengths selected by the information criteria. But the probability of
accepting the null when it is true is higher for a lag length of 3 than it is for a lag length
of 2. On this count, we proceed to test for cointegration assuming a common lag length
of 3, VAR(3). 6. The test results are presented in Table 9.10.
As the results clearly show, for the lamb price pair, the null hypothesis of no co-
integration cannot be rejected for the chosen VAR specification against the alternative of
co-integration. This suggests that, as they stand now, the price pair do not co-integrate.
This implies that on counts of information provided by the price pair alone, it is not
possible to establish a long-run economic relation for the price pair. This might imply
that the price series in the pair do not co-integrate at all, or, if they do, they do on the
proviso that other relevant information are provided.
6Running the test on the basis of a lag length of two does not produce a a co-integrating relation
either.
Table 9.10: Co-integration test: 0 am pnces,
110: rank=p Atrace 95% Amax 95%
p==O 8.369 15.4 5.299 14.1
p<=l 3.07 3.8 3.07 3.8
VAR fUK I b 1990.1-2000.12
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Table 9.11: C 1 th VAR f UK h' k 1990.1-2000.12ommon ag engl : 0 c IC en pnces,
Common lag length SBC HQ AIC
0 10.452 10.119 9.8914
1 5.7119 5.3236 5.0580
2 5.5120 5.0682 4.7647
3 5.5730 5.0737 4.7323
4 5.6253 5.0705 4.6911
Table 9.12: Serial correlation test: VAR of UK chicken prices, 1990.1-2000.12
Common lag length Test for serial correlation, ChiJ..2(4), AR 1-1
2 8.6603 [0.0702]
4 6.2771 [0.1794]
The UK chicken price pair Table 9.11 presents the choice of common lag length for
the VAR of UK chicken price pair on the basis of the above information criteria. As the
results clearly show, while the SBC and HQ choose 2 lags, the AIC chooses 4 lags.
To sce whether t.he choice of common lag length on counts of both categories of
information criteria is admitted by the data, we run a diagnostic test for serial correlation
assuming different lags. The test results are presented in Table 9.12. As the table clearly
shows, the null hypot.hesis of no-serial correlation cannot be rejected for both choices of
lag length. However, the probability of accepting the null when it is true is higher for a lag
length of 4 than it is for a lag lengt.h of 2. On counts of a higher probability of acceptance
of the null of no serial correlation therefore we conduct the test for cointegration assuming
a common lag length of 4 .
Table 9.13 presents the co-integration test results for the chicken price pair. As the
results clearly show, the nnll hypothesis of no co-integration cannot be rejected against
the alternative of co-integration. This means that, as they stand now, the chicken price
pair are not co-integrated. This suggests that either the price pair do not co-integrate
inherently, or, if they do, they do so conditional on the availability of other relevant vari-
ables that arc related to each of the prices in the pair independently. Hence, on grounds
of information provided by the price pair alone, no long-run economic relationship can
be established for tho pair.
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Table 9.13: Co-integration test: VAR of UK chicken prices, 1990.1-2000.12
Ho: rank=p Atrace 95% Amax 95%
p==O 14.8 15.4 14.08 14.1
p<=1 0.719 3.8 0.719 3.8
Table 9.14: Common lag length: VAR of UK fresh fruit prices, 1988.1-1998.12
Common lag length SBC HQ AIC
0 10.813 10.480 10.253
1 8.3496 7.9612 7.6956
2 8.4024 7.9585 7.6550
3 8.5003 8.0009 7.6595
The UK fresh fruits price pair Table 9.14 presents results for the choice of a common
lag length for the VAR of UK fruit price pair on counts of information criteria. As the
results clearly indicate, on counts of HQ and AIC, the chosen common lag length is 2
while on counts of SBC the chosen lag length is 1.
To evaluate whether the lag lengths chosen on the basis of the two information criteria
are admitted by the data, we conduct a diagnostic test for serial correlation corresponding
to each choice. The results are presented in Table 9.15. As the results clearly indicate,
the null hypothesis of no serial correlation cannot be rejected for both lag lengths against
the alternative of serial correlation. But evidently, the probability of accepting the null
when it is true is smaller for 2 lags than it is for 1 lag. On this ground therefore we
undertake the test for co-integration assuming a common lag length for the VAR of 1.
Table 9.16 presents the co-integration test results for this price pair. The results show
that at the 1% significance level, the null of no co-integration is rejected in favor of co-
integration on counts of both the Atrace and Amax statistics. On the other hand, the null
of a single co-integration vector against the alternative of more than one co-integration
Table S . I It' t t VAR f UK f h f .t 1988 1 1998.129.15: cna corre a .ion .es .: 0 res rui pnces, -
Common lag length Test for serial correlation, ChiA2(4), AR 1-1
1 8.0186 [0.0909]
2 8.692 [0.0693]
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Table 9.16: Co-integration test: VAR of UK fresh fruit prices 1988.1-1998.12,
Ho: rank=p Atrace 95% Amax 95%
p==O 37.57** 15.4 33.72** 14.1
p<=1 4.357 3.8 4.425 3.8
Table 9.17: Common lag length: VAR of UK potato prices 1988.1-1998.12,
Common lag length SBC HQ AIC
0 13.300 12.968 12.740
1 10.605 10.216 9.9506
2 10.661 10.217 9.9136
3 10.816 10.316 9.9748
vector is not rejected. This implies that the price pair for fresh fruit the information
provided by the price pair is enough to establish a long-run economic relationship for the
pair.
The UK potato price pair Table 9.17 presents the choice of common length for the
VAR of UK potato price pair based on the three information criteria. As the results
clearly show, the snc and HQ select a common lag length of 1 while the AIC selects a
common lag length of 2. To see if the lag lengths suggested by the information criteria
produce vector error terms that are white noise, we undertake a diagnostic test for serial
correlation for the respective lag lengths.
The test results are presented in Table 9.18. As the results clearly show, even though
the null hypothesis of no serial correlation cannot be rejected for both lag lengths, the
probability with which the null is accepted is higher for 2 lags than it is for 1 lag. On
counts of a higher probability of rejecting the null of no serial correlation therefore we
undertake the test for cointegration between the pair assuming a common lag length of
27.
Table 9.19 summarizes the co-integration test results for the potato price pair. As
the test results show, the null hypothesis of no co-integration between the potato price
7A lag length of 1 also produces a co-integrating relation between the price pair.
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Table 9.18: Serial correlation test: VAR of UK potato prices, 1988.1-1998.12
Common lag length Test for serial correlation, Chp·2(4), AR 1-1
1 5.7058 [0.2222]
2 4.7658 [0.3122]
Table 9.19: C . t ti t t VAR f UK t t 1988.1-1998.12o-m .egra ,IOn es : 0 po a 0 pnces,
Ho: rank=p Atrace 95% Amax 95%
p=e=O 27.35** 15.4 25.44** 14.1
p<=1 1.912 3.8 1.912 3.8
pair is rejected against the alternative of co-integration. On the other hand, the null
of a single co-integrating relation between the pair cannot be rejected in favor of more
than one co-integrating vector. This suggests that as they stand now, the potato price
pair are co-integrated. This implies that on counts of information provided by the price
pair alone, and without recourse to any other information, it is possible to establish a
long-run economic relationship for the pair.
UK milk price pair Table 19.20 presents results for the choice of lag length for the
VAR of UK milk price pair based on information criteria. Clearly, all the information
criteria choose a common lag length of2. To see whether the chosen lag length is admitted
by the data, we conduct a diagnostic test to check for serial correlation in the vector error
terms.
The test results are presented in Table 9.21. Clearly, for a lag length of 2, the null
hypothesis of no serial correlation cannot be rejected. And given this lag length, the
probability with which the null cannot be rejected is quite high. This suggests that for
Table 9.20: Choi f I th VAR f UK ilk 1995.1-2000.12ICC 0 common ag eng : 0 rm pnces,
Common lag length SBC HQ AIC
0 3.5103 3.0919 2.8109
1 -1.6332 -2.1214 -2.4492
2 -1.7029 -2.2609 -2.6355
3 -1.5307 -2.1584 -2.5798
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Table 9.21: Serial correlation test: VAR of UK milk prices, 1995.1-2000.12
Common lag length Test for serial correlation, ChiA2(4), AR 1-1
2 3.0755(0.5453)
Table 9.22: Co-integration test: VAR of UK milk prices, 1995.1-2000.12
Ho: rank=p Atrace 95% Amax 95%
p==O 21.88** 15.4 20.95** 14.1
p<=1 0.9265 3.8 0.9265 3.8
2 lags, the vector error terms are white noise. The test for co-integration between the
milk price pair is thus based on the assumption of 2 lags for the VAR.
Table 9.22 presents the co-integration test results for the milk price pair. As the
results show, the null hypothesis of no co-integration can be rejected in favor of the
alternative of co-integration at the 1% significance level. This implies that, as they stand
now, the milk price pair are co-integrated. This suggests that, given information provided
by the price pair alone, it is possible to establish a long-run economic relation for the
pair.
The UK egg price pair Table 9.23 presents results for the choice of lag length for
formulating the VAR of UK egg price pair using the three information criteria. As
the results clearly show, all three information criteria choose a common lag length of
2 for the VAR. Having chosen a common lag length for the VAR, the next step is to
evaluate whether this choice is compatible with white noise vector errors. To this end,
we undertake a diagnostic test for serial correlation of the vector errors.
The test results are presented in Table 9.24. As the results clearly show, the null
Table 9.23: Common ag engt : 0 egg pnces,
Common lag length SBC HQ AIC
0 11.375 11.043 10.815
1 5.4220 5.0336 4.7681
2 5.3194 4.8755 4.5721
3 5.4288 4.9294 4.5880
1 h VAR fUK 1988.1-1998.12
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Tabl 924 S '1e erai corre a ,IOn es: 0 egg;pnces,
-
Common lag length Test for serial correlation, Chi.A.2,AR 1-1
2 3.8292 [0.4296]
1 ti t t VAR f UK 1988 1 1998.12
Table 9.25 C .o-integration test: 0 egg pnces, 19
Ho: rank=p Atrace 95% Amax 95%
p=e=O 8.574 15.4 8.514 14.1
p<=1 0.05959 3.8 0.05959 3.8
VAR fUK 94.1-1999.7
hypothesis of serial correlation cannot be rejected for the vector errors assuming 2 lags.
Indeed, the probability of not rejecting the null seems to be very high for this choice of
lag. This suggests that VAR(2) is a good approximation of the data. In undertaking a
co-integration test for this pair therefore a lag length of 2 is assumed.
Table 9.25 summarizes the co-integration test results for the egg price pair. As the
results clearly indicate, the null hypothesis of no co-integration cannot be rejected in favor
of the alternative of co-integration. This suggests that, as they stand now, the price pair
do not co-integrate. This might be either because the price pair do not co-integrate at all
or there are factors that relate to each of the prices in the pair independently but which
are not included in the VAR. Therefore it appears that on counts of information provided
by the price pair alone, it is not possible to establish a long-run economic relationship
between the pair.
The UK sugar price pair Table 9.26 summarizes results for the choice of lag length
for the VAR of UK sugar price pair based on the three information selection criteria. As
the results clearly show, on counts of the three information criteria, the most appropriate
common lag length chosen for the VAR is 1. To ensure that this choice of lag length is
admitted by the data, we run a diagnostic test for serial correlation in the vector errors.
Table 9.27 summarizes the diagnostic test results. As the results clearly show, the
null hypothesis of no serial correlat.ion in the VAR errors cannot be rejected for the given
lag length. We therefore undertake our test for co-integration assuming 1 common lag
for the VAR.
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Table 9.26: Common lag length: VAR of UK sugar prices, 1994.1-1999.7
Common lag length SBC HQ AIC
0 10.060 9.5168 9.1759
1 5.1100 4.4764 4.0787
2 5.3355 4.6114 4.1569
Tabl 927 S . Ie . ena correa Ion es ,: 0 sugar pnces,
-
Common lag length Test for serial correlation, ChiJ..2,AR 1-1
1 6.9716 [0.1374]
It' t t VAR f UK 1994 1 1999.7
Table 9.28 summarizes the co-integration test results for the UK sugar price pair.
As the results clearly show, for the chosen lag, the null hypothesis of no co-integration
cannot be rejected for the price pair. This suggests that, as they stand now, the price
pair are not co-integrated. The explanation might be that either the price series in the
pair do not co-integrate at all, or, if and when they do, they do because of the presence of
other variables, which, being integrated of the same order as the price series themselves
relate to each series independently. The implication of this result is that on counts of the
informat.ion provided by the price pair alone, a long-run economic relationship cannot be
established for the pair.
The UK oil price pair Table 9.29 summarizes results for the choice of a common
lag length for the VAR of UK oil price pair based on the three information crit.eria.
The results show that two of the information criteria, i.e., the SBC and HQ choose a
maximum lag length of 2 for the VAR while the AIC information criterion chooses a lag
length of 3. To see whether these lag lengths are congruent with the data, we undertake
a diagnostic test for serial correlation in the vector errors.
Table 9.30 presents these diagnostic test results. As the results clearly show, the null
Table 9.28: Co-' t ti t t VAR f UK 1994.1-1999.7III .egra ,IOn es .: 0 sugar pnces,
Ho: rank=p Atrace 95% Amax 95%
p==o 13.21 15.4 10.64 14.1
p<=l 2.569 3.8 2.569 3.8
304
Table 9.29' Common lag length' VAR of UK oil prices 1982.1-1995.6,
Common lag length SBC HQ AIC
0 -15.219 -15.506 -15.703
1 -18.977 -19.312 -19.542
2 -19.111 -19.494 -19.757
3 -19.052 -19.483 -19.778
Tabl 930 S . 1 It' ttVARfUK'1 19821 19 5.6e ena corre a Ion es : 0 01 prices,
-
9
Common lag length Test for serial correlation, Chi.A.2,AR 1-1
2 13.767 [0.0081] **
3 3.1317 [0.5360]
hypothesis of no serial correlation in the vector errors is rejected for a lag length of 2
while it is not for a lag length of 3. This suggests that a lag length of 3 for the VAR is a
better approximation of the data. When conducting the test for co-integration therefore
we assume a common lag length of 3 for the VAR.
Table 9.31 summarizes the co-integration test results for the oil price pair. On counts
of the Atrace statistic, , the null hypothesis of no co-integration is rejected in favor of
the alternative of at least a single cointegration for the pair at the 5% significance.
However, on counts of the Amax, the null of no cointegration cannot be rejected in favor of
the alternative of a single cointegration. This apparent contradiction is not uncommon
in cointegration analysis and should not be cause for concern since the Atrace statistic
accepts the null of a single cointegration vector against the alternative of two cointegrating
vectors. Therefore one should take the results as suggesting that, as they stand now, the
oil price pair are cointegrated. This means that on the basis of information provided by
the pair alone, one can establish a long-run economic relationship between the price pair.
Table 9.31: C .o-integra Ion es : 0 01 prices,
lIo: rarik=p Atrace 95% Amax 95%
p==o 17.41* 15.4 14.0 14.1
p<=l 3.403 3.8 3.403 3.8
ti t t VAR f UK '1 1982.1-1995.6
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Table 9.32: C th VAR f UK it 1996.1-2000.8ommon ag engi : 0 co ee prices,
Common lag length SBC HQ AIC
0 11.398 10.860 10.522
1 7.9121 7.2853 6.8902
2 8.1544 7.4381 6.9865
13 8.7981 7.0970 6.0244
Tabl 933 S . Ie ena corre a Ion es: 0 co ee prices,
-
Common lag length Test for serial correlation, ChiA2, AR 1-1
1 3.1006 [0.5411]
13 9.7557 [0.0448]*
l ti t t VAR f UK ff 1996 1 2000.8
The UK coffee price pair Table 9.32 presents results for the choice of a common lag
length for the VAR of the UK coffee price pair based on the three information criteria.
As the results clearly show, two of the information criteria, i.e., the HQ and the AIC
select a common lag length of 13 while the SBC selects a common lag length of 1. To
see whether these lag lengths are supported by the data, we conduct a diagnostic test for
serial correlation in the vector errors assuming lags of 1 and 13.
Table 9.33 summarizes the diagnostic test results. As a cursory look at the results
reveals, while the null of no serial correlation in the vector errors cannot be rejected by
the data for a lag length of 1, such is rejected for a lag length of 13. This suggests that the
choice of VAR(I) is more congruent with the data. In testing for co-integration between
the series in the price pair therefore we assume a lag length of 1.
Table 9.34 summarizes the co-integration test results for the coffee price pair. As
the results clearly indicate, the null of no co-integration against the alternative of co-
integration between the series cannot be rejected. This suggests that, by themselves,
the UK instant and imported coffee bean prices do not co-integrate. The implication
is that, on the basis of information provided by the price pair alone, no meaningful
long-run economic relation can be established. But this should not be taken to mean
that, inherently, the price pair do not co-integrate. However, if at all any evidence of
co-integration can be established, then, it can be established with the availability of
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Table 9.34: Co-i t ti t t VAR f UK ff 1996.1-2000.8III egra Ion es : 0 co ee pnces,
Ho: rank=p >'trace 95% >'max 95%
p==O 12.44 15.4 10.81 14.1
p<=1 1.632 3.8 1.632 3.8
information about variables that are not only integrated of the same order as the price
series themselves but also are independently related to each of the price pair.
Summary
The foregoing analysis of the time series properties of the selected price pairs brings
out two major characteristics. The first major characteristic is that all price pairs are
non-stationary in the levels and stationary in their first differences. The second major
important characteristic that has been brought out is that, of the 11 selected price pairs,
in only 5 pairs, namely, potato, fresh fruits, milk pork and oil do we find co-integration
on the basis of information provided by the price pairs alone. For the remaining 6 pairs,
namely, sugar, coffee, eggs, beef, lamb and chicken, we find no co-integration given the
price information at hand. For the latter category of price pairs, the explanation for the
absence of co-integrat.ion might be that either the price pairs do not co-integrate at all,
or if they do, they do with the inclusion in the VAR of several other variables which not
only relate independently to each of the price series in the pair, but also are of the same
degree of integration as the price series themselves.
As might be recalled, the theoretical price transmission models predict that, given
only information provided by a pair of prices in a vertical market, co-integration arises as a
special case rather than in general. Apart from the assumptions of perfectly competitive
markets and constant returns to scale, these models predict that it arises under the
assumption of an industry whereby the cost share of the farm input is unity. Given these
restrictive assumptions, it follows that co-integration arises when the average price spread
remains constant over times. This being the case, it might be of interest to know whether
8Recalling from chapter 2, for a retail shock, the price spread in a perfectly competitive industry
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the price pairs for which we have found co-integration based on the price information at
hand have been characterized by an average constant spread over the sample period.
Evaluating whether the mean of the spread has remained constant over time is tanta-
mount to evaluating whether the spread has been stationary in the levels. In the following
therefore we apply the ADF unit-root test to the retail to producer price spread corre-
sponding to each of the 11 price pairs. We then see whether the null of non-stationarity
for the spread in levels can be rejected for the 5 price pairs for which we have found
co-integration using the FIML procedure and cannot be rejected for the remaining 6
price pairs for which we have not found co-integration using the same procedure. The
regression used to test for stationarity includes unrestricted constant and seasonals but
not a trend term. The exclusion of the trend term from the regression is done with the
view to controlling for the effects of non-price information.
Table 9.35 summarizes the ADF unit-root test results. As the results clearly show,
at reasonable significance levels, the null of a unit-root (non-stationarity) in the price
spread can be rejected for fresh fruits, for potato, for milk and for oil while it cannot
be rejected for the remaining 7 price pairs. This suggests that, on counts of the ADF
unit-root test, it is only for these price pairs that we can establish co-integration given
information provided by the pairs alone.
Evidently, for 4 price pairs, i.e., for fresh fruits, potato, milk and oil we find co-
integration both on counts of the FIML procedure and on counts of the ADF unit-root
test. It is quite striking that fresh fruits and potatoes are products which are sold in
supermarkets as they appear in their raw form. Therefore it is reasonable to expect the
cost of processing for these products to be minimal, and, consequently, the cost share of
the farm input in total industry cost to be very high.
However, we find one anomalous result. This relates to the pork price pair. Whereas,
operating with constant returns to scale is given by:
dP; -dP; IdN= 'lW""t"-"',), which, for Bb = 0, equals zero, implying a constant spread. On the other
hand, for a primary input shock, the price spread, given these assumptions is given by:
d.P: dp· I - _f'U'f'"I'L8b which again for Sb - 0 equals zero
:7J - a dW- D" - , .
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Table 9.35: ADF unit-root test on the price spread, UK food and oil prices
Price spread constant and seasonals
milk -3.2970 (1)*
fresh fruits -5.2218** (0)
sugar
-1.5164 (0)
potato
-5.2019** (0)
eggs 0.11514 (0)
coffee -0.63873 (0)
beef -1.1577 (12)
pork -2.7340 (1)
lamb -0.58906 (7)
chicken -0.82964 (10)
oil -3.3071** (0)
on counts of the FIML procedure, we find co-integration for this pair, on counts of the
ADF unit-root test, we do not find co-integration.
In general, from the above analysis, it appears that for 10 price pairs out of 11,
i.e., with the exception of the pork price pairs, the ADF and Johansen co-integration
test results seem to reinforce each other to support the inferences made by our theory
regarding a co-integrating relation between a price pair. However, for the pork price
pair, the Johansen and ADF co-integration test results are at variance suggesting that,
for this product, the validity of our a priori inferences cannot be evaluated.
9.5.3 Cointegration test in the presence of shocks
As might be recalled, in the preceding we have established that on the basis of information
related to the price pair alone, one is not able to establish a cointegrating relationship
between the price pairs for UK beef, lamb, chicken, eggs, coffee, sugar and pork. Given
that the theoretical models of price transmission point to the importance of shocks, this
might. be more a sign of misspecification of the cointegration equation than the lack
of cointegration between the pairs as such. As our review of the literature has shown,
changes in prices in different sectors of the vertical market are spurred by a combination of
sudden shocks which st.rike these sectors. Intuitively, therefore, the lack of cointegration
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between the price pairs for the above products could possibly have resulted from the
ommission of these shocks from the cointegration regression. To see if this is indeed
the case, we re-run, in keeping with the suggestion of economic theory, the cointegration
regression for each product allowing for sector shocks which originate in the retail, supply
and marketing sectors. Prior to proceeding with this, however, we briefly discuss the
exogenous shocks that we have chosen as proxy for each product. This is a task we turn
to next.
The retail (demand) shock
For the meat products, the demand shock is proxied by the natural logarithm of cumu-
lative UK monthly counts of meat scares (Lnlvl.scare) spanning over the period, 1985.1-
2003.12. These series are obtained from Euro PA Associates and represent the number of
articles in the press (Times, Sunday Times, Guardian, Observer) relating to meat scares.
Prior to Nov 96 these represent ESE related articles even though a small number of abat-
toir hygiene art.icles occur in the pre-1990 period. After Nov 1996, the index includes
articles relating to e-coli, abattoir hygiene etc. As Lloyd et al.. (2003) have pointed out,
the choice of this index as a proxy for a demand-side shock is justified by consumers'
over-reaction to potential health risks associated with commercial food in general and
meat-based food in particular.
For all non-meat product prices, the demand shock is proxied by the UK monthly
food retail price index (FRPI) spanning the period, 1987.1 -2003.12 (1987=100). The
index is sourced from the ONS Monthly Digest of Statistics. Our choice of this index
to proxy for a demand-side shock for all other products is based on our intuition that
exogenous factors such as a change in income and population size, few among others,
put pressure on the general level of food prices by affecting the level of demand for food
products.
Figures 9.23 and 9.24 plot the natural logarithm of monthly counts of meat scares
and the monthly food retail price indices respectively.
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Figure 9-23: Natural logarithm of cumulative monthly counts of meat scares, 1985.1-
2003.12
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Figure 9-24: UK monthly Food Retail Price Index (FRPI), 1987.1- 2003.12
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Figure 9-25: UK monthly index of the purchase prices of the means of agricultural
production, 1989.1 - 2003.12
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The supply shock
With respect to all agricultural products (except for coffee), the supply shock (SS..shok)
is proxied by the UK monthly index of the purchase prices of the means of agricultural
production as correspond to the category "Goods and services currently consumed".
Spanning over the period 1989.1 - 2003.12, they are obtained from the DEFRA website.
The intuition for our choice of this index as a proxy for supply-side shock is based on the
observation that, for most agricultural products that are produced domestically, input
costs (e.g., fertilizer, chemicals, etc.) make up a substantial proportion of their farm-gate
prices. Therefore we expect any sudden change in the level of an index which measures
input costs to feed through to changes in the farm gate prices of these products. Figure
9.25 presents a plot of the series over the reference period.
For coffee, the supply shock is proxied by the natural log of the monthly UK Stirling-
US dollar exchange rate (abbreviated hereafter LnDSE). This series is obtained from
the ONS and spans the period 1993.1-2003.12. The reason we use the Stirling-dollar
exchange rate as a supply shock for this product in place of the monthly index of the
purchase prices of the means of agricultural production, as we did for the other non-meat
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Figure 9-26: Log of monthly Stirling-US dollar exchange rate, 1993.1-2003.12
products, is because green coffee beans are imported rather than produced domestically.
This means that green coffee bean price is more likely to be prone to fluctuations in the
Stirling-dollar exchange rate than to fluctuations in the cost of the means of agricultural
production in the UK. Figure 9.26 plots the series over the reference period
The marketing shock
For all products, the marketing shock (Mcshok) is proxied by the seasonally adjusted
monthly unit wage cost index for UK manufacturing (2000=100) as sourced from the
ONS. As pointed out earlier, the cost of marketing input is an amalgam of several costs
of processing raw agricultural inputs for many of which publicly available information
is scant. nut, without doubt, changes in the general level of unit wage costs in the
manufacturing industry affect directly the industry processing costs which in turn affect
the level of retail prices. Figure 9.27 plots the secular trend of these series spanning the
period, 1987.1 - 2003.12.
As eyeballing of the plots in Figures 9.23-9.27 suggests, except for the supply shocks,
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Figure 9-27: Seasonally adjusted monthly unit wage cost index for UK manufacturing
(2000=100), 1987.1- 2003.12
Table 9.36: ADF unit-root test: retail, supply and marketing shocks for UK agricultural
produ t .c .s, vanous years
Variable Level lag First-difference lag Order of integration
Meat scares -1.0678 1 -10.482** 0 1(1)
FRPI -2.1478 0 -12.888** 0 1(1)
SS..shok -2.0681 2 -10.360** 1 1(1)
Mishok -0.9413 1 -22.160** 0 1(1)
DSE -1.914 0 -9.104** 0 1(1)
the demand and marketing shocks seem to show a persistent upward trend. This per-
sistent trend is obviously a rough indication that, as they stand now, the series are
non-stationary. To see if this is the case, we subject these shocks to a formal ADF
unit-root test. Table 9.36 presents the test results.
As the results dearly show, whereas the null of a unit root in the levels is not rejected,
the hypothesis of a unit-root in first-differences is rejected at the 1% significance level
as denoted by the double asterisk. This points to all shocks being non-stationary 1(1) in
levels and stationary 1(0) in first-differences. This suggests that re-running the cointe-
gration regressions for the above product price pairs, for which we have not established
cointegration on price information alone, allowing for these shocks is admissible as all
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these product pairs are also non-stationary 1(1).
In the literature, there are two approaches regarding the conduct of a cointegration
test allowing for 1(1) random variables. The first is one advocated by Johansen (1995)
which requires that all 1(1) random variables enter the cointegrating space as potentially
endogenous. This means, any cointegrating vectors present appear in the vector error
correction model for each of the variables and the error terms for each such variable are
correlated with those in the rest of the system. The second approach is that advocated
by Pesaran et al.. (2000) and regards a subset of random variables which are integrated
of order one 1(1) as structurally exogenous (or as forcing variables). This means that
any cointegrating vectors present do not appear in the sub-system vector error correction
model (VECM) for these exogenous variables and the error terms in this sub-system
are uncorrelated with those in the rest of the system. While the former approach gives
the analyst no room for subjective judgement regarding the treatment of 1(1) random
variables, the second approach gives the analyst such a room for subjective judgement.
In other words, in the former approach exogeneity of the variables has to be tested for,
whereas in the latter it is rather assumed.
Even though intuitively, considering certain 1(1) variables, such as the ones we have
just described above, might be appealing, on consideration of the lack of adequate infor-
mation regarding the nature of their relation with the individual product prices, treat-
ment of these variables as potentially endogenous is more appealing. In re-running the
cointegration regression for each price pair allowing for shocks, therefore, we adopt the
approach advocated by Johansen. Accordingly, we implement his Maximum Likelihood
cointegration test whereby we enter all the 1(1) price variables and shocks into the VAR
as potentially endogenous allowing for unrestricted constant, seasonal dummies but not
for a time trend. Our exclusion of the trend term from the VAR is premised on the
intuition that the shocks will already have taken care of its role.
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Table 9.37: Co-integration test: VAR of UK beef prices inclusive of retail, supply and
marketing shocks 1990.1-2000.12
rank Atrace Amax
p==O 70.28* 30.88
p<=1 39.4 23.27
p<=2 16.13 8.237
p<=3 7.896 4.845
p<=4 3.05 3.05
VAR of UK beef prices inclusive of retail, supply and marketing shocks
To test whether the UK price pair cointegrate in the presence of shocks, we first choose a
common lag length for the VAR using information criteria. We find that all information
criteria choose a common lag of 2 for which the vector errors are white noise. Based
on this common lag, we then undertake a cointegration test. Table 9.37 summarizes the
cointegration test results.
As Table 9.37 makes evident, the Atrace statistic rejects the null hypothesis of no
cointegration in favor of at least a single cointegrating vector at the 5% significance. The
Amax statistic, on the other hand, fails to reject the null of no cointegration in favor of a
single cointegrating vector. Evidently, however, both statistics do not reject the null of a
single cointegrating vector in favor of the alternative of more than one such cointegrating
vector. Despite the inconsistency of the "'max, we take this result as suggesting that there
is a single cointegrating vector in the VAR of the UK beef prices and the three shocks.
Indeed, a visual inspection of the plot of the cointegration vector, as shown in Figure
9.28 seems to confirm this".
This means that whereas, previously, in the absence of shocks in the cointegration
regression we could not identify a cointegrating relation between the price pair, now, in
their presence we can identify a unique cointegrating relation with a meaningful economic
interpretation.
9Forcing the constant term to enter the cointegrating space as restricted contributes to the identifi-
cation of cointegration even on counts of the ).max statsitc. But results are not reported here.
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Figure 9-28: Time series of cointegration vector, corrected for short-run dynamics, VAR
of UK beef prices inclusive of retail, supply and marketing shocks, 1990.1-2000.12.
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Table 9.38: Co-integration test: VAR of UK lamb prices inclusive of retail, supply and
marketing shocks 1990.1-2000.12
rank Atrace (prob) Amax(prob)
p==O 109.4** 63.28**
p<=1 46.17 22
p<=2 24.17 14.69
p<=3 9.478 5.682
p<=4 3.796 3.796
VAR of UK lamb prices inclusive of retail, supply and marketing shocks
Prior to testing whether the UK lamb price pair cointegrate in the presence of the three
exogenous shocks, we first choose a common lag length for the VAR. Using information
criteria and applying a test for serial correlation of the vector errors, we choose a common
lag of 3. On this basis, we test if we can detect any cointegrating relationship between
the price pair. Table 9.38 presents the test results.
As the test results show, both the Atrace and Amaxstatistics reject the null of no
cointegration in favor of at least a single cointegration at 1% significance. Indeed, as
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Figure 9-29: Time series of cointegration vector, corrected for short-run dynamics, VAR
of UK lamb prices inclusive of retail, supply and marketing shocks, 1990.1-2000.12.
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both statistics show, the null of a single cointegrating vector cannot be rejected in favor
of at least two coint.egrating vect.ors Thus, clearly, the results suggest that there is a
single cointegrating vector in the VAR of UK lamb prices and t.hree shocks. As a cursory
look at Figure 9.29 reveals, this seems to be confirmed by the plot of the vector errors
which fluctuate around a zero mean. This means that whereas, previously, in the absence
of shocks in the coint.egration regression we could not identify a cointegrating relation
between the lamb price pair, now, in their presence we can identify a unique cointegrating
relation.
VAR of UK chicken prices inclusive of retail, supply and marketing shocks
The test for cointegration between the UK chicken price pair in the presence of the
three shocks proceeds on the basis of a common lag length of 2 which we have chosen
using information criteria and allowing for white noise vector errors. The test results are
summarized in Table 9.39.
As the results show, both the "'trace and "'max statistics reject the null of no cointe-
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Table 9.39: Co-integration test: VAR of UK chicken prices inclusive of retail, supply and
marketing shocks 1990.1-2000.12
rank "'trace (prob) "'max (prob)
p==O 125.8** 69.33**
p<=1 56.47** 26.07
p<=2 30.4* 18.25
p<=3 12.15 8.587
p<=4 3.56 3.56
Figure 9-30: Time series of cointegration vector, corrected for short-run dynamics, VAR
of UK chicken prices inclusive of retail, supply and marketing shocks, 1990.1-2000.12.
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gration in favor of at least a single cointegrating vector at 1% significance. Indeed, as the
"'trace statistics indicates, the null of 3 cointegrating vectors does not seem to be rejected
in favor of the alternative of 4 such vectors. However, the "'max statistics fails to reject
the null of a single cointegrating vector in favor of the alternative of two cointegrating
vectors. This suggests that even though potentially, there are three cointegrating vectors,
it is more likely that a single cointegrating vector is identified. In fact, a visual inspection
of the cointegrating vectors points to the existence of a single cointegrating vector which
has error terms that seem to be white noise. This is plotted in Figure 9.30.
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Table 9.40: VAR of UK egg prices inclusive of retail, supply and marketing shocks,
1988.1-1998.12
rank >'trace (prob) >'max{prob)
p==O 64.39[0.125] 28.19[0.211]
p<=l 36.2[0.391] 17.66[0.535]
p<=2 18.54[0.537] 11.53[0.605]
p<=3 7.01[0.583] 6.79[0.523]
p<=4 0.2197[0.639] 0.2197[0.639]
This means that whereas, previously, in the absence of shocks in the coint.egration
regression we could not identify a cointegrating relation between the chicken price pair,
now, in their presence we do identify a unique cointegrating relation.
VAR of UK egg prices inclusive of retail, supply and marketing shocks
For this price pair, the test for cointegration in the presence of the three shocks is con-
ducted assuming a common lag length of 2 which we have chosen using information
criteria and allowing for whit.e noise vector errors. Table 9.40 summarizes the test re-
sults.
As the results clearly indicate, on counts of both the >'trace and >'maxstatistics, the
null of no cointegration cannot be rejected in favor of at least a single cointegration vector
at 1% significance. This means that even in the presence of the three shocks, one cannot
identify a unique cointegrating vector. This suggests that the UK egg price pair do not
cointegrat.e inherently probably because the UK market for eggs is not integrated such
that changes in producer price do not feed through to retail prices and vice versa. This
result seems to be robust to the type of VAR specification.
VAR of UK sugar prices inclusive of retail, supply and demand shocks
The test for cointegration between the UK sugar price pair in the presence of the three
shocks is carried out assuming a common lag of 1 chosen using information criteria and
allowing for vector errors that are white noise. Table 9.41 summarizes the test results.
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Table 9.41: VAR of UK sugar prices inclusive of retail, supply and market.ing shocks,
1994.1-1999.7
rank Atrace(prob) Amax (prob)
p==O 86.13** 40.29**
p<=1 45.83 23.52
p<=2 22.31 14.02
p<=3 8.292 5.699
p<=4 2.593 2.593
Figure 9-31: Time series of cointegration vector, corrected for short-run dynamics, VAR
of UK sugar prices inclusive of retail, supply and marketing shocks, 1994.1-1999.7.
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The results clearly show that, on counts of both Atrace and Amax statistics, the null of
no cointegration is rejected at 1% significance in favor of the alternative of cointegration.
In fact, as both statistics clearly indicate, the null of a single vector cannot be rejected
in favor of at least two cointegrating vectors. This suggests that, given this VAR spec-
ification, a single cointegrating vector can be uniquely identified. Figure 9.31 plots the
residuals of the cointcgrating vector which dance around a zero mean.
This means that. whereas, previously, in the absence of shocks in the cointegration
regression we could not identify a cointegrating relation between the sugar price pair,
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Table 9.42: VAR of UK coffee prices inclusive of supply and marketing shocks, 1994.1-
2001.8
rank Atrace (prob) "max (prob)
p==O 49.85 [0.030]* 33.12 [0.007]**
p<=1 16.72 [0.668] 11.07 [0.649]
p<=2 5.65 [0.738] 4.97 [0.745]
p<=3 0.67 [0.412] 0.67 [0.412J
now, in their presence we can identify a unique cointegrating relation.
VAR of UK coffee prices inclusive of retail, supply and marketing shocks
A cointegration test for the VAR of UK coffee prices inclusive of the demand, supply and
marketing shocks is undertaken assuming a common lag of 1 which is chosen using infor-
mation criteria. Given this VAR specification, the test does not detect any cointegration.
However, given a VAR devoid of the demand shock, the test yields a single cointegrating
vector. Table 9.42 snmmarizes the test results for a VAR of UK coffee prices inclusive of
the supply and marketing shocks.
As the results dearly show, with the given VAR specification, the null of no cointegra-
tion is rejected by both the "trace and Amax statistics at the 5% and 1% significance levels
respectively in favor of at least a single cointegration vector. In fact, the null of a single
cointegrating vector cannot be rejected by both statistics in favor of more than one such
cointegrating vector suggesting that there is a single cointegrating vector. Figure 9.32
plots the errors for the cointegration vector that has been uniquely identified. Except
for the episodes in 1997.7 and 2000.2, the vector errors seem to be well behaved lending
credence to the predictions of the test statistics.
This leads us to the conclusion that whereas in the absence of shocks in the regression
we could not identify a colntegrating relation between the UK coffee price pair, now, in
their presence we can identify such a cointegrating relation. This points to the fact that
the UK coffee prices at the producer and retailer levels tend to co-move only in response
to the supply and marketing shocks.
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Figure 9-32: Time series of cointegration vector, corrected for short-run dynamics, VAR
of UK coffee prices inclusive of supply and marketing shocks, 1994.1-2000.8.
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In this sub-section, we have tested for cointegration for the product pairs, for which we
could not find cointegration in 9.5.2, allowing for retail, supply and marketing shocks. The
results suggest that for five product price pairs, i.e., beef, lamb, chicken, sugar and coffee
price pairs, undertaking the test allowing for these shocks in the regression contributes to
the identification of cointegration. On the other hand, for the egg price pair, undertaking
the test allowing for these shocks does not contribute to the identification of cointegration
suggesting that the market for eggs is not integrated.
9.6 Summary
In this chapter we set out to test the hypothesis that, given information provided by a
price pair alone, a co-integrating relationship in a vertically related market arises as a very
special case rather than in general, arising as it is, under highly restrictive assumptions;
these being that all the vertical stages in the industry are perfectly competitive; that the
industry operates with a constant returns to scale technology; and that the cost share of
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the raw input is unity. With the view to testing this hypothesis, we applied the Johansen
maximum likelihood test for co-integration to 11 UK price pairs in the food and energy
sectors. On the basis of this test, we found co-integration for 4 out of 11 price pairs; i.e.,
potato, fresh fruits, milk and oil. Except for oil, the processing cost for potatoes fresh
fruits and milk is likely to be minimal as the raw input for these products seems to be
the only input which goes into the production of the final product.
As the aforementioned hypothesis implies a constant average price spread for a pair,
i.e., a stationary price spread, we also cross-checked the Johansen co-integration test
results by testing for stationarity of the price spread that corresponds to each of the
11 price pairs. We did this by applying the ADP unit-root test to each of the 11 price
spreads. We found that, except for results for the pork price pair, results for the remaining
other price pairs are consistent with the Johansen co-integration test results. We find
that the price spreads for potato, fresh fruits, milk and oil are stationary while those for
the remaining other pairs are non-stationary.
We thus find that on counts of both the Johansen and ADP unit-root tests, co-
integration is identified only for potato, fresh fruits, milk and oil. This result seems
to support our theoretical prediction that, given information provided by a price alone,
co-integration can be observed only for products for which the cost share of the raw
input is unity, i.e., products for which the cost of processing is minimal. And, obviously,
potatoes fresh fruits and milk are products which are sold in supermarkets as they appear
in their raw form with minimum processing involved suggesting that the cost share of
processing input for these products is minimal. It thus appears that on the basis of
information provided by these price pairs alone, it is possible to establish a long-run
economic relationship between the price series in the pairs.
For the remaining 6 price pairs'", co-integration cannot be observed either because
the price pair do not co-integrate at all (the egg price pair) Of, if they do (beef, lamb,
lOWe do not categorise the pork price pair here because without the shocks the pair do cointegrate.
We thus consider it as a borderline case.
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chicken, sugar and coffee price pairs) they do with the inclusion of sector shocks that are
not only of the same order of integration as the price series in the pair themselves but
are independently related to each price series in the price pair, which is in keeping with
the predictions of theory
The major implication of the above conclusion therefore appears to be that, given only
information on a price pair, the test for co-integration applies to products for which the
processing cost is minimal. For all other product categories, the test for co-integration
has to proceed on the basis of not only information related to both the price series in the
pair but also of information related to shocks, which originate in different sectors of the
vertical market.
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Chapter 10
Conclusion
10.1 Results
In this thesis we have made an attempt to review and evaluate the existing theoretical
and empirical literatures relat.ing to price transmission and identify the existing obvious
research gaps that need filling in. To fill these research gaps we have then made our
contribution to the existing literature by way of developing a theoretical model of price
transmission in vortical market.s assuming market power in both the farm and retail
markets. We have gone further to establish a link between economic theory and co-
integration.
The tasks we have accomplished in this thesis can be categorized into four. The first
task which we have accomplished in chapter 2 of the thesis involved use of an intuitive
(i.e., graphical) approach to explaining changes in the marketing margin, following retail
demand and input supply shocks, assuming that all markets in a vertically-related in-
dustry are perfectly competitive, that inputs are combined in variable proportions, and
that industry technology is characterized by constant returns to scale. We have illus-
trated that despite its simplicity this approach can make reasonable predictions about
movements in the price spread and the degree of price transmission.
Two important conclusions that are drawn from this approach are: (1) that the
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signs and magnitudes of changes in the marketing margin depend on the source of the
exogenous shock; and (2) that, in qualitative terms, the proportion in which inputs are
combined is of secondary importance for the impact of exogenous shocks on changes
in the marketing margin. As our review of the theoretical literature has shown, these
conclusions are consistent with predictions that derive from a more rigorous approach
which operates within the framework of multi-market equilibrium.
The second important task that we have accomplished in chapters 3, 4 and 7 of the
thesis involved an exposition of the rigors involved in modelling price transmission both
theoretically and empirically. This task has not only given us a deeper insight into the
techniques employed by price transmission models but it has also served us a purpose
as a pointer to potential research tasks that can be accomplished in the field. One such
task which was pointed to as a task worth pursuing is modelling the impact of oligopsony
power in the farm sector on the degree of price transmission and evaluating its interaction
with oligopoly power. And this is the third task which we have accomplished in chapter
5 of our thesis.
The major conclusion drawn from this modelling exercise is that, in the presence
of oligopsony power in the farm market and oligopoly power in the retail sector, the
outcome for the degree of price transmission, relative to that in the perfectly competitive
benchmark, cannot be determined a priori without knowledge of the functional forms for
farm supply and retail demand. This is because the degree of price transmission predicted
when oligopsony and oligopoly power interact can be identical to or different from that
predicted when the market is perfectly competitive. But this should not be taken to mean
that by themselves oligopoly and oligopsony power do not impinge negatively on social
welfare either in isolation or in juxtaposition. It has to be noted that, even when they are
behaving as if they were perfectly competitive, the welfare loss that producers often suffer
as a result of their operation cannot be overemphasized. This is particularly relevant in
situations where a highly concentrated industry which exercises market power both in its
relation with consumers and with producers imposes on producers what are commonly
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known as vertical restraints, practices that have negative social welfare consequences.
The third task which we set ourselves in chapter 6 involved simulating the effects of
market power on the degree of price transmission controlling for its interaction with other
determining parameters. The major conclusions that are drawn from this simulation
exercise can be summarized as follows. Firstly, for any given degree and form of market
power, increasing cost share of the farm input and the degree of substitutability between
inputs increases, ceteris paribus, the degree of price transmission. Secondly, for a given
degree of market power, the impacts, on the degree of price transmission, of both the
retail demand and marketing supply elasticities are ambiguous.
The fourth task which we have set ourselves in the eighth and nine chapters involved
making inferences about a co-integrating relation between the prices of the farm input
and the retail product based on the predictions of economic theory presented in chapter
eight and given information provided by the price pair alone. The major inference that
we have drawn from this exercise is that the price transmission coefficient implied by
different models, i.e., perfect competition, oligopoly, and (or) oligopsony power will not
be unique except in very special cases, as it depends on the source of the exogenous shock.
In other words, it is unidentified in the co-integration relation in all cases except where (1)
markets are perfectly competitive; (2) market power operates with a constant mark-up
and mark-down; and (3) the cost share of the farm input is unity. Consequently, under
the given assumpt.ions, farm input and retail prices will never co-integrate in general.
unless the empirical test for cointegration allows for industry-level shocks as suggested
by theory.
In chapter 9, we have attempted to evaluate whether this inference is borne out in
practice. Results for a coint.egration test on a time series of price pairs for the UK suggest
that, given only price information, a long run cointegration relation is identified only for
four price pairs out of eleven. Of the pairs for which a cointegrating relation is identified,
two relate to products for which the cost share of the farm input is likely to be high.
For the remaining other price pairs, except for one, cointegration is identified if the price
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equation on which the empirical test is based allows for industry-wide shocks.
10.2 Limitations
The thesis has set out to model the impact of market power on the degree of price
transmission in a vertically-related industry assuming that market power reflects only
as a distortion of a perfectly competitive pricing behavior where the relationship among
stages of the industry is non-contractual. As several studies have shown, however, market
power can reveal itself in practices that have nothing to do with prices. These practices
thrive in a market environment which is characterized by a contractual relation. As our
literature survey has made evident, vertical restraints are among the most common forms
of market power that thrive in such a contractual environment. If left unchecked these
practices are believed to harm the interest of the public. Indeed, of the 52 practices
that were identified by the UK Competition Commission as characterizing the vertical
relation between retailers' and suppliers, 27 stood to operate against the public interest.
Given that market power reveals itself in such harmful practices, then it follows that
the approach of modelling market power's impact on the degree of price transmission
solely on the basis of price information is bound to be limited in its usefulness. To ap-
preciate this point, say a particular industry faces constant elasticity retail demand and
farm supply functions. Under the given assumption, our model predicts that the degree
of price transmission for this industry is identical to that which one would obtain in a
perfectly competitive industry. This is because the industry does not vary its margin in
response to an exogenous shock suggesting that it behaves as if it were perfectly compet-
itive. In such circumstances, one would expect the industry to be harmless to the public
interest. Assume, now that despite the functional forms of demand and farm supply
which the industry faces, the supplier-retailer relation is characterized by a contractual
relation whereby vertical restraints are common. In this particular instance, the industry
might be judged as operating against the public interest where on grounds of its pricing
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behavior it is not.
The morale of this example is that conclusions drawn about market power's impact
on the degree of price transmission from a model such as we have developed in our thesis
need not be taken as final. They should rather be reinforced with analysis of market
power practices which such a model is not inherently capable of capturing.
A general limitation which our thesis suffers from concerns the aggregation procedure.
Through out the thesis we have aggregated by market shares as others have done in the
literature. But this implies that firms have different market shares, the obvious question
being why? In this setting, some firms are likely to be more efficient than others, due
to differences in costs. This is acceptable in most cases but in the context of price
transmission, the aggregate effect will depend on how firms are affected by the supply
shift which will also be contingent in their cost structure. So, for example, suppose firm
A uses a high proportion of farm inputs and is the market leader compared to firm B. If
there is a shift in the farm supply function, this will affect firm A more than firm B so
that market shares will also change, and hence likely have an effect on price transmission.
Even though the way to get around this problem is to assume a homogeneous oligopoly
i.e. to aggregate by the number of firms, the implication, for price transmission, of a
leader-follower type relat.ionship among firms in an industry still remains unclear.
Issues of market power and the aggregation procedure aside, our model of price trans-
mission is a two-stage model and as such does not treat the processing sector as a separate
stage in the vertical chain of the industry. It rather treats it as part of the retail sector.
The implication is that our model is not able to assess the impact of market power's
presence at the processing stage. This has a strong implication for the nature of infer-
ence regarding the existence of a cointegrating relation between the prices of the farm
input and the retail product that we have deduced from the model. As might be recalled,
given only information relating to the price pair, our model predicts that except under
highly restrictive assumptions, a cointegrating relation between the prices does not arise
in general. In the absence of a model which treats the processing sector as a separate
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entity, our thesis is limited in its ability to answer the question whether the rarity of a
cointegration relation between the price pair is due to the omission of marketing costs
from the cointegration regression.
10.3 Directions for future research
As the limitations of the thesis suggest, our work in the thesis is not by any means
complete. However, the limitations are also pointers to the potential areas of research
that can be undertaken in the future.
One potential area of research that can be undertaken in the future is to model price
transmission allowing for a contractual relation between the supply and retail stages of
the vertical market. It might be of interest to know whether modelling along this line
produces price transmission ontcomes that are any different from those which obtain
when the supplier-retailer relation is modelled based only on prices.
A second fruitful avenue of research that can be pursued in the future involves mod-
eling price transmission in the context of a Stackelberg competition whereby firms are
categorized according to whether they are leaders or followers. It will be interesting to
see whether this has implications for market shares which are nsed for aggregating over
firms.
A third potential area of further research is to model the vertical market as involving
more than two stages such that the processing sector is modelled as a separate entity
rather than as part of the retail sector. Of particular interest might be to assess how
oligopoly power in the processing and retail stages and oligopsony power in the purchase
of the farm input interact to impact on the degree of price transmission.
A fourth area of further research is to develop a structural model to see whether,
given only information by a price pair alone, as inferred from our model, a cointegrating
relation between the prices of the farm input and the retail product, arises only for an
industry for which technology is characterized by constant returns to scale, input and
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output markets are perfectly competitive and the cost share of the farm input is unity.
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